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Abstract
Coping Strategies and Causal Attributions Following Myocardial 
Infarction: A Longitudinal Study.
Coping strategies and causal attributions have been shown to be related to 
recovery and adjustment following illness. Certain coping strategies and 
causal attributions, such as avoidant coping and other blame have been 
found to be related to higher levels of distress while others, like 
behavioural self blame and attention coping have been shown to be related 
to lower distress. There have however, been few longitudinal studies of 
the process. The study described here examined coping strategies, causal 
attributions and levels of distress over a period of 1 year in 91 patients 
following a first myocardial infarction (MI). Coping strategies (measured 
by the COPE), causal attributions (measured by open ended questions and 
a check-hst) and distress (measured by the HAD a measure of anxiety and 
depression with minimal somatic symptoms), were measured within 2 
weeks of discharge and at 2, 6 and 12 months post MI. The main findings 
of the study showed that both coping strategies and causal attributions 
changed over time. Patients were most likely to use attention coping 
strategies early following the illness onset but more avoidant and religious 
coping later on. Patients made fewer attributions as time passed and the 
most commonly reported causal attributions were stress and smoking. 
Results further revealed that both coping strategies and causal attributions 
were either concurrently related to and/or predictive of levels of distress. 
Avoidant coping was related to higher distress at all assessment times. 
Furthermore, both characterological se lf blame and other blame were 
found to be concurrently related to higher distress, with characterological 
self blame also being predictive of subsequent higher distress. These 
findings have implications for care and rehabilitation of cardiac patients as 
they imply that certain causal attributions and coping strategies might be 
problematic as regards post MI distress. This points towards the 
importance of examining and if necessary, altering certain causal 
attributions and coping strategies in order for the patient to gain the best 
possible recovery.
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Introduction.
The scope and concern of this research was to examine how patients 
coped with a first myocardial infarction (MI), what they believed caused it 
(causal attributions) and how these factors interacted with each otlier and 
related to and predicted levels of distress
Coping has been shown to be a key concept in adjustment and recovery 
firom illness, such as MI. Numerous studies have found that different ways 
of coping are related to how patients adjust to illness, in particular how 
distressed they are, anxious and depressed (Jahanshahi, 1991, Cliristman 
et al. 1988). For example, one form of avoidant coping which has been 
named wishful thinking including thoughts and dreams of what miglit have 
been and self-pitying longing for better times, has continuously been 
related to poor adjustment and higher levels of distress (Felton & 
Revenson 1984; Revenson & Felton 1989; Lazarus, 1993a). Other forms 
of coping have on the other hand been related to less distress such as 
information seeking and acceptance (Felton & Revenson, 1984; Carver et 
al. 1993).
Research studies have also found that patients’ causal attributions are 
related to adjustment and recovery firom illness. Blaming others for one's 
illness has repeatedly been related to poorer adjustment and higher 
distress, whereas self-blame has iu most cases been related to less distress 
and better adjustment (Tennen & Affleck, 1990).
As will become evident in the following chapters the literature in this field 
has highlighted the importance of both coping strategies and causal 
attributions in adjustment and recovery fi*om illness, however it is flawed 
with numerous limitations. For example, there is a lack of prospective 
studies, much more is knovm about how coping influences distress at one 
point in time than is known about how it influences distress prospectively. 
This applies equally to causal attribution research. There is also a need for 
better organisation of coping responses i.e., is coping only one dimension 
or are there many different dimensions of coping. Furthermore, there is a 
need for assessment of consistency and inconsistencies in the way people
cope both over time and across different stressful situations which might 
enable researchers to recognise specific ways of coping with an illness 
such as MI (Carver, et al. 1993; Lazarus, 1993b).
The present study aimed to address and examine the above points and 
others both in relation to coping strategies and causal attributions in a 
sample of patients follovring a first MI.
In order to give the reader some backgroimd information on both medical 
and psychological aspects of an MI the thesis begins (chapter 1), by 
explaining the seriousness of the illness. This includes both the 
physiology of an MI i.e., what happens to the body when a person suffers 
an MI (physiological aetiology) but more importantly what the patient has 
to face and cope with and what there is to make attributions for. This part 
will also briefly explain the management of an MI, prospects of recovery, 
long-term complications and prevalence of the disease. This then leads up 
to one of the main scopes and concerns of the present research which 
begins in chapter 2 by a description of coping.
Chapter 2 includes a discussion of the history and theories of coping. It 
gives a general definition of coping and explains what kind of behaviours 
and cognitions are considered as coping. Two main approaches in 
describing coping are discussed and the distinction into coping styles and 
coping strategies illustrated. The main coping assessment and 
measurement techniques are described and the way researchers have 
attempted to define successful and unsuccessful coping explained. 
Chapter 2 also reviews numerous studies on how patients cope with 
chronic illness and includes a specific section on coping with MI. Finally 
it concludes with a general summary of the studies reviewed.
Chapter 3 deals with causal attributions, they are described and 
summarised in the same way as coping was explained in the previous 
chapter. Studies on causal attributions following illness are reviewed, witli 
a special section on self-blame and adjustment and a section of studies on 
attributions following ME.
Chapter 4 explains the aim and hypotliesis of the present study. It also 
gives an outline of the study design, including a description of the study 
participants, and the study procedure.
The study measures use and development are outlined in chapter 5. This 
chapter also includes a description of data coding, data analysis and 
screening.
Univariate analysis and results are described in chapter 6, which is divided 
into smaller parts with discussion of findings in between.
Bivariate and multivariate analysis and results are presented in chapter 7 
including a summary of findings, concluding with a general summary of all 
results.
The last section, chapter 8 gives a summary and discussion of findings 
including ideas about why things happened the way they did, what was 
surprising about the results and how the measures formed. Other points are 
also raised, including theoretical implications, implications for MI 
intervention and rehabilitation and implications for future research.
CHAPTER 1
Medical and Psychological Aspects of Myocardial Infarction.
What happens when a person suffers a myocardial infarction (MI)? Wliat 
is there to cope with and make attributions for?
In order to answer these questions it is important to understand some of 
die physiological aspects of an MI, what happens to the body when a 
person suffers an MI and why it is meaningful to carry out research into 
the recovery process following MI.
One of the first things that comes to mind when thinking of an MI and one 
of the things which makes it meaningful to do research in this field, is the 
prevalence of the disease. It is an illness which in western countries is 
responsible for between third and a half of all deaths and a half to three- 
quarters of all cardiac deaths. MI is the main cause of death in men and 
the second biggest killer in women (Jowett & Thompson, 1989). In 
Britain nearly a third of all male and female deaths are caused by 
myocardial infarction. Although, improved treatment in recent years has 
managed to reduce death rates and the prospects of physical recovery firom 
MI are now reasonably good, the consequences of this disease extend to 
many areas. This not only costs society an enormous amount of money 
every year, both in lost production and treatment costs, it is also widely 
acknowledged that an MI can produce immediate and long term effects 
which are both physical and psychological in nature and affect both the 
patient and their families (Cay, 1982; Coyne et al, 1991; Norman, 1991). 
Before discussing these factors further, lets first consider what myocardial 
infarction actually is.
Myocardial infarction (MI) refers to the process by which myocardial 
tissue is destroyed in regions of the heart that are deprived of their blood 
supply after closure of the coronary artery, or one of its branches, either by 
tlirombus or through obstruction of the vessel lumen by athersclerosis 
(Jowett & Thompson, 1989).
Among risk factors for MI are, genetic factors, high blood pressure, high 
levels of cholesterol, smoking, diabetes, lack of physical activity, obesity 
and stress. Smoking is thought to be the most important risk factor for 
both first and subsequent infarctions (Dauber, 1980). MI and sudden 
death occur two to four times more frequently in smokers than in non- 
smokers. Overall the risk of death from coronary heart disease is twice 
that of non-smokers (Friedman et al, 1979).
The first symptom of an MI is usually chest pain. Pain may be felt in the 
arms or the back and is frequently attributed to indigestion. The physical 
appearance and clinical findings in patients suffering from MI are 
extremely variable and alter with time and the presence of any coexistent 
comphcations (Jowett & Thompson, 1989). The first presentation of MI 
may be sudden death. Up to one-half of all deaths occur in the first hour 
following the onset of symptoms, the care of patients in the first hour is 
therefore of vital importance. Improved care and treatment in recent years 
has managed to cause a decrease in sudden death following an MI 
(Goldman & Cook, 1984, Faller, 1990).
Management of MI is initially aimed at relieving the immediate symptoms, 
with rapid haemodynamic stabilisation, followed by a prompt treatment of 
any ensuing complications. Further treatment includes for example, drug 
treatment of hypertension, dietary or drug treatment of high serum 
cholesterol and advice on stopping smoking, weight reduction and 
increased physical activity. Rehabilitation after MI aims at restoring the 
patient to an optimum level of recovery, including physical, emotional, 
social, economic and vocational. It also aims at preventing progression of 
heart disease. This kind of rehabilitation requires the use of wide range of 
skills from different health professionals including nurse, doctor, 
physiotherapist, occupational therapist, clinical psychologist, dietician and 
social worker. The rehabilitation process should begin when the patient 
enters the hospital and continue after discharge, but this is rarely the case. 
Cardiac rehabilitation programs are still relatively few and many patients 
leave hospital unaware that they have even had a heart attack, let alone 
what this means and what to do about it once they get home (Jowett & 
Thompson, 1989).
As mentioned earlier, recovery from MI is more than just a medical 
problem, complex and demanding social, vocational and psychological 
adjustments are also often required of patients and their famihes (Coyne & 
Smith, 1991). It is evident that having an MI is a very stressful experience 
which attacks both the physical and emotional integrity of the patient. The 
psychological impact can be as, and sometimes more, upsetting than the 
physical effects (Ben-Sira & Ehezer, 1990, Bennett, 1992). Psychological 
and social variables have in fact been found to have utility in the prediction 
of post-infarction adjustment (Mayou, et al. 1978). This leads back to tlie 
original questions of this section, i.e. ’’what might a person who has 
suffered an MI have to cope vrith and why is it important to examine how 
they cope and adjust?”
Myocardial infarction can be regarded as a life event that unexpectedly 
and dramatically interrupts the person’s daily routine. It is a serious 
chronic illness and something people do not recover from within a week or 
so and then forget about (Langosch, 1989). In the majority of cases 
people do not get back to their normal activities until a considerable time 
has passed, usually 2 to 6 months, even a year in some cases, and others 
might never regain their previous level of activities. Having an MI may 
have a number of implications and sometimes disabling effects on the 
patient’s life. The patient may for instance, experience disruption of 
occupational networks, not be able to drive, become less physically fit, 
experience pain and emotional upsets and in some cases the illness might 
require revaluation of long term life plans. In addition the patient has to 
adjust to taking medication and might also have to face some prohibition 
and changes regardiug things like dietary habits, smoking and alcohol 
intake. Changes which are often difficult to bring about are required, such 
as in lifestyle and patterns of family interactions (Krantz & Deckel, 1983; 
Jowett & Thompson, 1989; Langosch, 1989). These issues show that 
apart from having to cope with the fact of experienciug a severely life 
threatening event, as well as having to learn to live with a chronic ilhiess, 
the patient also needs to cope with a number of otlier factors.
How the patient reacts, has been found to play a central role in dealing 
with the stresses of illness. The patient's general reaction, includmg botli 
thoughts and behaviour, has been shown to influence the effects of MI and
other illnesses and to be related to and affect the illness process (Newman, 
1990). This includes effects on levels of pain, disability (Stewart & 
Knight, 1991), distress (Frank et al, 1987; Havik & Maeland, 1988; 
Stanton & Snider, 1993), blood pressure (Warrenburgh et al. 1989), 
social activity (Holmes & Stevenson, 1990) and survival rates (Pettingale, 
1984; Derogatis, et al. 1979; Levenson et al. 1989; Spiegel et al. 1989). 
Beliefs in the effects of how the patient reacts on illness adjustment can for 
example, be seen in many programs which have been set up for people 
diagnosed with cancer and which deal primarily with psychological care, 
with emphasis on group support, health education and stress reduction 
(Lemer & Remen, 1987, Bagenal et al. 1990). In fact, support for the 
importance of the patient’s reactions and ways of coping in cancer has 
been found in intervention studies aimed to enhance coping skills. Recent 
longitudinal intervention studies with cancer patients have shown benefits 
firom programs involving social support, health education, stress 
management and training in coping skills (Fawzy et al. 1990; Cunningham 
et al. 1993; Grahn, 1993). These studies have shown that training in 
coping skills along with other interventions enhanced quality of life in most 
patients (Cunningham et al. 1993), lowered depression and showed 
significantly more use of active-behavioural and active-cognitive coping 
than control groups receiving no intervention (Fawzy, et al. 1990).
Patients cope and adjust to life threatening events like MI with 
considerable variability. Some patients might use denial to avoid thinking 
about it or having to deal with its consequences, whereas others might 
accept it right firom the beginning and get actively involved in 
rehabilitation. These different ways of coping can however lead to 
different adjustment and outcome in a number of areas, in particular in 
relation to levels of distress (Christman et al., 1988).
Anxiety and depression following an Ml are considered among the most 
formidable problems in cardiac rehabilitation (Hackett & Cassem, 1974; 
Langosch, 1989). Depression has been described as a universal response 
to MI which occurs in every patient with symptoms similar to, but less 
severe, than those of a major clinical depression (Hackett, 1985, Garcia et 
al., 1994). Most research suggests that depression is associated with 
poorer post-MI outcomes (Krantz & Deckel, 1983; Frasure-Smith & 
Prince, 1987), and patient’s pre-morbid or trait anxiety has also emerged as
a significant predictor of poor adjustment (Mayou, et al. 1978, Cay et al., 
1973). Considering the established link between coping strategies and 
levels of distress (Christman, et al. 1988), and the link between distress 
and poorer post MI outcomes, it could be of vital importance to examine 
further how coping influences these factors in order to aid the patient's 
recovery process.
The form of coping used by the patient, could however be influenced by 
other factors, such as what they believed caused the ilhiess. The patient is 
likely to be wondering why it happened and why it happened to him/her, 
not someone else. Research has revealed tliat the majority of people with 
life-threatening illness or injiuy make and report ideas about what they 
think has caused their condition (Taylor et al., 1984; Janoff-Bulman & 
Wortman, 1977; Schulz & Decker, 1985; Affleck et al., 1987). What a 
patient thinks might have caused their illness has also been found to be 
related to illness adjustment, in particular to distress (Tennen & Affleck, 
1990). In this case, patients who engage in blaming others for the MI have 
been found to suffer higher levels of distress (Tennen & Affleck, 1990) 
and even higher incidence of reinfarctions (Affleck et al. 1987), whereas 
those who blame their own behaviour have been found to show less 
distress (Janoff-Buhnan & Wortman, 1977), and more lifestyle changes 
which could aid recovery (Naea de Valle & Norman, 1992). Furthermore, 
patients who blame their own character or personality have been found to 
show worse psychological adjustment which could lead to worse recovery 
(Timko & Janoff-Bulman, 1985).
It has also been suggested (Norman, 1991), that patients’ causal 
attributions might have an effect on their willingness to change their 
behaviour, which for MI patients is often necessary. A patient who 
attributes the MI for example, to fate, chance or the wül of God, might not 
see any reason to stop smoking or to change tlieir eating habits, which in 
return could prolong their recovery or result in another infarct. In this 
manner patients’ causal attributions might free them from taking 
responsibility for causes of the illness which might involve lifestyle 
changes that could help the recovery process or prevent a reoccurrence of 
the illness (Linn et al. 1982). On the other hand, the kind of causal 
attributions patients hold could also result in patients blaming themselves 
unnecessarily for illnesses wliich they have no control over, which could
then result in worse emotional reactions and recovery (Taylor, 1983). All 
of these points do however, need further examination.
As has been argued here and previous research findings have suggested, it 
is evident that having an MI is a traumatic life event requiring considerable 
long term adjustment. Furthermore, psychological factors, including both 
patients' coping strategies and causal attributions, have clearly been shown 
to have an effect on recovery from MI. However, research in this field has 
as yet not been able to study the full scope and depth of problems that 
arise, in particular how they might change over time, and most 
rehabilitation programs do not include any psychological counselling 
(Krantz & Deckel, 1983; Jowett & Tliompson, 1989). Health 
psychologists therefore have an important role to play, both in examining 
and explaining how these factors interact, change over time and how they 
could be dealt with in order to aid and improve the patient's recovery. The 
study this thesis is based on and will be described on the pages that follow, 
ahned to do just that, i.e., to provide further understanding of how patients 
cope with a first MI, what kind of attributions they make, how distressed 
they are and how these factors interact with one another and more 
importantly, considering the long term effects and the chronic nature of the 
ilhiess, how these factors change over time.
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of coping, organised in the 
following way:
2.1. Coping.
2.1.1. Definition o f coping
2.1.2. Coping as a trait or style and coping as a process
2.1.3. Coping styles and strategies
2.1.4. Models and theories o f coping
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CHAPTER 2.
Coping Review.
2.1 Coping.
2.1. L Definition o f coping.
The concept of coping has come to play a central role in health 
psychologists' attempts to make sense of peoples different responses to 
illness as well as outcomes in the health and disease process. The first task 
confronting any investigator who wishes to examine persons' attempts to 
cope with chronic disease is to provide a definition of coping. In this 
context the most commonly used definition of coping is that put forward 
by Lazarus and Folkman (1984), where coping is defined as:
''cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific external and/or 
internal demands. Coping is persons efforts to manage demands, 
whether or not the efforts are successful No a priori assumptions are 
made about what is good or bad coping" (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
Coping is commonly associated with positive activities, but in this context 
it is any effort to manage stressful events including people's behaviours 
that seem patently to be maladaptive, such as smoking cigarettes and 
drinking alcohol to excess. In other words, in its broadest sense any action 
and/or cognition which takes place in relation to a stressful event, such as 
a disease or ilhiess, could be considered as an attempt to cope (Murphy, 
1985).
Although the concept of coping defined in this form dates back to the 
1960s and 1970s, coping has a much longer history. Interests in coping 
can be traced back to the psychoanalytic theory of defences, where 
person’s defensive style was looked upon as a way of managing threat. 
Driven from this outlook came the so called hierarchical approach to 
coping. Still with emphasis on defences this approach regarded some 
defences as better or healthier than others (for a review see Haan, 1969). 
This view emphasised coping as an unchangeable trait or style (see 
below). However, iu the late 1970s a new development in both coping
theory and research occurred. Now coping was looked upon as a 
changeable process rather than a trait or a style. These two main 
approaches in describing coping still remain today, although describing 
coping as a process has gained wider research support (Lazarus, 1993a). 
Let’s take a closer look at what these approaches mean and the difference 
between them.
2.1.2. Coping as a trait or style and coping as a process.
The trait oriented approach assumes that coping is primarily a property of 
the person and variations in the stressful situation are of httle importance. 
This approach emphasises stability in coping rather than change. In the 
process oriented approach the context is critical because coping is 
assessed as a response to the psychological and environmental demands of 
specific stressful encounters. This emphasis on the context means that 
particular person and situation variables together shape coping efforts 
(Folkman et al, 1986). In taking the trait view of coping there is little that 
can be done, even in theory, to aid or to prepare a therapeutic intervention, 
people simply have different traits and some traits are better suited to 
manage disease and illness. People who are coifflonted with a disease and 
happen to have the wrong or inappropriate personality are just out of luck. 
The process oriented view of coping on the other hand, at least gives 
some hope that people can be trained to respond differently to situations, 
to make different attributions, or to seek different kinds of information 
(Singer, 1984). The trait oriented approach has been criticised as 
assuming a consistency in behaviour which has not been supported in the 
literature. Research has revealed more information in the direction tliat 
coping is not an individual trait or disposition which is stable over time and 
across different types of stressfld situations. Coping seems to be a 
continuous, transactional process which is modified by experience within 
and between stressful episodes (Cohen & Lazarus, 1979; Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1985; McCrae, 1984; Parkes, 1984; Folkman et al., 1986; 
Aldwin & Revenson, 1987; Bolger, 1990; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; 
Carver et al., 1993).
2,1.3. Coping styles and strategies.
Coping is also divided into coping styles and coping strategies. Coping 
styles refer to traits and are stable properties of personality but coping 
strategies are what people do in a particular situation (state) and refer to 
situation and person, they are specific. An example of a coping style 
would be a trait like hardiness, some individuals would have a lot of it 
while others had less. Coping styles, like the concept of hardiness have 
been examined m relation to outcomes for a variety of stressful 
experiences and the results have shovm their importance in explaining the 
outcome. Although such stable coping styles are important they do not 
paint the complete picture of the way people manage. Coping also 
includes other elements which are referred to as coping strategies and they 
can change over time and across different stressful conditions (Singer, 
1984). Denial for example, is one type of coping strategy, where the 
individual refuses to believe that the stressor exists or tries to act as though 
the stressor is not real. While people’s coping styles are fixed across time 
and circumstances coping strategies are changeable, in other words, 
coping strategies can be referred to as the process of coping. Any 
particular coping strategy can reduce stress in one situation yet be 
remarkably maladaptive in another (Cohen & Lazarus, 1979).
2.1.4. Models and theories o f coping.
One of the leaders in identifying and examining coping as a process is 
Richard S. Lazarus. After a series of studies in the early 1960s, on how 
people protected themselves from threat, Lazarus abandoned the theory of 
ego-defences as the main way of explaining ways of coping. Instead he 
shifted towards a general concept of appraisal. Appraisal was viewed as a 
universal process in which the individual constantly evaluated the 
significance of what was happening (Lazarus, 1993b). The individual 
could make sequences of appraisals for example, they could appraise the 
strength of the event or stressor, their own ability to witlistand it, the 
possible extent of the damage it miglit cause etc. FurÜiermore, the 
appraisal was divided into primary appraisal and secondary appraisal. 
Primary appraisal is the process of being aware of the meaning of an event 
to oneself, it contains judgements about whether the event is irrelevant.
benign-positive or stressful. Appraising an event as irrelevant implies that 
it has no significance for v^ell-being and a benign-positive appraisal 
indicates that the event does not exceed the individual’s resources and 
signals only positive consequences. Stressful appraisals include: 
harm/loss, threat or challenge. Harm/loss refers to injury or damage 
already done, threat refers to a potential for harm or loss and challenge 
includes an opportunity for mastery, growth or gain. Primary appraisal, 
whether it be harm/loss, threat or challenge, is shaped by person and 
situation factors. The most important person factors relevant to primary 
appraisal are beliefs and commitments. For example, beliefs about control 
over the outcome can influence primary appraisal, the same is true for 
commitments as they reveal what is important to and at stake for the 
person. Furthermore, primary appraisal is also influenced by situational 
factors, this includes for instance, the nature of the harm or threat, whether 
or not the event is familiar or novel, how likely it is to occur, when it might 
occur and how clear or ambiguous the expected outcome is. Secondary 
appraisal on the otlier hand, is the evaluation of coping resources and 
options, it is the process of considering a possible response to the threat 
and addresses the question ’’What can I do?” Secondary appraisal 
becomes critical when there is a primary appraisal of harm/loss, threat or 
challenge. In secondary appraisal a number of coping resources are 
evaluated with respect to the demands of the situation. Appraisal of 
control is a part of secondary appraisal, control which could have a 
number of target outcomes including for example, reduction of harmful 
conditions, to tolerate or reduce negative events, to maintain a positive 
self-image, to maintain emotional equilibrium and to continue good and 
satisfying relationships with other people (Folkman, 1984). In this 
context, coping is viewed as any belief or action which is a result of the 
appraisal and evaluation process, which enables the individual to carry out 
the response developed by the secondary appraisal (Smger, 1984). From 
this theory and other research in this field additional ideas and models of 
coping have emerged, such as the Self-regulation model of illness put 
forward by Howard Leventhal et al. (1984). Since this model was used to 
develop one of the main hypothesis the present research is based on (see 
below), some details of the model are presented here.
2.1.5. LeventhaVs Self-regulation model.
This model includes coping as well as many other elements which are of 
importance when examining how people respond to illness. However, for 
the interest of this review only those aspects of the model which directly 
involve the development and processing of coping strategies will be 
described.
The model proposes that people's coping reactions are created on a 
moment to moment basis by a so called information processing system. 
This information processing system blends new information with both 
inherited and acquired codes or memories and in this manner organises 
people's experiences and behaviour. The model also assumes that this 
processing system is divided into two parallel pathways. One creates a 
view or a representation of the illness and it also develops a coping plan in 
order to manage the illness threat. The other is involved in creating an 
emotional response to the threat and moreover develops a coping plan to 
manage these emotions. As the individual adapts to the situation these 
two pathways interact. Furthermore, the processing system works in 
three stages. The first stage produces the representation, the individual's 
thoughts, of the event and the emotions that follow it, the second develops 
and completes a response plan fo r coping with both the event itself and 
the emotions and the third stage includes an appraisal o f coping. This last 
stage determines the effectiveness o f coping i.e., it examines if the coping 
responses have moved the individual any closer to achieving the goals 
which were set by the representation. This appraisal stage feeds back 
information to the preceding stages and in that way it can change the 
coping strategies and/or how the event has been represented. According 
to the model a part of people's representation is what they believe caused 
their illness (their causal attributions) which then could play a part in 
guiding their ways of coping (Leventhal, et al. 1984, Meyer et al., 1985). 
It is from this proposal that the present study drives one of its main 
hypothesis, i.e. that causal attributions will predict patients^ coping 
strategies. However, bearing in mind that the model also suggests that by 
appraising the effectiveness of coping the representation can be changed, 
in that respect coping could influence patients causal attributions as well.
Finally, the model assumes that the processing system is hierarchically 
organised. It works with both real and hypothetical characteristics of an 
illness. For example, in all the stages, (i.e. the representation, coping and 
the appraisal) coping with chest pain includes both real features, tlie pain 
itself, and hypothetical features, the idea that one is having an MI. This 
hierarchical part of the model could however cause either consistency or 
inconsistency between the reality and the hypothetical level. A patient 
might for instance be told that they are physically improving as a result of 
a treatment but at the same time tliey might feel worse (distressed). The 
authors suggest that inconsistency which often arises between different 
coping strategies might be created as a result of tkese different levels of 
representation (Leventhal, et al. 1984).
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Figure 1. Leventhal’s self regulation model. (Copied from Leventhal et al., 1984, page 221).
2.1.6. Classification and dimensions o f coping.
One of the aims of the present study was to examine the dimensions of 
coping, i.e. to assess how and which coping strategies grouped togetlier or 
if they tended to work in isolation. The main way to examine the 
dimensions of coping is to examine and consider coping strategies by 
asking individuals to respond to structured questions on how they would 
handle stressful situations. The responses are then independently 
examined against outcome variables or combined in a statistically 
meaningful way (Newman, 1990; Aldwin & Revenson, 1987).
A well known approach in this area is the one proposed by Folkman and 
Lazarus (1980), which divided strategies into emotion or problem focused 
coping strategies according to how individuals report they respond to 
particular stress provoking situation. Problem focused coping includes 
efforts where the individual is actively doing something constructive about 
the threat, whereas emotion focused coping involves efforts to manage the 
emotional consequences of the threat.
Another approach classifies behaviours into avoidant and attention/non 
avoidant strategies (Suis & Fletcher, 1985). The research literature on 
coping strategies has a variety of terms in referring to avoidant coping, 
among these are denial, distraction, repression and suppression. All these 
strategies have a critical feature in common, they all involve a strategy that 
focuses attention away fi*om either the source of stress or away fi*om one's 
psychological/somatic reactions to the stressor. Attention coping, on the 
other hand is referred to when attention is focused on the source of stress 
and/or one's psychological/somatic reactions to the stressor, including such 
strategies as information seeking and direct action (Suis & Fletcher,1985). 
Overall, there are a number of coping strategies an individual might use in 
confronting a stressful event, but they tend to be grouped together either in 
a statistical meaningfiil way, such as by using factor analysis or as 
theoretically defined (Newman, 1990).
2.1.7. Coping assessment.
After moving away from looking at coping as an unconscious process 
which had to be examined and uncovered by a clinician, towards viewing 
coping as a conscious process, research since the 1970s and 1980s has 
developed a number of coping instruments which assess a variety of 
coping dimensions (Parker & Endler, 1992). Assessment of coping rehes 
now mainly on questionnaires or face to face interviews, including both 
general measures of coping and assessment tools for coping with specific 
illnesses or other stressful situations. With the instruments which are 
specific for an illness it is possible to take account of the specific issues 
that patients have to cope with in that particular illness.
There are a number of different instruments available for assessing hoAv 
people cope with events in their lives. The particular coping strategies 
included in each questionnaire and the number of coping dimensions 
included in each one, can vary across different measures and studies. 
However, as the following coping literature review vnll show, a common 
feature of most of these instruments are the broader categories of coping, 
such as problem focused coping, emotion focused coping, avoidance, 
attention, positive appraisal etc.
The most widely used coping assessment scale is the Ways o f Coping 
Questionnaire (WCQ) developed by Folkman and Lazarus. This scale 
was originally called The Ways o f  Coping Checklist (WCC) and 
developed, using a sample of middle aged people, as a checklist of 68 
items, which described a broad variety of both cognitive and behavioural 
strategies (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Twenty four of those 68 items 
made up a sub-scale of problem focused coping, 40 were emotion focused, 
and 4 items were not scored. Answers were coded on a "yes" and "no" 
response scale. Folkman and Lazarus later (1985) revised this scale, either 
by deleting or rewording unclear items and adding new items, in addition 
the response format was changed, now using a 4 point Likert scale. This 
scale was labelled The Ways o f  Coping Questionnaire (WCQ) and 
included 66 items instead of 68 before. This new scale was administered 
to 198 undergraduate students on 3 different occasions and their responses 
then factor analysed. This gave, after deleting items which did not load 
clearly, a final version of 42 items and 8 scales: confrontive coping (6 
items), distancing (6 items), self-controlling (7 items), seeking social 
support (6 items), accepting responsibility (4 items), escape-avoidance (8 
items), planful problem solving (6 items) and positive reappraisal (7 
items). Six of those factors are considered to reflect emotion focused 
coping, one problem focused coping and the remaining one is a mixture of 
the other two. This instrument can be used either in the form of an 
interview or be self-administered (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Lazarus, 
1993a; also for a review see Cohen, 1987; Parker & Endler, 1992).
The WCQ has been both revised and modified by other researchers and 
factor analysed on a number of occasions (for a review see Cohen, 1987). 
One of the studies which set out to examine the WCQ further, was carried 
out by Vitalino and his colleagues (1985), In a study with 425 medical
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students, they factor analysed the WCQ and the results presented 6 
factors, of which they created the 5 following interpretable coping scales: 
problem focused, seeking social support, se lf blame and two wishful 
thinking scales. This has been referred to as the Ways of Coping 
Questionnaire - Revised.
In their review Parker and Endler (1992), present a comprehensive list of 
the main criticisms the WCQ has come under. This includes for instance, 
that researchers using this measure have frequently found different number 
of factors. This seems to depend on the sample in question or the number 
of items selected. Other points criticised include test - retest reliabilities 
for the WCQ, which have not been presented. Furthermore, researchers 
tend to add or drop coping items on the basis of what hypothesis are being 
examined and, according to Parker and Endler, this is encouraged by 
Folkman and Lazarus. Parker and Endler (1992) do however, point out 
that this is hardly methodologically acceptable when using a standardised 
instrument. In their conclusion the above authors point out that the various 
Ways of Coping measures have considerable theoretical value and have 
been an important contribution to the coping area, both theoretically and 
empirically. However, they also argue that this coping measure has most 
likely been used too often considering its methodological value.
Other coping questionnaires, include for instance, a coping inventory 
developed by Billings and Moos (1981). This instrument was developed 
by asking 194 families, including both partners, to indicate, using 19 items, 
how they had reacted to a recent stressful life event. Responses were 
rated on a yes/no scale. Based on the study findings the authors, using 
face validity, grouped the responses into 3 different categories of coping, 
i.e., active-behavioural coping, avoidance coping and active-cognitive 
coping. Billings and Moos subsequently (1984) revised this coping 
measure, this time using a sample of 424 people suffering from depression. 
This time including 31 items which the subjects were asked to use in order 
to indicate how they had responded to a recent stressful experience. The 
response format was now on a 4 point Likert scale rather than a yes and no 
response. Like before the authors focused on, using item analysis, 
categorising coping strategies into appraisal-focused coping, problem- 
focused coping and emotion-focused coping. This resulted in a scale of 28
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items which were foimd to be related to outcome variables including, 
depression severity, physical symptoms and self confidence.
A number of other coping questionnaires will be mentioned in the 
following review on coping with chronic illness. Several of these 
questionnaires have been based on the WCQ while others have been either 
individually developed or specifically developed for a particular study or a 
particular disease. This includes measures such as, the Coping Strategies 
Questionnaire (CSQ) (Rosenstiel & Keefe, 1983), a 64 item self-report 
measure which requires the respondent to report on how often they use 
different coping strategies. The CSQ has 8 sub-scales: diverting
attention, reinterpreting pain sensations, coping self statements, ignoring 
pain sensations, praying and hoping, catastrophizing, increasing activity 
levels and pain behaviours. In addition the CSQ has two items where the 
subject rates their ability to control their pain. Other questionnaires are for 
instance, the Bernese Coping Modes (Heim et al. 1993), Coping Strategies 
Questionnaire for Sickle Cell Disease, based on The Coping Strategies 
Questionnaire (Gü, et al. 1992), the Medical Coping Modes Questionnaire 
(Feifel et al. 1987a), and the Jalowiec Coping Scale (Jalowiec et al. 1984). 
The Jalowiec Coping Scale includes 40 coping items making up 3 
independent factors, one including confrontive or control oriented coping, 
another emotive or reactive behaviours and the third palliative or passive 
behaviours.
Other instruments have aimed towards measuring one particular aspect of 
coping, such as the Hackett - Cassem Denial Scale (Hackett & Cassem, 
1974). This measure was developed as a semi-structured interview to 
assess denial in patients with myocardial infarction. It examines a variety 
of denial like coping strategies, such as, avoidance, delay in seeking 
treatment, miniinisation and non challenge. Critiques have pointed out that 
by putting together so many different denial like coping aspects the authors 
have overextended the meaning of denial (Cohen, 1987). Furthermore, the 
scale has been criticised for having an unstructured interview schedule 
which could lead to variability in how information is coded and collected 
(Cohen, 1987). Nevertheless, the scale has been found to have predictive 
validity (see coping with MI review).
One of the latest developments based on the Ways of Coping 
Questionnaire is the COPE scale (Carver, et al. 1989). This copmg 
inventory was, according to the authors, developed mainly for 4 reasons. 
Firstly, Carver et al. (1989), argued that even though the distinction 
between emotion focused- and problem focused coping, as the WCQ 
examines them, was an important one, it did not cover all the coping 
strategies an individual might use. This Carver and colleagues based on 
previous research which, using the WCQ, had found that people's 
responses were not just based on emotion vs. problem focused coping, but 
on a number of others as well. Secondly, Carver, et. al. argued that pre­
existing measures of coping did not manage to gain all the information they 
thought was of theoretical importance while assessing coping. Thirdly, 
items in other scales were considered not clear enough. Finally, most 
existing measures were criticised for being empirically based rather than 
theoretically. As a result of this the measure Carver et al. developed, i.e., 
the COPE, covers a broader range of coping strategies than the WCQ and 
other measures have done. It contains 60 items which then make up 15 
different coping scales, 13 based on factor analysis, while 2 were added at 
a later stage for exploratory reasons. It includes both emotion focused and 
problem focused coping as well as other strategies, such as "focusing on 
and venting of emotions", "behavioural disengagement" and "mental 
disengagement". The COPE is now frequently used within health research 
(for example see Carver et al. 1993). This instrument was used for the 
assessment of coping in the present study and will therefore be described 
in more detail later (see chapter 5). Parker and Endler (1992), in their 
review of coping measures, point out that although the factor structure of 
the COPE might need further investigation (for reasons such as: no 
information on how many items were used for factor analysis to get the 
coping scales, items were dropped or factors divided and number of 
factors were based on eigenvalues greater than 1), the COPE’s test - retest 
reliability is well presented and extensive validity information is available 
which shows that the COPE is a multidimensional measure of coping 
strategies.
Questionnaires assessing coping strategies have been criticised for 
methodological weaknesses, including lack of empirical vahdation for sub­
scales, unstable or unsubstantiated factor structure, low internal 
reliabilities and lack of construct validity (Parker & Endler, 1992; Cohen,
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1987). Furthermore, coping check-lists have been criticised for either not 
including enough coping items or for being too long and including items 
that are neither relevant nor appropriate for the study sample (Watson & 
Kendall, 1983, Leventhal & Nerenz 1985). For these reasons it is difficult 
to judge which scale is best or most appropriate. However, as Cohen 
(1987) suggests '7/ie choice o f a coping instrument should depend on 
the type o f situation to be studied, the researcher ^ s goals and conceptual 
framework, the level o f generality desired and the degree to which it 
taps the dimensions o f coping the investigator thinks are most 
important (Cohen, 1987, page 300). Keeping this in mind and making 
use of the latest methodologically soimder coping instruments now 
available, such as the COPE, the researcher should be well equipped to 
carry out empirical work providing better understanding of the coping 
process.
2.1.8. Successful vs. unsuccessful coping.
Researchers have attempted to define successful coping by evaluating 
coping with respect to a variety of outcomes. One way to determine what 
is successfiü and unsuccessful coping has been to measure physiological 
and biochemical functioning. Coping efforts are generally thought to be 
more successful if they reduce arousal and its indicators, such as heart 
rate, pulse and skin conductivity (Taylor, 1986).
Many stressors interfere with the conduct of daily life activities, a second 
criterion of successfiil coping can therefore be whether and how quickly 
people can return to their pre-stress activities. Coping may be judged to 
be successful in relation to what extent people’s coping strategies enable 
them to resume usual activities (Taylor, 1986).
Finally, coping is most commonly judged according to its effectiveness in 
reducing psychological distress. For example, when a person's anxiety or 
depression is reduced, the coping response is judged to be successful . It 
is important to keep in mind that coping efforts may be judged as 
successful according to one criterion but may appear less effective when 
judged by another. For instance, a coping effort, such as denial, may 
reduce psychological distress but also interfere with an individual's abihty
23
to take action against the stressftil event. Coping is a very complex 
process which is best assessed according to a number of different criteria, 
some of these criteria may be affected positively by the coping efforts and 
others negatively (Newman,!990).
In summary, coping is successful if, within the definition, it reduces 
demand and the outcomes are evidence of reduced demand.
2.2. Coping with Chronic Illness.
Numerous studies have been carried out in order to determine the 
effectiveness of different coping strategies on recovery and adjustment to 
illness. Since the purpose of this thesis was to examine the role of coping 
strategies focusing on its relationship with causal attributions and 
psychological distress for a period of 1 year following a chronic illness, the 
research reviewed here will focus on areas of relevance and interest to 
this domain. This includes mainly studies showing the relevance of coping 
in adjustment to illness, in particular in relation to distress. Longitudinal 
studies on coping are reviewed which show how coping might change over 
time and predict psychological adjustment and illness outcome. Some 
cross-sectional studies, showing the relevance of coping are also included. 
The review is organised by type of illness, starting with rheumatoid 
arthritis, followed by studies on coping with cancer, spasmodic torticolhs, 
spinal cord injury, chronic headache, chronic low back pain, chronic pain 
and a final section including studies on coping with MI. Each illness 
review includes sub-headings depending on the outcome under study. 
These particular studies were selected for this review as they are the maiu 
areas which have been studied focusing on coping with chronic illness and 
its relation to illness outcome, in particular to levels of distress.
One of the central questions put forward by research in this area is which 
coping strategies are successful in reducing the impact of the stresses, 
psychological and others, that follow a disease. As wiU become evident in 
this review, a better understanding and knowledge of this issue is essential 
for developing and designing psychological treatments and interventions.
2,2,L Coping and adjustment to illness.
Is coping related to and predictive o f adjustment to rheumatoid arthritis?
Like MI, rheumatoid arthritis (RA) is a chronic illness requiring 
considerable adjustment, largely because of the pain and disability that 
follow this kind of disease. Furthermore, individuals with RA have been 
identified as a medical population at risk for psychological disorder 
(Revenson & Felton, 1989; Zautra et al., 1992).
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A number of studies have examined patterns of coping among patients 
who have suffered from RA for some time. A longitudinal study, carried 
out by Felton and Revenson (1984), studied the significance of coping 
strategies on psychological adjustment in RA and three other chronic 
illnesses, cancer, hypertension and diabetes. The sample consisted of 151 
nonhospitalised patients who were interviewed on 2 occasions, initially 
just after being contacted and again 7 months later. The two coping 
strategies included in this analysis , i.e., wish-fulfilling fantasy and seeking 
information were measured by the Ways of Coping Checklist (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1980). The criteria for evaluating coping included measures of 
adjustment to illness, such as acceptance, dependency and feelings of 
uselessness and a measure of general emotional state, i.e. negative and 
positive affect. The findings showed that coping by seeking information 
(search for information and advice about the illness and its treatment) was 
related to better adjustment but wish - fulfilling fantasy (pining and longing 
for the illness to go away or be over with), was linked with poor 
adjustment, this was the same for all 4 groups of patients. The longitudinal 
findings of the study further showed that coping by wish - fulfilling fantasy 
remained associated with and predictive ofpoorer adjustment.
Felton and colleagues (1984), later reported additional cross sectional 
results from the aforementioned study. This time including 170 patients 
how had suffered from one of those 4 chronic illnesses (hypertension, 
diabetes, cancer and rheumatoid arthritis) for an average of 65 months. 
Coping was assessed like before, using 55 items from the Ways of Coping 
Checklist, in addition 10 items were adopted from previous research 
(Pearlin and Schooler) or developed through a pilot study. The coping 
items were factor analysed providing the following 6 scales: cognitive 
restructuring (efforts to find positive aspects of the illness and opportunity 
for inner growth), emotional expression (expressing emotional strain, for 
example, getting angry or joking), wish-fulfilling fantasy, self-blame 
(blaming oneself in order to avoid accepting the illness as a chronic 
problem), information seeking and threat minimisation (refusal to dwell 
on tlioughts about the ilhiess - put distressing thouglits aside). 
Psychological adjustment was assessed through, acceptance of illness, 
self-esteem and positive and negative affectivity. The main findings of this 
study showed that overall the type of coping strategies used by patients
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witli different illnesses were largely the same. The one exception being 
patients with rheumatoid arthritis who used cognitive restructuring, 
emotional expression and wish-fulfilling fantasy more than others. After 
accounting for type of illness, the results showed that each of the 
psychological adjustment measures was significantly explained by 2 or 3 
coping strategies, explaining up to 11% of the variance. Findings showed 
that coping by cognitive restructuring and information seeking was 
positively related to positive affect and cognitive restructuring was also 
found to be related to higher self esteem. Emotional expression, wish- 
fulfilling fantasy and se lf blame were related to negative affect, lower self 
esteem and less acceptance o f illness. Finally, threat minimisation was 
related to more acceptance o f illness. The authors concluded that these 
results suggested that a modest variation in psychological adjustment could 
be explained by coping strategies. However, particular diseases were not 
exclusively linked with particular ways of coping.
Schussler (1992) when examining three groups of patients (N=205) with 
chronic illness, rheumatoid arthritis, sarcoidosis and coxarthrosis, assessed 
6 months after diagnosis showed similar results. Coping by wishful 
thinking, assessed by the Ways of Coping Checkhst, was found to be 
concurrently related to viewing the illness as enemy, negatively related to 
seeing the illness as a challenge and predictive o f worse health outcome 
assessed 6 months later. Other studies exanodning the effects of coping on 
adjustment to chronic RA (also using the Ways of Coping Questionnaire), 
have further replicated these findings (Parker, et al., 1988; Manne & 
Zantra, 1989). All these studies showed that seeking information and/or 
cognitive restructuring as a coping strategy was associated with better 
psychological well being, but wish - fulfilling fantasy was related to and 
predictive of poorer well being. Felton and Revenson (1984) pointed out 
that the explanation for this could lie in that people with accurate and 
extensive information about how to care for themselves may be better 
informed about the meaning of their symptoms or may engage in more 
appropriate health practices. Wish - fulfilling fantasy, on the other hand 
entails thoughts about what might have been and a self - pitying longing 
for better times, as a consequence this provides no escape from the 
stresses of the illness.
A more recent longitudinal study on coping witli RA, also carried out by 
Revenson and Felton (1989), suggested that strategies of coping, measured 
by six scales derived from the Ways of Coping Questionnaire, in the early 
stages of the illness (a few days following diagnosis) appeared to be 
unable to influence psychological well being, measured by positive affect. 
However, in the later stages of the illness ( 6 - 7  months later) coping 
strategies such as emotional expression, wish - fulfilling fantasy and self 
blame were predictive of poorer outcomes in terms of psychological well 
being.
Variability and stability in coping with rheumatoid arthritis over time.
Other longitudinal studies (Revenson et al. 1991) have shown that the 
pattern of coping with RA changes over time. Some coping strategies 
such as gathering information, seeking spiritual comfort and seeking 
emotional support showing more consistency than others, including 
thoughts about solutions or distraction. Coping with RA has also been 
shown not to change with illness duration (Gunther et al., 1994).
Is coping related to and predictive o f pain and disability in patients with 
rheumatoid arthritis?
How patients cope with RA does not only affect their psychological well 
being but also the extent of their disability and pain. Two recent studies on 
coping with RA have shown this relationship (Newman et al. 1990; 
Stewart & Knight, 1991). Newman et al. (1990), studied how 158 patients 
with RA coped with their illness and how their coping strategies related to 
pain and disabihty. Coping was assessed by a 36 item questionnaire called 
the "Coping with Arthritis Questionnaire". This instrument was developed 
from interviews with patients with arthritis, from specific strategies 
suggested by patients' health care staff and by using the Ways of Coping 
Questionnaire. The results of the study showed that patients who coped 
by confronting the disease, engaged in physical activity and expressed 
their feelings showed lower levels of pain and disability than those who 
used denial, wish - fulfilling fantasy and distraction.
Stewart and Knight (1991), also examining the relationship between 
coping, pain and disability, studied 53 women who had been suffering
from RA less than 7 years. They were approached while attending a 
rheumatology clinic with the follow up interview completed 18 months 
after tlie initial interview. Coping was assessed by the Coping Strategies 
Questionnaire, a 64 item questionnaire including 8 sub-scales (see section
2.1.7.). The findings from this study showed that coping strategies were 
significantly related to concurrent physical disability and pain. 
Furthermore, coping strategies reported m die initial interview were found 
to be predictive o f pain at the 18 months follow up time, which particular 
strategies were predictive was however, not reported.
The final study to be reviewed here on coping with RA is the study carried 
out by Smith and Wallston (1992). This was a longitudinal study on 
adaptation in 239 patients with chronic RA, including an assessment of 
coping and depression. The study spanned 4 years of data collection, 
subjects completed questionnaires which were mailed to their homes eveiy 
6 months for the first 3 years with the final questioimaire being sent at the 
end of the 4th year. Coping with arthritis related pain was assessed by the 
Active and Passive Coping sub-scales of the Vanderbilt Pain Management 
Inventory (Brown & Nicassio, 1987). Active coping in this context is 
defined as attempts to continue to fimction despite the pain, for example 
by ignoring the pain or staying busy. Passive coping on the other hand, 
includes strategies such as going to bed, restricting social activities etc. 
The data analysis of this study included both correlations and path analysis 
which showed a number of interesting relationships and predictions with a 
considerable contribution from ways of coping. These included the use of 
passive coping with pain being related to less initial health status, lower 
life satisfaction, higher levels of depression, more psychological 
impairment and pain and lower internal locus of control beliefs. Further 
analysis showed an appearance of a vicious cycle involving coping, where 
helplessness appraisal and passive coping with pain appeared to feed on 
one another, with the presence of one contributing to an increase in the 
other. Passive coping with pain also appeared to predict increases in 
psychological impairment ( such as, decreased family interactions, 
hobbies, sport, sexual activities, more sleeping, decrease in social 
activities, working and less comforting and helping others), both directly 
and indirectly through its influence on the perceived quality of emotional 
support. Psychological impairment appeared to predict reduced perceived 
competence and to predict increased depression and helplessness
appraisal. In this manner the cycle was completed, involving helplessness, 
passive coping with pain and psychological impairment. These findings 
clearly show the importance of examining coping both over a longer time 
span and in relation to a number of different variables.
On the whole the central findings of this and other research on coping with 
rheumatoid artliritis suggest, as also pointed out by Newman (1993), that 
how individuals cope with their illness affects not only their psychological 
well - being but also the extent of their pain and disability.
Coping and adjustment to cancer.
How patients cope with cancer has been another big area of interest in the 
study of how coping strategies relate to and affect illness recovery and 
adjustment.
Traditionally, post operative cancer patients have been studied in terms of 
how many survive and for how long and in this manner the effectiveness of 
different coping strategies has been evaluated in relation to survival rates. 
However, as the life span of individuals who have been treated for cancer 
increases, an interest in patients quality of life has begim to emerge. 
Although the earlier cancer research concentrated mainly on the quantity 
rather than the quality of life, this research provided a considerable 
contribution to the understanding of the influence of psychological factors, 
including coping, on the development and course of cancer prognosis.
One such study carried out by Greer et al. (1979), examining 69 women 
with early stage breast cancer, showed tliat patients’ coping strategies, 
measured 3 months post operatively, were related to outcome 5 years later. 
Survival rate was significantly greater among those patients who had 
reacted to the cancer by denial or had a "fighting spirit" than among 
patients who had responded with stoic acceptance or feelings of 
helplessness or hopelessness. This same patient population examined 
again 10 years later showed that a favourable outcome was still more 
fi*equent in those who coped by "fighting spirit" and denial compared to 
those coping with stoic acceptance or showing helpless/hopeless response 
(Pettingale, 1984). Derogatis et al. (1979), when studying 35 women with 
metastatic breast cancer found similar results when they compared short
and long-term survivors. The long-term survivors' coping strategies 
involved more suppression or denial o f affect and psychological distress. 
These studies concluded as a likely explanation for these results that the 
kind of psychological response adopted by patients affected their outcome.
Variability and stability in coping with cancer.
How coping with cancer changes over time has also been of interest to 
researchers in this field and is of particular importance to this thesis as it 
was one of the aims of the present study to examine how coping changed 
over time. Heim et al. (1993), examined the variability and stability of 
coping in 74 patients with breast cancer over a period of 3 - 5 years with 3 
- 6 months intervals. Coping was assessed by the Bernese Coping Modes, 
an instrument including 26 different coping modes which are classified as 
behavioural, cognitive or emotion oriented. The overall findings of the 
study were both in favour of stability as well as variability in coping. The 
most stable coping strategies used by these patients over time included, 
attention and care (i.e. getting social support), acceptance - stoicism, 
diversion (attention is directed away from the illness and towards 
something else) and tackling (i.e. seeking information, taking active part in 
thprapy etc.). Variability in coping appeared to depend on the stage or 
time of the illness, with attention - care, acceptance - stoicism and problem 
analysis being the most prominent ways of coping during hospitalisation 
and the operation period. Other coping strategies came into use at later 
stages such as optimism and self - validation during radio- or 
chemotherapy. Coping by acceptance - stoicism did however continue to 
be used at all stages. During rehabilitation and reintegration the above 
coping strategies continued to be used but with a new emphasis on copmg 
by comparing oneself with others who are worse off (relativizing) and 
being helpful to others (altruism). Patients who suffered relapse still 
showing acceptance - stoicism as the most common way of coping, they 
also showed coping by tackling and expressing trust in carers by passive 
co-operation high in the coping rank order. Finally, patients who faced the 
terminal phase, having to cope with the process of dying, mainly showed 
coping by attention, care and religion as well as attempting to play the 
illness down, deny it, minimise or ignore it (dissimulation).
Is coping related to and predictive o f distress in patients with cancer?
Another study (Carver et al. 1993), examined how coping with cancer 
changed over time as well as assessing its relationship with other variables 
including distress. This is the Carver et al. (1993) longitudinal study on 59 
women with early stage breast cancer which is of particular interest to this 
thesis as it measured coping strategies using the COPE questionnant, the 
same instrument as was used in the present research. Coping was 
measured on 5 occasions, 1 day pre surgery, 10 days post surgery, and at 
3, 6 and 12 months follow ups. Patients also reported their overall 
optimism about life and their level of distress. The results from this study 
showed that many coping strategies were used more as an early response 
to the illness but significantly less at later follow ups. These included, 
active coping, planning, use o f religion, seeking social support, restraint 
coping, self-distraction and suppression o f competing activities. 
Acceptance was the most reported coping strategy at all times. The study 
also examined the relationship between coping and levels of distress. This 
analysis found three coping strategies which were significantly predictive 
of lower distress: coping by acceptance, use o f humour and thinking 
positively about the illness were all concurrently related to and predicted 
lower levels o f distress. Other coping strategies did however, predict 
poorer adjustment, with denial and behavioural disengagement (feelings 
of giving up or withdrawing) repeatedly related to higher levels o f  
distress. Optimism and coping strategies were also found to be related, 
optimistic women were more likely to accept the illness and less likely to 
deny it or experience feelings of giving up or withdrawing. Path analysis 
indicated that these three coping strategies {acceptance, denial and 
behavioural disengagement) acted as mediators through which optimism 
was related to distress at different times in the study and to changes in 
distress from one time to another. This study therefore clearly highlighted 
the important role of coping in adjustment to illness. Stanton and Snider 
(1993) in studying women undergoing a biopsy for breast cancer, showed 
further support for the impact of coping on patients' levels of distress. 
Among women who were diagnosed as having cancer, coping by cognitive 
avoidance (wishfiil thinking and turning the situation to others) at pre 
biopsy was found to predict higher levels o f distress both after the positive 
diagnosis and following surgery.
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A cross - sectional study by Dunkel-Schetter and colleagues (1992) 
assessed how coping affected adjustment in a large sample (N=603) of 
patients with cancer. The sample was heterogeneous with respect to type 
and severity of cancer, in all 8 types of cancer were included, with the 
majority of patients suffering from breast cancer (42%). Time since 
diagnosis ranged from newly diagnosed (25% in previous 18 mth) to first 
diagnosed several years ago (70% in previous 5 years, 50% in previous 3 
years). Letters including a 31 page questioniiaire were mailed to each 
participant. The questionnaire consisted of questions concerning the 
following issues: sociodemographic and personal background items, 
information on medical condition, health care providers, social 
networks/support, stress, adjustment, the Ways of Coping Questionnaire 
(WCQ) adopted cancer version and the bipolar version of the Profile of 
Mood States scale. The authors identified a set of specific cancer related 
stressors based on results from previous research, including fear and 
uncertainty about the future, limitations in physical ability, pain, treatment, 
and problems with family and friends related to cancer. Respondents were 
asked to pick the one that had been the most stressfiil for them or identify 
their own. The WCQ was evaluated for its applicability to cancer, 6 items 
were dropped, some were reworded and 4 items added. The respondents 
then answered the WCQ cancer version with the most stressful problem 
they had picked in mind. Factor analysis was carried out on the coping 
data obtaining the following 5 factors: seek and use social support, focus 
on positive, distancing, cognitive escape-avoidance and behavioural 
escape-avoidance. Results showed that the most reported coping strategy 
was distancing, followed by seeking support and focus on positive. 
Assessment of relationships between demographic variables and way of 
coping showed the following results: Younger patients coped more by 
seeking support, focused more on the positive and used more behaviour 
escape-avoidance. Those who were less educated coped more by using 
distancing and cognitive escape-avoidance. Being religious was related to 
more cognitive escape-avoidance coping and more focusing on the 
positive. Participation in support groups was related to more support use, 
more focusing on the positive and more both behavioural and cognitive 
escape-avoidance coping. Living alone was related to more support 
seeking and more behavioural escape-avoidance. Finally, sex was 
unrelated to coping. Other results showed that the specific problem patient 
had identified as coping with was not related to patterns of coping. Type
of cancer did not appear to be related to coping strategies with one 
exception, patients with breast cancer were more support seeking. The 
more time since diagnosis was related to more coping by behaviour 
escape-avoidance. Finally, less emotional distress (assessed by the 
POMS) was related to more coping by seeking social support, more 
focusing on the positive and more distancing. More emotional distress, 
was on the other hand, related to more coping by both behaviour and 
cognitive escape-avoidance. The authors in their conclusion pointed out 
that the fact that distancing was the most reported coping strategy could be 
due to the ambiguity of the outcome of most cancers and the 
uncontrollabihty of the disease. They also argued that as two escape 
avoidance coping patterns, behavioural and cognitive, had not been found 
in community samples, this might suggest that they are primarily a 
response to illness.
Is coping concurrently related to levels o f distress?
Moving on from studies on cancer to other chronic illnesses, but keeping 
with how coping relates to and affects levels of distress, a cross - sectional 
study carried out by Jahanshahi (1991), looked at 67 patients suffering 
from spasmodic torticollis in relation to depression and coping strategies. 
Coping strategies (assessed by the WCQ), were divided into adaptive and 
maladaptive coping on the basis of how they correlated with severity of 
depression. The results of this study showed that wish-fulfilling fantasy 
and religious faith were positively related to depression and therefore 
considered as maladaptive coping strategies. Threat minimisation, 
positive reappraisal, cognitive restructuring and instrumental coping 
were adaptive coping strategies, they all correlated negatively with 
depression.
Another cross - sectional study finding a relationship between coping and 
distress was carried out by Frank et al. (1987). They divided 53 persons 
with spinal cord injury into 2 groups depending on their coping strategies 
(measured by the WCQ) and their health related beliefs. These two 
groups showed a significant difference in psychological distress, with 
those individuals using fewer coping strategies experiencing less 
depression. Whereas the other group which utilised more coping by
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wishful thinking, mixed coping, growth coping and self - blame, showed 
more distress.
Yet another cross - sectional study (Bombardier, et al. 1990), also using 
the Ways Of Coping Checklist Revised to measure coping, found a 
relationship between coping and levels of depression. The participants in 
this study were 101 patients with a wide range of medical and psychiatric 
diagnoses, including chronic headache, low back pain, cardiovascular and 
gastroenterologic disorders and chronic fatigue. The results from this 
study confirmed previous research by replicating the positive relationship 
between coping by wishful thinking, avoidance and se lf - blame and 
higher levels of distress.
Studies, both cross - sectional and longitudinal, on various other chronic 
illnesses, such as sickle cell disease (Thompson et al. 1992; Gil et al.
1992), asthma (for a review see Deenen & Klip, 1993), HIV and AIDS 
(Folkman et al. 1993; Blomkvist et al. 1994; Pakenham et al., 1994), and 
chronic depression (Rohde et al. 1990; Billings & Moos, 1984), have also 
found a relationship between coping strategies and psychological 
adjustment, in particular in relation to more passive, pessimistic or 
avoidant coping and higher levels of distress.
Is coping related to adjustment to chronic low back pain?
A number of studies have been conducted in order to examine tlie role of 
coping strategies in patients suffering from chronic low back pain 
(Harkapaa, 1991; McCrachen & Gross, 1993; Valach, et al. 1990; Valach 
& Toscano, 1993). In a majority of these studies coping has been found to 
be related to health outcome and social adjustment. For example, a cross - 
sectional study by Valach et al. (1990), examining 672 individuals with 
chronic low back pain (CLBP) found coping strategies to be related to 
social adjustment. Social adjustment included assessment of occupation, 
finances, family life, social contacts and social activity. Coping, assessed 
by asking patients about their self attributions for coping, by tackling, 
optimism, preserving composure, acceptance, thought as diversion and 
activity as diversion, were all found to be related to better social 
adjustment. Coping by compensation, passive co-operation, resignation,
social withdrawal, rumination, se lf - accusation and valorisation, were on 
the other hand associated with worse social adjustment.
Other cross - sectional studies on patients suffering from chronic low back 
pain have foimd a relationship between coping strategies and anxiety and 
depression (McCrahen & Gross 1993; Harkapaa, 1991). Harkapaa
(1991), examined the relationship between distress and coping in 476 
chronic low back pain sufferers. Coping strategies were assessed by a 27 
item questionnaire, including both cognitive and behavioural copmg 
strategies, where the subjects themselves assessed how often (1 = never to 
3 = often) tliey used each strategy in dealing with their back pain. 
Harkapaa's results showed that higher distress was related to more use o f  
passive cognitive coping strategies, i.e., hoping and praying and 
catastrohizing thoughts. McCrachen and Gross (1993), studied 165 
patients with chronic pain, mostly low back pain. Coping was assessed by 
the Coping Strategies Questionnaire (CSQ) and the Pain Anxiety Symptom 
Scale (McCrachen et al. 1992), was used to assess pain specific anxiety 
symptoms. This scale includes four 10 item sub-scales measuring, 
cognitive anxiety responses ("i find it hard to concentrate when I hurt"), 
escape and avoidance anxiety ("I avoid important activities when I hurt"), 
fearful appraisals ("I think that if my pam gets too severe it will never 
decrease") and physiological anxiety ("I become sweaty when m pain"). 
The scale is on a 6 point response format from 0 = never to 5 -  always. 
The results from the study showed that cognitive pain coping strategies 
were related to more cognitive anxiety, greater use o f pain behaviours as 
coping was related to escape and avoidance anxiety and finally coping by 
catastrophising was related to overall anxiety symptoms. The authors of 
the study pointed out that these results could indicate that cognitive anxiety 
may inhibit copmg, whereas physiological anxiety may enhance it.
All these studies have been cross - sectional studies and one can therefore 
not make any assumptions about causality. It is impossible to judge 
whether coping led to depression and/or anxiety or vice versa. However, 
another cross sectional study carried out by Weickgenant et al. (1993), 
according to the authors interpretation, pointed towards the possibility that 
coping, as measured fry the Ways of Coping Questionnaire - Revised 
(Vitaliano, et al. 1985), might fre affected fry levels of distress and not the 
other way around. They divided patients with chronic hack pain into two
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groups, those with high scores on depression (n-37) and non - depressed 
patients (n=40) and a third group including healthy control subjects 
(n=40). The results showed that depressed patients reported more use o f  
passive - avoidant coping strategies than did the non - depressed and the 
controls. The authors concluded tliat an over - reliance on passive - 
avoidant copmg strategies was not characteristic of all chronic low back 
pain patients, but seemed to be more likely as a function of depressed 
mood. Although, it is possible to speculate in this manner that depression 
led to passive - avoidant çoping, there is, like in the aforementioned 
studies, no way of knowing what came first i.e., avoidant coping which 
then resulted m depression or depression which then resulted in the use of 
passive - avoidant copmg. More research of this kind is needed in order to 
be wholly conclusive on this matter.
Attention versus avoidant coping and adjustment to illness.
Other studies on coping have focused exclusively on the effectiveness of 
avoidant vs. attention coping strategies. A meta analysis, including a 
number of different studies on coping, including 5 studies on coping with 
MI, was performed by Suis and Fletcher (1985), in order to assess the 
efficacy of these different strategies looking at short term as opposed to 
long term outcomes, such as treatment and rehabilitation. Suis and 
Fletcher defined attention coping strategies as those strategies which 
focus attention on the source o f stress and/or one's 
psychological/somatic reactions to the stressor, these included, high 
somatic concern, active coping, vigilance, reappraisal, high hardiness and 
no diversion. Avoidant coning strategies were on the other hand, defined 
as strategies which focus attention away from  the source o f stress 
and/or one's psychological/somatic reactions to the stressor, including 
for example, denial, low somatic concern, distraction, diversion, blunter 
and avoidance. Studies were included in the analysis if they met the 
following four criteria: a) explicit operationalization of stressor; b)
attention and avoidant strategy conditions that were operationalised; c) 
quantifiable outcome measure and d) reported lengtli of time between 
occurrence of the stressor and measurement. Forty three studies met these 
criteria, 29 were classified as short term, i.e., outcome was measured on 
the day that the stressor occurred, the remaining 14 studies were 
considered as long term, i.e., had an interval of at least 3 days before
adjustment was assessed. Twelve of the short term studies assessed 
attention versus avoidant coping in relation to cold pressure, 1 in relation 
to heat pressure, 1 radiant heat, 2 childbirth, 1 noise, 1 jogging, 1 
treadmill, 1 dynamometer, 3 in relation to distress film, 4 shock, 1 RT task 
and 1 assessed attention versus avoidant coping in relation to coloposcopy. 
Of the long term studies 5 assessed avoidant versus attention coping 
following MI, 4 in relation to surgery, 1 pain, 1 bronchial asthma and the 
remaining 3 examined attention and avoidant coping following various life 
events. The overall results of these analysis revealed that avoidant coping 
strategies were more effective fo r  short term outcomes but attention 
strategies were better in the long term. These results indicate that the 
point in time the effectiveness of coping strategies is assessed is critical, 
therefore stressing the importance of assessing coping at more than one 
time point. The results in relation to the Ml studies included in the 
analysis, showed that for 2 studies attention coping was related to better 
adjustment, as assessed in terms of recurrent MI, survival, return to work, 
cardiological outcome, medical consultation and satisfaction. Two of the 
MI studies favoured avoidant coping in relation to outcome, as measured 
in death, return to work and resumed sexual activity. The 1 remaining MI 
study in the analysis did not favour one strategy over another as assessed 
in relation to depression and blood pressure outcome. These contradicting 
results in the MI studies could be due to the different variables used as 
outcome measures or result from the different interval time points. Future 
studies, as suggested by Suis and Fletcher, need to use comparable 
outcome measures at each point of measure and examine attention and 
avoidant coping immediately following an event and again at later times.
More recent studies have found further support for this "time x strategy" 
hypothesis. A study by Holmes and Stevenson (1990) looked at two 
groups of patients, one with recent - onset pain (less than 4 weeks, n=70) 
and another with chronic pain (more than 6 months, n=70). Their results 
showed that individuals with recent - onset pain using avoidant coping 
strategies (as measured by the Coping Scale by Billings and Moos, 1981), 
were less anxious and depressed, had lower back pain severity and higher 
levels o f social activity. The reverse was true for patients with chronic 
pain, those using attention coping strategies experienced less distress, 
less pain and more social activity. Other studies examining avoidant 
and/or attention coping have fiirther showed the difference of these
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strategies. For instance, in relation to illness adjustment in a sample of 
1198 patients with chronic diseases (hypertension, diabetes and heart 
disease) avoidant coping (assessed by the Coping Scale by Billings and 
Moos, 1981) was found to be related to less adherence with doctors 
recommendations and higher distress (Sherboume et al. 1991). In a 
sample of 73 blood donors avoidant coping, assessed by recording 
subjects thoughts and rating them according to the Billings and Moos 
(1981) Coping Scale, was found to be related to less distress (Kaloupek & 
Stoupakis, 1985). Finally in a study including 150 elderly people 
assessing the effects of life events on health status, using avoidance 
coping, (assessed by the Ways of Coping Questionnaire using a "yes-no" 
response format), as a response to stressful life events was found to be 
related to and predictive o f more health symptoms (Smith, et al. 1990).
2.2.2, Coping and adjustment to MI.
Denial and adjustment following ML
How patients cope with MI has been of interest to health care 
professionals for many years. The earlier empirical studies of patients 
with MI were almost exclusively devoted to the mechanism of coping by 
denial. The study by Froese et al (1974), is among the earlier studies of 
this kind. They looked at two groups of MI patients, deniers (n=19) and 
non-deniers (n=17) (using the Hackett - Cassem Denial Scale), through 
their hospital stay. The aim of the study was to determine if anxiety and 
depression ratings would differ for deniers and non-deniers. The findings 
showed that patients who denied having had an M l were less anxious and 
less depressed than non deniers. Because this study was limited to the 
hospital phase it could not address the question of whether denial is 
adaptive or maladaptive during the post hospital phase. Croog and 
colleagues (1971) in a study of 345 male MI patients did however, find 
that denial was a persistent way of coping. They interviewed patients on 
two occasions, 1 month and 1 year after discharge from hospital and found 
that patients who were classified as deniers in the first interview remained 
deniers 1 year later. The methodology of classifying patients into deniers 
or non - deniers in this study was based on a "no" or a "don't know" 
response to a single question, i.e., "Do you think you have had a heart 
attack?" It is however difficult to know whether the patients were actually
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denying the illness on die basis of this single question. They genuinely 
miglit not have know or not been sure if they had an MI, for example 
through lack of communication with health care professionals.
A more recent study by Levenson et al. (1989) assessed the affect of 
denial on medical outcome in patients with unstable angina during 
hospitalisation. The patients were divided into two groups, one including 
low - deniers (n=23) the other including high - deniers (n=25), as 
measured by the Hackett-Cassem Denial Scale. The results like in 
previous studies, showed a more favourable outcome for high deniers than 
low deniers. Compared to low deniers, high deniers had half as many 
episodes o f angina and were more likely to reach medical stabilisation. 
Furthermore, two myocardial infarctions and one death all occurred in low 
deniers.
A longitudinal study (Havik & Mæland, 1988), measured three aspect of 
denial in 367 patients with MI in regard to medical, social and 
psychological outcome over a period of 3-5 years follow up. Different 
aspects of denial, based on the authors' previous work (Havik & Maeland, 
1986), were measured according to what was being denied, including, 
denial of illness, denial of impact and suppression. Overall results of this 
study showed that low level of denial o f illness was associated with more 
problems related to work, sexual life, physical activities and with a higher 
mortahty rate. High levels of denial o f  impact were related to better 
emotional outcome (measured by levels of anxiety, depression and 
irritability) and also weakly associated with increased mortahty. 
Suppression was only related to self-reported emotional distress. The 
authors pointed out that these results emphasised the necessity of meeting 
different aspects of denial according to what is being denied.
Other empirical studies on how patients cope with MI have found further 
support for the use of denial. Among these is a cross - sectional study 
comparing coping strategies in 223 patients with life - threatening (cancer 
11=74 and MI n=77) and non life - threatening (arthritis and dermatitis 
((n=72)) illness, all patients were interviewed during hospital stay (Feifel 
et al., 1987a). Coping responses were measured by a Medical Coping 
Modes Questionnaire which was developed to measure three fomis of 
coping: confrontation, avoidance and acceptance-resignation. The results
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of this study showed that cancer and the ME patients did not differ 
significantly on any of the three coping scales and they used avoidance 
coping significantly more than coping by acceptance-resignation. 
However, the results did indicate that life - threatened patients (cancer and 
MI) used coping by confrontation significantly more than did non life - 
threatened patients (arthritis and dermatitis). This same study (Feifel et 
al. 1987b) also found that use of acceptance-resignation coping was 
particularly evident in patients with little expectation of recovery and lack 
of hope. Faller (1990), using a semi structured interview based on 
quantitative methodology, in studying 51 patients with MI also found that 
denial, defined as turning attention away from features of threat, was 
present in the majority o f cases.
Another study on two groups of medical patients (MI n=29 and epileptic 
n=16 patients) whose blood pressure (BP) was measured during a stress 
interview, showed a favourable outcome for those patients coping by 
denial of illness. Denial of illness was found to be associated with 
dampening o f cardiovascular arousal during the stressful situation 
(Warrenburg, et al. 1989).
The aforementioned studies indicate tliat an optimal coping strategy for a 
patient with MI would be to strongly deny it (i.e., resulting in less 
distress), but conscientiously follow the rehabilitation instructions. A 
patient who is able to follow this strategy must be able to tolerate the 
dissonance caused by adopting a treatment regime for an illness he/she 
never had. Bearing this in mind, denial could be a problem for cardiac 
rehabilitation, as one most likely needs patients' attention coping for 
success. Maintenance of denial in the post hospital phase could lead to 
non - compliance with medical advice and rejection of rehabilitation 
efforts, mcreasmg the risk of reinfarction (Singer, 1984).
A descriptive study of coping with MI (Scherck, 1992), showed little 
evidence of attempts by patients to deny the existence of the illness as a 
means of copmg. This study looked at patients (N=30) coping during the 
first 3 days of illness, showing that in an attempt to reduce, minimise, 
master and tolerate the demands of this stressful experience, they used 
many and varied coping strategies Among the most used coping 
strategies were optimistic, confrontive, self-reliant and supporting
strategies. This study did however, not examine coping in relation to any 
outcome measures, such as distress like the previous studies.
As with other illnesses, as was pointed out in the previous review, coping 
with MI by denial or avoidance, as the aforementioned MI studies have 
revealed, has in most cases been shown to be adaptive during the early 
stages of the illness but maladaptive in the long term. A study by Agren et 
al, (1993) found further support for this. While examining 36 male 
patients who underwent a coronary bypass surgery over a period of 5 
years, Agren and colleagues (1993), found that those patients, (examined 
preoperatively), who minimised their illness, defined as viewing the heart 
condition in objective non-self terms and as a parenthesis in life, were 
better adjusted (measured in terms of mood, capacity for work and 
everyday activities) than those who confronted, acknowledged and 
accepted the illness. Furthermore, 6 montlis following the surgery, more 
minimisers had returned to work. However, one year after surgery this 
outcome was different, with minimisers facing worse clinical outcome 
than accepters. As the authors pointed out, these results indicated that 
minimising the illness was more adaptive in the short - term, whereas 
confronting, acknowledging and accepting was more successful in the long 
- run, resulting in better clinical outcome.
Are coping strategies related to levels o f distress and other outcome 
following MI?
Other studies on coping with MI have looked further than just denial and 
avoidance and included other coping strategies in their analysis. 
Christman et al. (1988), examined the influence of coping methods on 
emotional distress and uncertainty following an MI. Seventy patients 
were followed up over a period of 4 weeks they were interviewed within 
72 hours of admission to hospital and 1 and 4 weeks after discharge. 
Emotional distress was measured using the Profile of Mood States, a 65 
item mood adjective checklist with responses on a 5 point Likert scale, 
ranging fi*om "not at all" to "extremely". This scale measures levels of 
tension, depression, anger, vigour, fatigue and conftision. Uncertainty was 
measured by perceived uncertainty about symptoms, diagnosis, treatment 
and relationships with caregivers. Coping strategies, assessed by the 
Jalowiec Coping Scale, were divided into control-oriented coping, reactive
coping behaviours and passive coping behaviours. Results showed an 
increase in emotional distress over time and a significant decrease in 
uncertainty at 1 week post discharge but an increase 4 weeks after 
discharge up to the level of uncertainty at pre discharge. The use of 
passive coping behaviours and control oriented coping did not change 
over time, but the use of reactive coping behaviours was significantly less 
1 and 4 weeks after discharge than before discharge. Higher emotional 
distress was significantly related to high levels of uncertainty. Coping 
methods explained a significant amount o f the variance in concurrent 
distress, patients experiencing high levels o f distress used more reactive 
behaviour coping aimed at reducing the distress, e.g. getting mad, blaming 
others, eating or smoking. Both uncertainty and emotional distress were 
associated with less use of control oriented coping behaviours. Patients 
experiencing greater uncertainty used fewer control oriented coping 
behaviours.
A longitudinal study by Terry (1992), examined levels of distress and a set 
of variables (see below) and their relationship with coping strategies in 40 
patients with MI two to three weeks following the infarct and again 3 
months later. Coping was measured by a 12 item questionnaire, derived 
fi'om the coping measure by Billings and Moos (1981), with 6 items 
assessing problem focused coping including both behavioural and 
cognitive efforts directed towards management of the infarct, and 6 items 
measuring emotion focused coping strategies, which could be used to 
improve the emotional distress associated with an infarct. The study also 
included an assessment of coping effectiveness where the patients were 
asked "How well do you think you have coped with the MI?" The results 
showed no support fo r  a relationship between problem focused coping 
and better adaptation, including anxiety, depression, locus of control 
beliefs, self - esteem, quality of family life and disruption to patients 
recreational and social activities. Emotion focused coping on the other 
hand was found to be related to impairment o f adaptation to the MI. This 
included emotion focused coping being related to high levels o f anxiety, 
depression and high levels o f psychological symptomatology (as 
measured by the 12 item General Health Questionnaire), high scores on 
the measure o f disruption o f social and recreational activities and poor 
subsequent ratings o f own coping effectiveness. This study, although 
longitudinal, did not report any predictive analysis of coping strategies.
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Denoilet (1991), also found a marked association between coping 
strategies and psychological distress, in a sample of 178 male cardiac 
patients when assessed at a beginning of a rehabilitation program and 
again at discharge, 3 months later. Coping was defined as negative 
affectivity, examined by the Dutch adaptation of the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory and repression, assessed by Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (MC), this scale was used in order to identify low negative 
affectivity (NA) patients with a repressive coping style . Patients showing 
high negative affectivity initially reported much more psychological 
distress than patients with low negative affectivity and repression, and 
these group differences were maintained at discharge. Patients with low 
negative affectivity and coping by repression, however, did not differ from 
each other at both assessments. Another study by Denoilet and Potter
(1992), in an attempt to outline coping subtypes using the same sample as 
above, this time including 166 men with coronary heart disease, found a 
further support for a relationship between coping and distress. They 
identified 3 subtypes of coping, i.e., negative affectivity, social inhibition 
and self-deception and found them to be significantly related to self reports 
of subjective distress.
Finally, examining coping in relation to wider range of variables a recent 
study by Nolan & Wielgosz (1991), assessed adaptive and maladaptive 
coping strategies, as defined by The Structured Interview which identifies 
copmg responses by means of impatience, hostility and competitiveness. 
The results showed that patients using maladaptive coping, defined as 
type A behaviour pattern, potential for hostility and anger-in, reported 
greater distraction from M I symptoms, more relief-seeking behaviour, 
and greater perceived vulnerability to reinfarction. Maladaptive copers 
also showed delay in seeking medical assistance, which indicates, as the 
authors pointed out, that maladaptive copers may require counselling 
directed at increasing their abihty to monitor and respond to cardiac 
symptoms throughout their recovery.
2.3. Summary of review of coping with chronic illness.
The general conclusion from the studies reviewed here shows that coping 
has been found to be concurrently related to and predictive of adjustment 
to chronic illness. Summary of studies and research findings are presented 
in table 2.3.1. (see page 48-52).
Although different studies have approached assessment of coping in a 
variety of ways, the overall results could be summarised as follows:
Coping strategies change over time (Revenson, et al., 1991; Carver et al.,
1993), with variability in coping related to stage and time of illness (Heim 
et al., 1993). Coping strategies have been found to change over time in 
other areas of study as well, such as in students before and after 
examination (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Bolger, 1990) and in adjustment 
to college (Aspmwall & Taylor, 1992).
Coping strategies are related to and predictive o f pain and disability, in 
particular coping strategies which involve paying attention to the illness 
and its consequences have been found to be related to less pam and less 
disabihty (Newman, 1990; Holmes & Stevenson, 1990; Stewart & Knight, 
1991).
Coping strategies are related to and predictive o f distress levels (Smith & 
Wallston, 1992; Carver, et al. 1993; Stanton & Snider, 1993; Jahanshahi, 
1991; Frank et al. 1987; Bombardier et al. 1990; Harkapaa, 1991; Holmes 
& Stevenson, 1990; Sherboume et al. 1991; Kaloupek & Stoupakis, 1985; 
Froese et al. 1974; Havik & Maeland, 1988; Christman et al. 1988; Terry, 
1992; Denolett, 1991; Denolett & Potter, 1991). Passive or avoidant 
coping strategies were in a majority o f studies (12 out o f 16) related to 
and/or predictive o f higher distress, while attention strategies were 
related to and/or predictive o f less distress.
Avoidant coping is related to better adjustment in the short term but 
attention coping is related to better adjustment in the long term (Suis & 
Fletcher, 1985; Holmes & Stevenson, 1990; Agren et al. 1993).
Coping strategies are related to survival rates, in particular denial and 
fighting spirit which have been found to be related to greater survival rates 
in patients with cancer (Greer et al., 1979; Pettingale, 1984; Derogatis et 
al. 1979).
Coping strategies are related to and predictive o f social adjustment, 
including family relationship, return to work, sexual and physical activity 
(Valach, et al., 1990; Smith & Wallston, 1992; Terry, 1992). Here like 
before, avoidant and passive coping strategies were related to worse 
social adjustment.
Coping strategies are related to and predictive o f health outcome 
(Schussler, 1992; Smith et al. 1990; Agren et al. 1993; Nolan & Wielgosz, 
1991). Overall, avoidant coping and wishful thinking have been found to 
be related to and/or predictive of poorer health outcomes.
Based on these previous coping research findings, and supported by recent 
studies, the study presented here set out to examine the following points:
Does coping change over time (1 year) following MI? Can coping 
strategies be grouped into two broader dimensions o f  coping, Le., 
attention vs. avoidant coping? I f  so, is avoidant coping related to less 
distress in the short term but higher distress in the long term? Are 
coping strategies concurrently related to and predictive o f  distress? 
Finally, do people use different coping strategies when coping with an 
illness then when they cope with other stressful situations in their lives.
On the whole the studies reviewed here have all made a considerable 
contribution to the understanding of the role of coping in illness 
adjustment, however, there is always need for improvement.
For instance, as pointed out elswhere (Cohen & Lazarus 1979; Parker & 
Endler, 1992) and in tliis review, there is a need for more consistency in 
coping assessment tools as well as in the types of outcome variables 
examined. Differences in the ways researchers define and classify coping 
strategies also limits general conclusions. If different investigators used 
similar measures, this would increase the possibihty of obtaining 
rephcation of results.
Furthermore, chronic illnesses are often very complicated and patients 
often have to face a range of difficulties, it is tlierefore important to study 
different aspects of the illness as patients may respond and cope differently 
to each one (Cohen et al, 1986).
Finally, there is a need for more longitudinal studies in this area, in 
particular following MI. Of the 6 longitudinal studies on coping following 
MI reviewed here, only 1 presented predictive longitudinal findings (Agren 
et al. 1993). Because of the duration over which a chronic illness extends 
there is a need to examine how coping strategies may change over time or 
be influenced by time. The repertoire of coping skills may increase over 
time as the individual learns new ways of managing their illness. Time can 
also have an effect on the state of the disease so it might be expected that 
the overall level of stress associated with the illness, would influence ways 
of coping. In order to gain more information on this there is a need for 
broadening the assessment of coping over a longer time span (Newman, 
1990).
The present study tried to meet at least some of these critical points, i.e., it 
is a longitudinal study presenting predictive results, it examines a broad 
range of coping strategies and uses well validated and standardised 
measures (the COPE for coping strategies and the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HAD) to assess levels of distress), instruments which 
are now also wildely used within health research.
Table 2.3.1. Coping and adjustment to chronic Hlness: Summary of research
findings.
Study Type of Study Subjects Outcome Results
Felton & 
Revenson (1984)
Longitudinal
Felton et al. 
(1984)
Cross-sectional 
findings reported
Schussler
(1992)
Longitudinal
151 patients 
with either 
rheumatoid, 
arthritis (RA), 
cancer, diabetes 
or hypertension
170 patients 
same sample as 
above
Acceptance, dependency 
feelings of uselessness & 
negative & positive affect
Acceptance of illness, 
self-esteem and 
negative & positive 
affectivity
205 patients with Illness recovery 
chronic illness, 
chronic RA
sarcoidosis & coxartluosis
Coping by seeking 
information related to 
better adjustment vs. 
wishful filling fantasy 
= poor adjustment.
Coping by information 
seeking, cognitive 
restructuring and threat 
minimisation = better 
adjustment vs. coping by 
wish-fulfilling fantasy, 
emotional expression & 
self blame = poorer 
adjustment. Coping not 
related to type of illness.
Wishful thinking related 
to looking at illness as 
enemy, negatively 
related to lookup at 
illness as challenge & 
predictive of worse 
health outcome.
Revenson & 
Felton (1989)
Longitudinal
Revenson et al. Longitudinal 
(1991)
45 patients 
with chronic RA
Positive affect
Patients with 
chronic RA
No outcome measure, 
assessment of how 
coping changed over time
Coping strategies few 
days following discliarge 
not related to outcome 
but 6-7 mth later coping 
by emotional expression 
wish-fiilfilling fantasy & 
self blame related to 
poorer outcome.
Coping by gathering 
information, seeking 
spiritual comfort & 
emotional support 
= more consistency 
than others.
Newman et al. 
(1990)
Longitudinal 158 patients 
with chronic RA
Pain & disability Coping by engaging in 
physical activity, 
expressing feelings & 
confronting related to 
lower pain & less 
disability.
Stewart & Longitudinal 53 women with Pain & disability
Knight (1991) chronic RA
Coping strategies were 
related to pain and 
disability & predictive 
of pain 18 mth later.
Table 2.3.1. cont. Coping and adjustment to chronic iUness: Summary of
research findings.
study Type of study Subjects Outcome Results
Smith & Longitudinal
Wallston (1992)
Greer et ai. Longitudinal
(1979)
Pettingale (1984) Longitudinal
Derogatis et al. Longitudinal 
(1979)
Heim et al. (1993) Longitudinal
239 patients 
witli chronic RA
Depression, life 
satisfaction & 
psychological impairment
69 women with Survival rates
early stage at 5 year follow up
breast cancer
Same sample 
as Greer 
et al's.
study (1979)
Survival rates 
at 10 year follow up
35 women with Survival rates
metastatic breast
cancer
74 women with 
breast cancer
No outcome measure, 
assessment of how 
coping changed over time
Passive coping with pain 
= more depression, more 
psychol. impairment & 
more pain, also 
predictive of increases 
in psychol. impairment
Greater survival 
rates if  coping by denial 
or fighting spirit than if 
coping by stoic 
acceptance or feelings of 
help- or hopelessness
Same as above.
Long term survivors 
coped more by denying 
or suppressing of affect 
& psychological distress
Most stable coping 
strategies over time = 
attention - care, 
acceptance - stoicism, 
diversion and tackling. 
Variability in coping 
depended on stage & 
time of illness.
Carver et al. 
(1993)
Longitudinal
Stanton & 
Snider(1993)
Longitudinal
Dunkel-Schetter 
et al. (1992)
Cross-sectional
59 women, with 
early stage breast 
cancer
Levels of distress
Women going for Levels of distress 
biopsy for breast
cancer
603 patients with 
one of 8 different 
types of cancer
Emotional distress
Coping by acceptance 
humour & thinMng 
positively related to & 
predicted lower distress 
but denial and behaviour 
disengagement related to 
higher distress.
Coping by cognitive 
avoidance at pre biopsy 
predicted higher levels 
of distress both after 
positive diagnosis and 
following surgery.
Coping by seeking and 
using social support, 
focusing on the positive 
& distancing = lower 
distress vs. coping by 
behavioural & cognitive 
escape-avoidance = 
higher distress.
Table 2.3.1. cont. Cooing and adjustment to chronic iUness: Summary of
research findings.
study Type of study Subjects Outcome Results
Jahanshahi (1991) Cross-sectional
Frank et al. (1987) Cross-sectional
67 patients with Levels of depression 
spasmodic torticollis
53 people with 
spinal cord injury
Levels of distress
Coping bywish-fiilfilling 
fantasy & religions faith 
-  more depression vs. 
coping by threat 
minimisation, positive 
reappraisal, cognitive 
restructuring & 
instrumental coping = 
less depression.
Coping by wishful 
thinking, mixed coping 
growth coping & self 
blame = more distress
Bombardier et al. Cross-sectional 
(1990)
Valach et al. 
(1990)
Cross-sectional
Harkapaa (1991) Cross-sectional
McCrachen 
& Gross (1993)
Cross-sectional
Weickgenant et al. Cross-sectional
(1993)
Suis & Fletcher 
(1985)
Meta-analysis 
including 43 
studies
101 patients with Levels of distress
different illnesses,
chronic headache,
low back pain,
chronic fatigue etc.
672 people witli 
chronic low back 
pain
Social adjustment
476 people with 
chronic low back 
pain
Levels of distress
165 people with Anxiety 
chronic pain
Patients with 
chronic low back 
pain, 37 with high 
depression, 40 non 
depressed and 40 
healthy control 
subjects
Patients with ML 
asthma, pain, 
surgery & other 
people following 
various 
stressful experiences
Levels of distress
Nmnber of different 
adjustment measures, 
including: return to work, 
death, distress, fear, 
tolerance, discomfort etc.
Coping by wishful 
thinking, avoidance & 
self-blame = more 
distress
Coping by generally 
paying attention = 
better social adjustment 
vs. coping by general 
avoidance strategies, 
withdrawal or 
passiveness = worse 
social adjustment.
Passive cognitive 
coping related to 
more distress
Cognitive pain coping 
strategies related to 
more cognitive anxiety, 
pain behaviours as 
coping related to escape 
and avoidance anxiety & 
catastrophising coping 
related to overall anxiety
Depressed patients used 
more passive-avoidant 
coping strategies than 
non-depressed and 
controls.
Avoidant coping more 
effective in the short run 
but attention coping in 
the long run.
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Table 2.3.1. cont. Coping and adjustment to chronic illness; Summary of
research findings.
study Tvne of study Subjects Outcome Results
Holmes & 
Stevenson (1990)
Cross-sectional Two groups of Levels of distress, pain 
patients suffering & social activity 
from pain: 70 witli 
recent onset pain &
70 with chronic 
pain (6-7mth)
Tliose with recent onset 
pain using avoidant 
coping = less distress, 
less pain & more social 
activity. Tliose with 
chronic pain using 
attention coping = less 
distress, less pain & 
more social activity.
Sherboume 
et al. (1991)
Longitudinal 1198 patients Adherence with 
with chronic illness, doctors advice 
i.e., hypertension, & levels of 
diabetes distress 
& heart disease
Avoidant coping related 
to less adlierence & 
higher distress.
Kaloupek & 
Stoupakis (1985)
Cross-sectional 73 blood donors Levels of distress Avoidant coping was 
related to less distress.
Smith et al. (1990) Longitudinal 150 elderly 
people
Health status Coping with a life event 
using avoidance coping 
related to & predictive 
of more health problem
Coning and adiustment to MI: summary of research findings.
Study Tyoe of study Subjects Outcome Results
Froese et al. 
(1974)
Cross-sectional Patients with 
MI, 17 deniers 
& 19 non-deniers
Levels of distress Denial related to less 
distress
Croog et al. 
(1971)
Longitudinal 345 patients 
with MI
No outcome 
measure but 
assessment of 
consistency in 
denial
Patients who were 
classified as deniers 
1 mth after discharge 
remained deniers 1 year 
later.
Levenson et al. 
(1989)
Cross-sectional Patients with 
MI, 23 low 
deniers & 25 
high deniers
Medical outcome High deniers had fewer 
episodes of angina & 
more likely to reach 
medical stabilisation
Havik & 
Maeland (1988)
Longitudinal 367 patients 
witli MI
Sexual and physical 
activity, mortality 
rate, initability & 
levels of distress
Low level of denial of 
illness = more problems 
with work, sex life, 
physical activity & 
h i^ e r  mortality rate. 
High denial of impact = 
less distress, irritability 
& increased mortality. 
Suppression = higher 
distress.
Study Tyne of study Subjects
4.TJU.JU.* #*m  T V *  »
Outcome Results
Feifel et al. 
(1987a)
Cross-sectional 223 men with 
chronic illness, 
74=cancer, 
77=MI& 
77=arthritis & 
dermatitis
Comparing the use 
of coping strategies 
in those 4 different 
patient groups, 
life-threatening vs. 
non-life threatening 
illnesses
Cancer & MI used 
similar coping strategies 
but more avoidance 
coping than non-life 
threatening patients
Faller (1990) Cross-sectional 51 patients with 
MI
No outcome, assessment 
of prevalence of denial
Majority of patients 
used denial coping
Warrenburg 
et al. (1989)
Cross-sectional 29 patients with Cardiovascular arousal 
MI and 16 epileptic
Denial of illness related 
to dampening of 
cardiovascular arousal
Scherck (1992) Cross-sectional 30 patients with 
MI
No outcome measure, 
assessment of how 
patients coped
Most used coping strat. 
optimism, confronting, 
self-reliance & support.
Agren et al. (1993) Longitudinal 36 men before & 
after bypass 
surgery
Mood, return to work, 
capacity to work, everyday 
activities & clinical results
Coping by m inim i^g 
the illness = predictive 
of better adjustment up 
to 1 year but then 
minimising was related 
to worse clinical 
outcome.
Christman et al. 
(1988)
Longitudinal 70 patients with 
MI
Levels of distress Reactive coping: eating, 
getting mad, blaming 
others or smoking = 
related to more distress
Terry (1992) Longitudinal 40 patients with 
MI
Distress, self-esteem, 
quality of life, social 
& recreational activities 
& psychological 
symptomatology (GHQ)
Emotion focused coping 
related to higher distress 
more disruption of social 
& recreational activity,
& more psychological 
symptomatology.
Denolett (1991) Longitudinal 178 male cardiac 
patients
Levels of distress Coping by high negative 
activity related to more 
distress.
Denolett & 
Potter (1992)
Same study as 
Denolett (1991)
166 male cardiac 
patients (same as 
above)
Levels of distress Coping by negative 
affectivity, social 
inhibition & self - 
deception = higher 
distress.
Nolan & 
Wielgosz (1991)
Cross-sectional 201 patients with 
MI
Distraction from MI 
symptoms, relief seeking 
behaviour, perceived 
vulnerability to 
reinfarction & seeking 
medical assistance.
Maladaptive coping 
defined as type A beh. 
potential for hostility & 
anger-in, was positively 
related to all outcome 
variables.
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Chapter 3 presents a literature review on causal attributions, organised in 
the following way:
3.1. Causal attributions.
Page
3.1.1. Definition o f causal attributions 54
3.1.2. Causal attribution theory 5 5
3.1.3. Causal attribution research 55
3.1.4. How do causal attributions relate to adjustment? 56
3.1.5. The nature o f causal attributions 58
3.1.6. Self-blame 60
3.1.7. Characterological versus behavioural self-blame 61
3.1.8. Model o f learned helplessness and characterological 
self-blame 62
3.1.9. Characterological versus behavioural self-blame and 
adjustment to life events 63
3.1.10. Other blame 68
3.1.11. Causal attribution assessment 11 
3.2. Causal attributions and illness.
3.2.1. Causal attributions and adjustment to illness 73
3.2.2. Self blame and adjustment to illness 75
3.3. Causal attributions and myocardial infarction.
3.3.1. Causal attributions and adjustment to MI. 87
3.4. Summary of causal attribution review. 101
CHAPTER 3.
Causal Attribution Review. 
3.1. Causal attributions.
2.1.1. Causal attribution definition.
As has become evident in the previous chapter, stressful events, like 
chronic illness, may produce variable outcomes based on cognitive factors, 
such as coping (problem focused, emotion focused, avoidant, non-avoidant 
etc.). In addition, a person’s beliefs about what caused the event (causal 
attributions), may play a crucial role in the appraisal or representation of a 
stressful event, which then affects the selection of coping strategies used 
and the appraisal of possible outcomes (Folkman, 1984, Leventhal et al. 
1984).
Researchers (Koslowsky et al. 1978; Folkman, 1984; Leventhal et al., 
1984) have pointed out and recognised that the perception and meaning of 
an event are among the most important factors in determining and affecting 
the coping strategies an individual will use. For example, in the case of a 
severe illness, the perception of causation by the patient miglit be of a key 
relevance, as it could influence the steps the patient miglit take in seeking 
treatment, following the doctors advice and participation in rehabilitation 
programs. In other words, it has become evident (Naea de Valle & 
Norman, 1992; Affleck et al. 1987) that patients hold beliefs about what 
caused their illness and these beliefs have been found (Affleck et al. 1987) 
to change throughout the recovery process and have an effect on actions an 
individual might take in response to the illness. Thus for instance, if a 
patient believes that eating fatty foods was a significant factor in causing 
their medical condition they might be motivated, and use as a way of 
coping, actions in order to change eating habits. On the other hand, if the 
patient believed that their illness was caused by fate or chance they might 
not see any reason to engage in behaviour changes which might however, 
be necessary in order to prevent further complications. Research has in 
fact found some support for a close association between blaming ones own 
behaviour and number of lifestyle changes in patients following MI (Naea 
de Valle & Norman, 1992). These points do however, need further 
investigation.
As the following literature review will show, causal attributions, in 
particular self-blame and other blame, have been found to have an effect 
on recovery and adjustment to illness and other events. In this context 
causal attributions are defined as "implicit and explicit causal 
explanations fo r behaviour and/or other events" (Tumquist, et al. 1988, 
p.55). In order to provide some background knowledge about causal 
attributions, causal attribution theory and related ideas are briefly 
described.
5. 7.2. Causal attribution theory.
Attribution theory (Heider, 1958, Kelley, 1967, Wong & Weiner, 1981) 
suggests that when a person is faced with a sudden threat or change in 
their environment, they will initiate a causal search in an attempt to 
understand the reasons for that threat or change. Individuals are thought to 
engage in attributional search in order to understand, predict and control 
threat and this is predicted to be especially important early on in the 
adjustment process. The theory further suggests that people spontaneously 
engage in causal searches when faced with negative, unexpected or 
unusual outcomes and by identifying such causes individuals are able to 
find or give meaning to such events. Furthermore, when an event results in 
a particularly bad outcome the individual will engage more actively in 
attributional search because a more threatening event demands an 
explanation in order to help the individual create a sense of meaning. 
These theoretical approaches of causal attribution theory have been used in 
order to test individuals' reactions and adjustment to stressfiil and 
unpleasant events.
3.1.3. Causal attribution research.
Causal attributions have been an important research subject since the mid- 
sixties both within social and cognitive psychology. Initially, causal 
attributions were examined in experimental settings however, since the 
1970s causal attribution research has focused on experiences of real life 
events, such as severe accidents (Janoff-Bulman & Wortman, 1987), life - 
threatening diseases (Taylor et al. 1984), rape (Janoff-Bulman, 1979), 
unemployment (Ostell & Divers, 1987), exam failure (Follette & Jacobson, 
1987), abortion (Major et al. 1985), divorce (Bradbuiy & Fincham, 1990),
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etc. Research is carried out in order to examine çausal attributions and 
their ftmctions for the cognitive and emotional adjustment to life events. 
The importance of finding reasons or causes for unwanted outcomes has 
for example, been found in parents of children with leukaemia (Chodoff et 
al. 1964), who preferred to blame themselves for their child’s illness rather 
than accept that there is no estabhshed explanation for it. Thus, finding a 
cause for the child's condition was so important to these parents that they 
would rather take the blame for it themselves than accept that there was no 
identified cause.
While recognising that the search for meaning and causes, as suggested by 
attribution theory (Heider, 1958), might be particularly important in 
adjustment and coping with serious illness, a number of studies have been 
carried out including a variety of medical populations (Taylor et al. 1984, 
Janoff-Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Schulz & Decker, 1985; Affleck et al. 
1987). These studies have sought to examine what kind of attributions 
patients make and assess the relationship between causal attributions 
patients make about their illness and their subsequent recovery. Findings 
have revealed that a majority of patients with a life - threatening illness or 
injury make and report attributions about the origin of their condition. 
Attributions also seem to be associated with type of illness, time since 
diagnosis and severity of the disease. Furthermore, as the following 
review will reveal, patients who make attributions have been shown to be 
better adjusted than patients who fail to report any attributions. Finally, 
while some attributions, such as self-blame, were related to good 
adjustment, others were found to be related to poor adjustment, generally 
other-blame.
3.1.4. How do causal attributions relate to adjustment?
The question of how attributions contribute to good or poor adjustment has 
been a matter of interest to scientists for some time. Mainly three factors 
have been hypothesised as mediators between attributional characteristics 
and adjustment. These include preservation of self-esteem (Shaver, 1970), 
maintenance of a perception of justice (Lemer, 1965; Lemer & Matthews, 
1967), and sense or achievement of control (Heider, 1958).
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The first hypothesis put forward by Shaver (1970), uses the term 
"defensive attributions" which focuses on the influence of attributions to 
adjustment by maintaining or enhancing self-esteem. According to this 
hypothesis people’s reactions to negative events are affected by their desire 
to avoid blame for other future misfortunes. This is particularly found in 
people who are observers and have not actually experienced the unwanted 
event themselves. By using such "defence attributions" for example, by 
attributing the event to chance people manage to protect themselves in 
case such an event might one day happen to them. This hypothesis also 
suggests that people are more likely to accept more causal responsibility 
for positive outcomes than for negative ones. Therefore, if one is 
recovering well from an illness one is likely to attribute the cause for the 
recovery to oneself, i.e. preservation of self-esteem. Thus, as Janoff- 
Bulman and Wortman pointed out (1977), defensive attribution theorists 
would predict that people's motivation to maintain a positive self-view 
would lead them to attribute their misfortune to external factors rather than 
to their own shortcomings.
The second hypotliesis for mediation of attribution effects involves 
Lemer's (1965) just world principle. According to this idea people have a 
need to believe that people get what they deserve and deserve what they 
get. Thus, people's reactions to negative events may be affected by a 
desire to maintam a behef in a just world. If people believe that they 
deserve the outcome they received, they will either re-evaluate the event 
and its outcome as positive or blame or feel bad about themselves.
The third hypothesis suggests the influence of perceived control over one's 
self and one's environment (Heider, 1958). Personal sense of control is 
identified as primarily attributing responsibility for events to oneself 
whereas lack of personal control behefs are thought to show attributions to 
powerful others, chance or fate. A support for this mechanism has been 
reported, for example, a study by Martin and Lee (1992), examining a 
variety of process variables connected with an MI, found that individuals 
who perceived the MI as a controllable event utilised more self-blame. 
Heider (1958) suggested that by attributing causality to factors under one's 
own control and therefore most readily modifiable factors, people could 
adjust better to an unexpected event as well as to the threat of it happening 
again. Research examining causal attributions and adjustment to life -
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threatening illness, such as cancer and MI, has found support for this 
(Affleck et al. 1987; Taylor et al. 1984; Ell & Haywood, 1985). However, 
as Tumquist et al. (1988) pointed out, perceived control may not mediate 
attribution - adjustment associations in all circumstances. Attributions 
which increase a patient's perception of control may be more adaptive in 
cases where there is a strong link between people's behaviour and the life 
event. These kind of control beliefs could also be questioned if an event, 
such as an illness, worsened or recurred. Strong control beliefs could in 
such cases be related to subsequent poor adjustment.
3.1.5. The nature o f causal attributions.
Scientists (Weiner, 1979) have also made an attempt to explain the nature 
of causal attributions people make. Weiner and his associates (Weiner et 
al. 1971; Wong and Weiner, 1981) carried out series of experiments where 
subjects were asked to identify causes for various outcomes, usually 
success or failure, in hypothetical situations. As a result of these studies 
Weiner identified three primary attributional dimensions which accounted 
for the majority of reasons people gave for various outcomes. The first of 
these dimensions, labelled locus dimension, is concerned with the source 
of causality, that is, is the cause seen as being within the person 
themselves, some other people or in the situation, in other words, is the 
cause internal or external to the person. The second dimension labelled 
control dimension refers to whether the cause(s) is seen as being under the 
person's own control or as being controlled by others, either people or 
events. The third dimension, stability refers to prediction, will the causal 
factor(s) persist the same or will it change over time, is it seen as stable or 
unstable. Weiner did also identify two other dimensions which have been 
less documented and referred to, these are intention dimension referring to 
responsibility and purpose, and a dimension of generality which is 
concerned with the generalizability of a causal factor to other people or 
situations. These dimensions were found to be related to and affect 
different variables, success for example, was most commonly attributed to 
internal factors, whereas failure was attributed to external factors. The 
stability dimension was most often found to be related to predictability and 
expectancy for change, while the control dimension was related to self­
esteem and the locus dimension was associated with judgements about 
personal characteristics, such as whether the person was considered
helpless or not (Weiner, 1979). Weiner's theory was initially mostly tested 
using hypothetical situations not real life experiences and could therefore 
not be generalised as applying to other than experimental conditions.
In order to examine to what extent Weiner's attribution model would apply 
to medical situations, DuCette and Keane (1984), set up a study where 
they could assess this idea and examined whether attributions patients 
made about tlie cause of their illness affected tlieir recovery. Ninety 
patients undergoing tlioracic surgery were interviewed 6 days post- 
operatively. The patients were asked two open-ended questions: "Why do 
you think you got the disease which required this surgery?" and "What 
reasons can you identify to explain your situation since surgery?" All 
answers were coded by two raters into the 3 dimensions proposed by 
Weiner, Locus dimension which indicated whether the attributions were 
internal or external. Stability, stable or unstable attributions, and Control 
dimension. An assessment of how well patients were doing after surgery 
was obtained from direct observation of each patient's performance, the 
interviews with the patients and information from chart or nursing plans. 
This assessment instrument examined four factors: pulmonary status, 
infection status, activity status and general outcome measure. The results 
from this study showed that those patients who attributed their disease to 
unstable factors showed better recoveries. On the whole the findings 
supported the idea that an attributional search is valuable in 
understanding patients' responses to an illness. Patients who made causal 
attributions indicated that the questions were important, in particular the 
question about why the illness had happened. Furthermore, patients who 
did not have an answer to the two causal attribution questions showed 
poorer recovery than those who did have an answer. It was therefore 
evident at least for those patients that making causal attributions about 
their illness was related to the patient's ability to recover. When testing 
the apphcability of Weiner's theory to this population by coding patients' 
responses, the results showed that only 2 o f his dimensions were necessary 
to account for the majority of the answers, these were the Stability and the 
Control dimensions. DuCette and Keane therefore suggested that little 
would be lost by categorising the attributions patients make about illness 
through a simple two dimensional system: Stability and Control. They 
however, pointed out the need for further research with other patient
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populations in order to see if a modification of the model would be 
necessary.
Traditionally, the attributions people made were categorised in this way 
into broad and global categories like the ones above, in particular into 
either internal or external attributions. Attributing to external causes was 
initially thought to be less disruptive and cause less distress than if one 
attributed to personal and internal causes. However, research results were 
found to be contradicting which led scientists to look at separate 
dimensions of those broader terms. Although these categories are still 
useful and appropriate, researchers have moved on firom a simple 
distinction into internal versus external attributions towards looking at 
causal factors within those broad terms, such as self-blame (an internal 
attribution) and other blame, chance or fate (external attributions) (for a 
review see Antaki & Brewin, 1982). Some of tliose individual attributions, 
m particular self-blame and other-blame have been a subject of a number 
of studies in this area, which have shown them to be related to recovery 
and adjustment in different ways (see below).
3.L6. Self-blame.
Self-blame in its broad definition refers to blaming oneself, both one's 
character and one's behaviour for an event and would thus be categorised 
as a dimension of an internal attribution. Self-blame as a response to an 
unpleasant, unexpected and negative event, such as illness, has received 
considerable attention in the psychological literature and a number of 
studies have examined its effects on adjustment, results have however 
been contradictory. On one hand, self-blame has been associated with 
positive adjustment and coping, for example in accident victims (Janoff- 
Buhnan & Wortman, 1977; Schulz & Decker, 1985), mothers of ill infants 
(Affleck et al, 1982), children with diabetes (Tennen et a l, 1984) and rape 
victims (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). On the other hand, results have shown 
that blammg oneself can also be negatively associated with adjustment or 
be uncorrelated with adjustment outcomes, such as in cancer patients 
(Taylor, et al. 1984), in mothers of diabetic children (Affleck et al. 1985) 
in patients with acute bum wounds (Kiecolt-Glaser & Williams, 1987) and 
in individuals suffering from depression (Beck, 1976). This has led to two 
different views on the role of self-blame in adjustment. One view regards
self-blame as maladaptive, resulting in a lowered self-esteem and a 
correlate of depression (Beck, 1976). The other, views self-blame as an 
adaptive, positive psychological mechanism which is related to and 
enhances a belief in personal control over the outcome, which in turn 
enables people to perceive the causes as modifiable and predictable 
(Kelley, 1967; Chodoff et al., 1964; Janoff-Bulman & Wortman, 1977). In 
an attempt to solve this issue, Janoff-Bulman put forward a theory of two 
types of self-blame which theoretically could have different impact on 
adjustment. He (1979) pointed out that realising that self-blame may be 
both adaptive and maladaptive was the first step towards the verdict that 
there were in fact two different types of self-blame. One type representing 
an adaptive, control-oriented response (behavioural self-blame), the other 
a maladaptive, self-deprecating response (characterological self-blame).
2.1.7. Characterological versus behavioural se lf - blame.
The main distinction between these two self-blame attributions is the 
nature of the focus of the blame; Janoff-Bulman (1979) proposed that 
control related self-blame focuses on one’s own behaviour, whereas 
esteem related self-blame focuses on one's character, an overall view of 
the kind of people individuals perceive themselves to be. The esteem 
related self attributions are referred to as "characterological" self-blame 
(or character self blame) and the control related kind "behavioural" self­
blame (or behaviour self blame). The distinction between these two kinds 
of self-blame attributions can further be seen in the difference between 
ability versus effort attributions. Ability is stable and unchangeable 
therefore individuals who make an attribution to poor ability beheve that 
there is httle they can do to control the situation. Effort, on the other hand, 
is something one can change and control, individuals who make effort 
attributions will therefore beheve that as long as they try harder, they will 
be able to control outcomes in a positive way. According to Janoff- 
Bulman, characterological self-blame corresponds to ability attributions 
and behavioural self-blame corresponds to effort attributions and they have 
very different imphcations for perceived personal control. The primary 
distinction between characterological self-blame and behavioural self­
blame lies however, in the perceived controllability over the factor(s) 
being blamed, with behaviour self-blame being related to greater sense of 
control and character self-blame unrelated to such control beliefs. Janoff-
Bulman further suggested that in blaming one’s behaviour, the individual is 
concerned with the future, in particular how he or she can avoid negative 
outcomes in the friture. This concern for avoidability in the future is 
consistent with the idea of controllability as the basis for behavioural self­
blame. Individuals who engage in characterological self-blame are on the 
other hand more concerned with the past, i.e., what it was about them that 
resulted in a negative outcome.
3.L8. Model o f learned helplessness and characterological s e lf  blame.
A related idea, concerned with controllabihty as well as self-blame, was 
put forward by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978). This is the 
reformulated model of learned helplessness which maintains that after 
repeated, unsuccessful efforts at control the individual will give up 
responding, a term called "learned helplessness". The model suggests that 
when a person finds herselfhimself helpless following a negative event, 
they will ask why they are helpless and the causal attributions they make 
will then determine the generality and chronicity of their helplessness as 
well as their later self-esteem. These attributions can either include behefs 
that the helplessness or the outcome that caused helplessness, is due to 
something about themselves (an internal attribution), or something about 
other people or the environment (an external attribution). The model 
predicts that making external attributions for negative outcomes, buffers 
people's self-esteem. The attributions made can also be either stable or 
unstable, something that is persistent (a stable attribution) or something 
that will change (an unstable attribution). According to the model, people 
who make unstable attributions will find themselves distressed for less 
time. Finally, causal attributions can either be global or specific, i.e., will 
the cause appear in a range of situations (a global attribution), or is it only 
relevant to one particular event (a specific attribution). In this case the 
model predicts that people who attribute to specific causes will not show 
disturbances in as many areas of their lives as those who make global 
attributions. Overall the model predicts that people who make internal, 
stable and global attributions for a negative outcome should show worse 
adjustment. In this context self-blame (an internal attribution), would 
therefore be related to poorer adjustment. The model frnther suggests that 
self-blame in helplessness follows from attributions of failure or other 
events, to causal factors that are controllable. However, Janoff-Bulman
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(1979) pointed out, that the self-blame Abramson and colleagues refer to is 
concerned with self-esteem deficits and self-criticism and therefore 
parallels characterological self-blame, which relates to feelings of lack of 
control. In this manner characterological self-blame is the type of self­
blame that apphes to self-blame in helplessness and could thus lead to 
maladjustment. In fact, studies exarnining the role of helplessness in 
response to illness, such as rheumatoid arthritis, have found beliefs of 
helplessness to be related to poorer health outcomes, greater pain, 
depression and more physical disability (Brown, et al., 1989; Callahan et 
ai., 1988; Nicasso et al., 1993). In light of the studies reviewed earlier, 
showing self-blame (globally defined) either as related to better or poorer 
adjustment, the distinction into behavioural versus characterological self­
blame would support the predictions made by the model of learned 
helplessness as regards self-blame.
3.1.9. Characterological versus behavioural self-blame and adjustment to 
life events.
In order to test the usefulness of the distinction between behavioural and 
characterological self-blame, Janoff-Buhnan (1979) conducted two 
studies. The first was designed to determine whether characterological 
self-blame was a characteristic of depressed individuals and whether it co­
occurred with decreased personal control behefs. Tlie second study aimed 
to identify which type of self-blame, behavioural or characterological, 
would more accurately characterise the reactions of rape victims attending 
rape crisis centers. Causal attributions were assessed in the first study by 
asking participants to read four different scenarios and indicate how much 
they blamed themselves (as a person or behaviour), other people, the 
environment and chance, for the situation described. In the second study 
rape counsellors were asked what percentage of the rape victims they saw, 
blamed themselves either because of the kind of person they were or 
because of their own behaviour. Both of these studies supported Janoff- 
Bulman's two types of self-blame. The first found that depressed 
individuals engaged in more characterological self-blame than non­
depressed individuals, while behavioural self-blame did not differ between 
the two groups, depressed subjects did also report more attributions to 
chance and had less believes in personal control. The second study 
showed that rape victims, as reported by the rape counsellors, were more
likely to respond with behavioural self-blame than characterological self­
blame, which as Janoff-Bulman proposed, could show a motivation to 
maintain control over similar situations in the future.
Another study carried out by Timko and Janoff-Bulman (1985) further 
assessed the distinction into characterological vs. behavioural self-blame, 
this time using responses of 42 women who had undergone a mastectomy 
within 2 years prior to being interviewed. A series of questions 
concerning causal attributions was presented to each woman. This 
included asking questions about the extent to which the subject felt other 
people, the environment and chance were a cause of their cancer. Three 
items represented self attributions for breast cancer, i.e., to what extent 
they thought they got cancer because of the kind of person they were 
physically, because of their personality or because of their past behaviour. 
Two separate questions assessed to what extent the women thought they 
could have avoided getting breast cancer and to what extent they thought 
they personally would be able to avoid a recurrence of cancer. All 
responses were rated on a 11 point scales, ranging from not at all to 
completely. Psychological adjustment was assessed using 3 different 
measurement tools. The Beck Depression Inventory examining 
psychological distress. A scale called Emotions, where each woman was 
asked to indicate to what extent they were experiencing the following: 
anger, ashamed or embarrassed, displeased with self, happy or serene, 
optimistic or hopeful, powerful, strong, in control of events, proud, worthy 
or pleased with self, sad, unhappy or depressed, scared, frightened, 
worried and anxious. Answers were rated on a 11 point scale with 
endpoints labelled not at all experiencing and very strongly experiencing. 
The third indicator of adjustment was a measure of self-esteem, each 
woman rated the extent of their self-esteem on a 11 point scale, ranging 
from extremely low to extremely high.
The main findings of the study regarding causal attributions, showed that 
women who made casual attributions to their own personality and/or to 
other people were less likely to believe that their mastectomy was 
successful in removing all the cancer. Believing that the mastectomy was 
unsuccessful was related to feeling ashamed, being displeased with 
oneself, feeling sad and scared. Furthermore, the relationship between 
behavioural self blame and psychological adjustment was mediated by
perceptions of avoidability of cancer. Future avoidability of cancer was 
associated with perceived past avoidability and past avoidability was 
positively related to behavioural self-blame. Women who felt they could 
have avoided the cancer were most likely to relate that to past behaviours, 
such as having taken the contraceptive pill, not maintained a proper diet or 
having injured the breast. These women were also more likely to believe 
that they could avoid recurrence of cancer, they also reported feeling 
happy and optimistic. Thus, this study supported the distinction into 
behavioural vs. characterological self-blame m relation to adjustment. 
Characterological self blame was related to worse psychological 
adjustment while behavioural self-blame was found to be related to better 
adjustment mediated by perceived avoidability and its related cogniticms.
A number of other studies have been conducted using this distinction into 
behavioural versus characterological self-blame. For example, in a study 
by Tennen et al. (1986) examining self-blame among mothers of infants 
with prenatal comphcations, behavioural self-blame (assessed by an open 
ended question with answers content coded into categories) was found to 
be positively associated with perception of severity of the child's condition 
and with the behef that one could prevent similar circumstances in the 
future. Behavioural self-blame was also foimd to play an indirect role in 
emotional adaptation through its relation to feelings of control over 
recurrence.
Affleck et al. (1985) examined a similar topic to the aforementioned study, 
i.e., mother's behefs about behavioural causes for the condition of their 
developmentally disabled infant. Mothers of 57 infants were interviewed 
on 3 occasions, within 1 month of the infants discharge from hospital and 
9 and 18 months later. Causal attributions were assessed by open ended 
questions and answers were coded independently by two judges into 
behavioural self-blame, other blame and non behavioural causes. Mothers' 
mood state, including anxiety, depression, anger, fatigue, vigour and 
confusion, maternal caretaking perceptions and the quality of the infant's 
home environment were also examined. The results showed that early 
behavioural self-blame was related to greater maternal responsiveness and 
involvement with the child and more effective environmental organisation 
both at 9 and 18 months.
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Another study by Major et al. (1985) examined the role of self - blame, in 
particular the distinction between characterological self-blame and 
behavioural self-blame, in predicting coping and depression after abortion. 
247 women undergoing a first trimester abortion were interviewed one 
hour before the abortion and 30 minutes after the abortion. Women 
(N=99) who returned to the clinic for a 3 week follow-up visit were again 
surveyed concerning mood, ^ticipation of negative consequences and 
depression at that time. Attributions were measured an hour before the 
abortion, by an 18 factor scale where the participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they blamed each factor for their pregnancy. 
These factors characterised 5 categories of blame: self-character, self­
behaviour, other people, the situation and chance. All the items were 
rated on a scales from 1 {not at all) to 7 {totally). Coping outcome was 
measured, (an hour before the abortion and at 3 weeks follow up) in terms 
of physical complaints (the degree to which women were experiencing 
abdominal cramps, nausea, dizziness, pains in the lower back, pains in the 
legs and headache), current active state or mood (the degree to which 
women were feeling happy-sad, anxious-calm, good-bad, regretful-not 
regretful, relieved-not relieved, guilty-not guilty, right-wrong, loss-no loss, 
in control-not in control) and anticipation o f negative consequences 
(worry about future side effects from the abortion and tlie abortion having 
a bad effect on future sexual experiences). All items were rated in the 
same way as the causal attributions, on scales from 1 {not at all) to 7 
{totally). Depression was measured both 30 minutes following the 
abortion and at 3 week follow up, by the Beck Depression Inventory, a 
self administered scale measuring intensity of depression.
The findings of this study showed that behavioural-self blame was 
significantly more prevalent and stronger than other types o f  blame. 
Furthermore, overall internal or self-blame (behaviour plus character) was 
significantly higlier than overall external blame (chance, situation and 
others). The responses for each coping outcome scale were averaged in 
order to get an average physical complaint, mood and anticipation score 
for each subject. Each score could range from 1 (good coping, i.e., no 
physical complaints, good mood and no anticipation of negative 
consequences) to 7 (poor coping). The results showed that the majority of 
women coped very well immediately after the abortion and even better 3 
weeks later. When exanhning the difference between characterological-
self blame and behavioural-self blame and their relationship with coping, 
the results showed that women who blamed their pregnancy on their 
characters coped significantly worse with the abortion than did women 
who did not blame their characters. Furthermore, high characterological 
self blamers were significantly more depressed, anticipated more severe 
negative consequences and tended to have more negative moods than low 
characterological se lf blamers. High characterological se lf blamers also 
tended to continue to cope worse three weeks after the abortion than did 
low characterological self blamers. High and low behavioural self 
blamers however did not differ significantly in their coping responses, 
either overall or on any specific measure, including depression. These 
results thus replicated Janoff-Bulman's (1979) finding tliat 
characterological self-blame, but not behavioural self-blame, differentiated 
depressed fi*om non depressed women. These data were also consistent 
with prior research in showing that external blame is associated with 
poorer coping (Janoff-Bulman & Wortman, 1977, Janoff-Bulman, 1979). 
High situation blamers were significantly more depressed than low 
situation blamers, those who blamed others anticipated more severe 
negative consequences than those who did not blame others and finally, 
high chance blamers tended to experience a worse affective state than low 
chance blamers. These results suggested, as concluded by the authors, 
that it is important to draw a theoretical distinction between 
characterological and behavioural self-blame, because the former is 
maladaptive for coping at least with certain types of negative events, 
whereas the latter is not and this is contrary to earlier reports where self­
blame (globally defined) was found to be either maladaptive or adaptive.
Another study also carried out by Mueller and Major (1989), examined 
283 women undergoing abortion using the same procedure and 
methodology as their previous study, replicated their previous findings and 
showed that low characterological self-blame and low otlier blame were 
related to better adjustment.
There are however, other studies which have not been able to rephcate 
these findings, among these is a study earned out by Kiecolt-Glaser and 
Williams (1987) examining patients with acute bum wounds (this study is 
described in more detail later in this chapter). They found behavioural 
self-blame to be associated with poorer compliance, more pain behaviour
and greater depression. Behavioural self-blame was also foimd to be 
related to greater depression in a study conducted by Meyer and Taylor 
(1986) examming attributions among rape victims. Thus, it could be 
concluded that further studies are needed in order to be wholly conclusive 
when attributing the contradicting results of self-blame (globally defined) 
to two types of self-blame, i.e., behavioural versus characterological self­
blame.
3.1.10. Other blame.
The term other blame, categorised as an external attribution, refers to "the 
belief that another person is the cause o f one^s victimisation or is in 
some way responsible or blameworthy fo r an untoward outcome"
(Tennen & Affleck, 1990, p. 209). In a review paper on this subject, 
Tennen and Affleck (1990) pointed out that although one of the most 
consistent findings in this literature has shown that blaming someone else 
is related to physical impairment and emotional distress, this factor has 
received the least attention. Much more attention has focused on self­
blame despite inconsistent findings. In their paper Tennen and Affleck 
reviewed 25 pubHshed studies which had measured attributions to others 
and adjustment outcomes among people who had experienced a major hfe 
event. A variety of studies were reviewed, including individuals (children 
and adults) who had experienced both acute aversive events and chronic 
conditions, such as mothers of seriously ill infants, patients with MI, 
children with insulin-dependent diabetes, people with rheumatoid arthritis, 
men and women with cancer, accident victims, women having an abortion, 
women who had experienced a miscarriage, people with infertility 
problems, rape victims, school children who had experienced a lightning- 
strike disaster, fire victims and young adults who had recently lost a 
parent. Overall, the studies had sampled responses from people who had 
experienced a wide range of stressful and life-threatening situations.
Causal attributions were mostly measured by content coding responses to 
open ended questions, rating scales or both of these. None of the studies 
examined spontaneous attributions, therefore as Tennen and Affleck 
pointed out, there was no way of knowing if the attributions individuals 
made were a result of a prior causal search or were produced by 
investigators inquiries. Adjustment and outcome was assessed in a
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variety of Avays, including psychological adjustment as reported by the 
victim and/or by health care professionals or observers. Measures of health 
outcomes were also included, assessing disease control, length of stay in 
hospital or complications during hospitalisation, re-hospitahsation and self- 
reports of physical complaints and symptoms.
The overall results from these studies showed that in 22 studies 
participants did perceive another person as a cause and in 17 of these, 
blaming others was associated with less positive adaptation. Otlier-blame 
was in none of these studies found to be related to more positive 
adjustment. Among the 5 studies which did not find an association 
between other-blame and adjustment, 4 found no association between any 
attribution and adjustment and 1 study did not report direct correlations 
between other-blame and adjustment, only a regression statement which 
said that other-blame did not make a unique contribution to adjustment. 
Apart from these 5 studies the overall findings did show a strong pattern 
towards other-blame being consistently related to poorer adjustment.
As a result of this review Tennen and Affleck proposed that this pattern 
demanded an adequate conceptual framework. They then went on to 
search for relevant explanations for these results. The first of these is 
derived from the psycho-dynamic literature which according to Tennen 
and Affleck can be understood as variations on a single theme, i.e., people 
who blame others for their misfortune are considered in some way as less 
mature. Their explanation for the event comes from their pre-existing 
immaturity rather than from the event itself. These theories explain the 
association between blaming others and poor adjustment, either as a result 
of other people not accepting it, as a developmental deficit or as an 
immature defence, such as projection which leads to maladjustment. The 
studies reviewed by Tennen and Affleck however did not include any 
measurement to test psychoanalytic hypothesis and therefore one can not 
conclude that they apply as explanations for these study results.
The second explanation for these results, Tennen and Affleck took from 
two social psychology models: learned helplessness and excuse making. 
The model of learned helplessness would predict, as mentioned earher, 
that people who make external, unstable and specific attributions for a 
negative outcome should show better adjustment. The model does
however, include other-blame as a part of external attributions and as 
Tennen and Affleck pointed out, could therefore not explain the majority 
of the research findings. Excuse theory, put forward by Snyder and 
colleagues (see Tennen & Affleck, 1990), suggests that people try to 
distance themselves as responsible for a negative outcome and they 
therefore shifi; causal attributions fi'om themselves to others, i.e. externalise 
the cause. This theory does predict other-blame to be related to 
maladjustment this is because even though they see themselves as unlinked 
to the outcome they are still faced with a negative outcome. Excuse 
makers must eventually face those whom they blame and therefore the 
benefits of unlinking oneself fi'om the causes are lost and result in poorer 
adjustment.
Tennen and Affleck's point of view is that all of these models and theories 
capture a part of the mechanism that relates other-blame to poor 
adjustment. Nevertheless, they suggest that one must go further and take 
into account at least four aspects of a threatening or negative event which 
could influence whether another person is blamed. These include: the 
presence of another person at the time of the event, the authority, 
knowledge and ability of the other person, the nature of the relationship 
between the victim and the other person and finally the severity of the 
outcome. Taken together the aspects of this idea has found support in the 
literature (Janoff-Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Kiecolt-Glaser & Wilhams, 
1987). There is for example, little evidence for other-blame as a response 
to chronic illness. This could partly have to do with the fact that, with 
chronic illness people are less likely to have a set starting point which they 
can link to another person. Nevertheless, other-blame is worth exaniining 
as a response to illness as evidence shows that it is linked witli poorer 
recovery and adjustment in those who engage in such attributions (Affleck 
et al., 1987; Taylor, et al., 1984).
Tennen and Affleck also predicted that blaming others might interfere with 
adaptive coping strategies. They suggested firstly, that thinking of 
someone to blame might distract an individual from planful problem 
solving. Secondly, that other-blame might affect seeking social support if 
the person who is being blamed is also the potential provider of support. 
Thirdly, that coping by acceptance would be made impossible as it is 
contradictory to other-blame. Finally, they suggested that coping by
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positive reappraisal might be difficult when the negative event is attributed 
to another person. Thus, they hypothesised that blaming others would 
restrict die range of coping strategies available.
3.1.11. Causal attribution assessment.
Subjects in a typical attribution study are asked to complete rating scales 
or provide open ended explanations for events presented in a scenario 
form. A subject might for example, be asked to imagine what causal 
attributions they would make to account for a hypothetical success or 
failure (DuCette and Keane, 1984). Much of the earlier research asked 
subjects to respond to hypothetical situations by indicating how certain 
factors (e.g. luck, effort or ability) might account for the success or failure 
described. The bulk of this research used college students in academic 
situations. When assessing attributions following real life experiences the 
same kind of methodology has been used, relying mostly on rating scales, 
where subjects are given a list of items to choose from, open-ended 
questions about causaUty and spontaneous attributional reports have also 
been used (Tumquist, et al., 1988). Rating scales allow easier 
quantification of attributions. They however limit the subject's choices to 
pre-structured items which may also increase demand effects. Open ended 
questions on the other hand, allow the subject to freely generate causes 
and do not lead to any demand effects. Responses, to both rating scales 
and open ended questions, are then either coded by at least two 
independent judges into categories, such as internal, external, self-blame 
(behavioural versus characterological), other-blame etc., or factor analysed 
in order to produce statistically consistent categories.
It is however, important to use consistent methodology across different 
studies to avoid obscuring consistent trends in causal attributions which 
might result from using different coding procedures. Researchers 
(Tumquist et al., 1988) have also pointed out that the wording of cues used 
to assess attributions could have an effect on the responses given, cues 
such as "Why", "Why me" and "Why do I have this outcome". These 
wordings may reflect different constructs and therefore touch on different 
mediators with adjustment. For example, a response to "Why" would most 
likely reflect causes about the illness/event itself and possibly ideas about 
perceived controllability. A question of "Why me" would however, focus
on the specificity of the illness/event to the individual and beliefs about 
justice. Another area which Tumquist and colleagues (1988) mention and 
might lead to inconsistency in attributional inquiries is the probing 
following open ended-questions. While some investigators would settle 
for one response others m i^ t continue probing the subject which would 
then lead to inconsistent results. In their review on attributional assessment 
Tumquist et al. (1988) concluded that bearing these shortcomings in mind, 
it is not surprising that strong eflfects and consistent findings have not been 
found in the literature on attributions and adjustment to life events, such as 
illness. However, the solution to these problems could lie in using more 
than one method, including assessment of spontaneous attributions, open- 
ended questions and rating scales.
Other researchers (Brickman, et al. 1975) have criticised typical causal 
attribution assessment for not recognising that causes interact with one 
another, that they do not operate in isolation. For example, imagine an 
accident where a car hits a lamppost. This accident might have been 
caused by a failure in the car, which was caused be the driver not having 
the car examined which in tum was caused by the previous owner of the 
car who led the new owner to believe that the car had recently been 
examined. Brickman et al. (1975) proposed that "if information about 
more than one cause is available, the interpretation o f any particular 
cause may be strongly affected by the chain o f events in which it 
embedded^ (Brickman, et al., 1975, p. 1060). A study carried out by 
Blumhagen (1980), examining 103 women suffering from hypertension 
found support for the importance of this idea in identifying causes for a 
medical condition. Causes were seen not to operate in isolation but one 
led to another and resulted in a variety of outcomes. Furthermore, Norman 
(1991) has pointed out the importance of assessing causal chains in 
medical populations, such as in patients with MI or other heart conditions. 
He referred to the evidence which suggests that the causes for heart 
disease do not operate in isolation, instead they interact with each other, 
such as eating fatty food which leads to high levels of cholesterol. In a 
study assessing university students beliefs about the causes for coronary 
heart disease (CHD), Norman (1991) demonstrated that these students 
were able to identify the link between different causes. He then proposed 
that examining causal attributions among CHD patients might highlight 
certain areas which health education professionals could address and more
importantly assessing patients' knowledge about the link between different 
causes could improve strategies to encourage the adoption of new risk 
reducing behaviours. As an example, Norman referred to a smoker who 
wishes to stop smoking. By using the structure of examining causal chains 
in the smoker's causal attributions, Norman suggested that it could be 
possible to identify what caused the smoking. For example, the individual 
might smoke to relieve stress which in tum is caused by demands at work. 
Thus, smoking is not an isolated behaviour, it has both causes and effects. 
Therefore the aim of the health counsellor would be to identify these and 
provide alternative coping strategies.
The importance of examining causal attributions over time has also been 
recognised (Wong & Weiner, 1981; Blumhagen, 1980), but there is a lack 
of longitudinal studies in this area. The ones which have been carried out 
have however, shown that causal attributions tend to change over time 
(Burgess & Hartman, 1986) and predict subsequent adjustment (Affleck et 
al., 1987).
Taking into account the existing methodological criticism outlined above, 
the study presented here attempted to use multiple methods in assessing 
causal attributions. This included assessment of spontaneous attributions, 
open ended questions about causality, rating scales and examination of 
causal chains on 4 different occasions over a period of 1 year.
3.2. Causal attributions and illness.
2.2.1. Causal attributions and adjustment to illness.
As the previous introduction has pointed out, research has revealed that 
patients' emotional reactions to their illness are closely related to the 
attributions they hold. This section reviews studies which have examined 
causal attributions and adjustment to illness. These studies include patients 
with cancer, spinal cord injury, serious bum wounds and a special section 
on patients with MI. The reason for selecting these particular studies 
resides in the fact that they are tlie main areas which have been examined 
with regard to causal attributions following serious illness. Furthermore, 
as one of the aims of the present study was to examine self-blame, this 
review also includes a specific section on self-blame and adjustment.
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Patients often blame themselves unnecessarily for diseases over which 
they have had little control (Taylor, 1983) but, just as often, they do not 
take responsibility for its cause which might involve life-style changes that 
would make some illnesses relatively preventable. For example, a study 
carried out by Linn et al. (1982) showed that terminally ill pulmonary 
cancer patients were significantly less likely to attribute their illness to 
smoking than non-cancer patients. The main purpose of Linn's et al. study 
was to generally describe what patients with different types of late-stage 
cancer (terminally ill) thought about the aetiology of cancer and to 
compare their beliefs with other patients who did not have cancer. 
Patients' beliefs about causes of cancer were measured with a 10 item 
scale covering the following areas: smoking, drinking, diet, inheritance, 
type of occupation, stress, medicines, water, environment, God's will and 
other (anything the person wished to add). The answers were rated on a 4 
point scale, ranging from having no influence on the development of 
cancer to having a strong influence. The results including the 
aforementioned one, showed that cancer patients had significantly lower 
scores on all the 10 items indicating that they did not have as strong beliefs 
as others that any of the factors on the scale were related to development 
of cancer. Cancer patients were however, significantly more willing to 
attribute the disease to the will of God or to genetic factors, whereas the 
non-cancer patients listed environmental factors or diet. Bearing in mind 
that these cancer patients were all terminally ill, these results could mean 
as attribution theoiy suggests, that people would be likely to attribute to 
external factors if they feel they have little or no control over the situation. 
However, contradictory to this previous finding, when type of cancer was 
correlated with causal beliefs, lung cancer patients tended to beheve that 
smoking was a factor and stomach cancer patients believed alcohol and 
diet were associated with cancer. The patients holding these causal 
attributions could simply have been better informed about the causes of 
their cancer or else they might have believed in being able to control these 
factors which could have given them something to hold on to rather than 
having to face the ultimate end.
Attribution theory emphasises the importance of feelings of control over an 
event (Kelley, 196'/). This has indeed been shown to have an effect on 
recovery from illness, for example, Frank et al. (1987) when studying 53
persons with spinal cord injury found that those individuals who relied 
mostly on mtemal attributions of beliefs, i.e. indicating strong feelings of 
responsibility for their health, were better adjusted. The Multidimensional 
Health Locus of Control (MHLC) 18 item self report measure including 3 
scales, intemality, powerful others and chance, was used to assess feelings 
and beliefs of control. Individuals who scored high on this scale were 
found to rely less on coping factors, as measured by the WCQ, and 
showed evidence of less emotional distress, measured by the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI).
3.2.2. Self-blame and adjustment to illness.
Attributions are thought to be made so that individuals feel that they can 
control their environment (Heider, 1958, Kelley, 1967), as a result of that 
attributions made to factors which are under personal control are predicted 
to be more adaptive than attributions made to uncontrollable factors. 
Attributions including self-blame are of a particular importance in this 
respect as they are proposed to be closely connected with feelings of 
control, in particular when one blames their own behaviour. Blaming 
oneself for a negative event is predicted to enhance feelings of control and 
tlierefore the world seems more modifiable and predictable, which in tum 
should lead to better adjustment (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). This has been a 
subject of a number of studies within the illness -attribution literature.
The study carried out by Janoff-Bulman and Wortman (1977) is one of the 
earlier and much referred to study examining the relationship between 
causal attributions, self-blame in particular, and adjustment to a chronic 
condition. The general purpose of this study was to assess the relationship 
between attributions of causality and coping in 29 individuals with spinal 
cord injury. The participants were either paraplegics or quadriplegics as a 
result of an accident which occurred either 1 - 4  months or 8 - 12 months 
prior to the interview. The mean age of the injured individuals was 27 
years, ranging from 16 to 35 years and the majority were males (23 males 
and 6 females). All interviews were carried out in the hôpital and 
included a measure of feelings of control using the Internal-External scale 
developed by Rotter (1966), the Just World scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) 
and a religious attitude scale (Poppleton & PiUdngton, 1963). Causal 
attributions were assessed by asking each person about the percentage of
self-blame for the accident, percentage of blame to others, to 
environmental factors and to chance. The amount of perceived 
avoidability was assessed by an open question asking "To what extent do 
you believe you could have avoided what happened", answers were rated 
on a scale from 1 "not at all" to 5 "completely". The respondents were 
also asked whether they had ever asked the question "Why me?" and if 
tliey had done so they were asked to indicate how they had answered it. 
Finally, how the patient was coping with their disability was assessed by 
asking the social worker assigned to each patient and one nurse who knew 
the patients well to rate him or her on a 16 point scale with 1 "coped very 
poorly" and 16 "coped extremely well". Prior to the study 20 social 
workers and nurses were asked how they would define good and poor 
coping. The following definition was provided with considerable 
agreement: Patients who were thought to be coping well were described 
as those who had accepted the reality of their injury and were attempting 
to deal positively with the paralysis. Furthermore, patients who had a 
positive attitude toward physical therapy, who were motivated to work 
towards improvement of their physical abilities and those who showed a 
desire to be as physically independent as possible were also thought to be 
coping well. Patients were thought to be coping poorly if they denied the 
extent of their injuries despite medical evidence to the contrary, if they 
denied how much had to be done for rehabilitation and/or were expecting 
to get better miraculously, and finally if they showed no interest in 
improving their condition and/or showed no interest m attending physical 
therapy sessions.
The results from this study showed that individuals were most likely to 
blame themselves i f  they thought they could have avoided the accident, i f  
there were no others involved and i f  they were very religious. Time smce 
the accident happened seemed to have some effect on attributions with 
respondents placing more blame on environmental factors if longer time 
had passed. Circumstances of the accident also seemed to have an effect 
on attributions, i f  another person had been involved other blame was 
more likely to occur. Wlien exanimmg the relationship between causal 
attributions and copmg outcome, the results revealed that the more the 
patients blamed another and/or the more they thought they could have 
avoided the accident the worse they coped. Blaming oneself was 
however, related to better coping outcome. These results were however,
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a bit surprising as the authors pointed out, in hght of the fact that feeling 
that one could have avoided the accident was positively correlated to self­
blame but negatively related to good coping outcome, while self-blame and 
good coping outcome were positively related. In order to examine this 
further tlie authors used a median spht to divide the subjects into 
categories of either high or low feelings of self-blame and high or low 
feelings of perceived avoidability. These analysis showed that those 
respondents who blamed themselves and who did not feel that they could 
have avoided the accident were more likely to be good copers than bad 
copers. On the other hand those who placed little blame on themselves 
and felt that they could have avoided the accident were more likely to be 
poor copers than good copers. In an attempt to explain this finding the 
authors pointed out that many respondents seemed to distinguish between 
whether the activity they were engaged in at the time of the accident was a 
common or an unusual activity. If the activity was a common one, 
something they used to do a lot of the time for example swimming, they 
were more likely to think of it as unavoidable, whereas if it was an unusual 
activity for them something they had just done on that particular occasion 
they were more likely to see it as avoidable. In both these cases the 
individual might engage in self-blame however, when self blame was 
related to an unavoidable incident they intended to cope more successfidly.
Other results fi'om this study showed that all respondents said they had 
posed the question "Why me" and all but one had been able to come up 
with an answer. The reasons they gave fell into 6 categories of: 
predetermination, probability, chance, God had a reason, deservedness and 
revaluation of the event as positive. The last category was highly 
correlated with self-blame. The one individual who did ask "Why me" but 
could not come up with an answer, was among the individuals who coped 
worst with their condition. From these results JanofFBuhnan and 
Wortman concluded that what may be important is ascribing meaning to 
the accident or event in a manner that proves satisfying to the individual. 
The study found little evidence for the idea that people are motivated to 
avoid blame, as the defensive attribution hypothesis would predict, in 
general the individuals were willing to attribute blame to themselves even 
beyond what objective circumstances would have warranted. The idea of 
just world did however, gain some support in this study with most patients 
blaming tliemselves and those who did blame others showing poorer
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coping, which could indicate feelings of unjust. Finally, the idea that one 
is motivated to view negative outcome as the result of modifiable or 
avoidable factors in order to be able to prevent them happening again, was 
not supported in this study. Hie authors concluded that the result that 
perceived avoidability was negatively correlated with successful coping, 
suggested that although feehngs of control may generally be adaptive, they 
could be maladaptive when the individual faces a permanent, non 
modifiable outcome. This supports the view put forward by Tumquist and 
colleagues (1988) mentioned earlier about feelings of personal control and 
being related to the circumstances and the implications of the negative 
event.
A study by Taylor et al (1984) interviewed 179 patients with breast 
cancer, examining attributions for cancer and beliefs about control over 
cancer and their relation to adjustment. The authors predicted that the 
majority of patients would make causal attributions and that attributions 
would be made early in the adjustment process, around the time of 
diagnosis and finally that cancer patients who believed they had control 
over their cancer would show better psychological adjustment than those 
who did not hold such behefs. Causal attributions were assessed by an 
open ended question asking about ideas for the causes of the illness and by 
a hst of 22 items that might be considered as potential causes of breast 
cancer such as, stress, heredity, diet, ethnicity, God's will, a blow to the 
breast etc. The patient rated their answers on a 4 point scale of 1 "not at 
all important" to 4 "very important". Patients were then asked to rate the 
causal responsibility of self some other person, the environment and 
chance for their cancer, this was rated on a 5 point scale. Questions about 
why the patient had developed ideas of causes and when it had been 
developed were also included. Feelings of control were assessed by 4 
open ended questions and 9 items fi'om the Rotter Internal-External Locus 
of Control Scale. Measures of adjustment included. Global Adjustment to 
Illness Scale (GAIS) as rated by the physician, the interviewer and the 
patient, the patient's self report of current psychological distress (anxiety, 
fear, depression and anger). Multivariate Health Locus of Control Scale, 
tlie Profile of Mood States (POMS), Self-Esteem Scale, Index of Well 
Being and a Scale of Marital Adjustment. In order to create an overall 
measure of adjustment these scales were factor analysed and quartimax 
rotated. This gave one factor which accounted for 76% of tlie variance.
this included the physicians' and the interviewers’ GAIS scores, the 
patients’ self rating of adjustment and their summed report on 
psychological distress, the Index of Well Being Score and the total score 
on die POMS. These scores were combined and standardised for each 
subject and were used as a global measure of adjustment. The results 
showed that 90% o f patients had a causal attribution fo r  their cancer. 
Only 28% o f the sample said that the question o f cause was important at 
the time o f diagnosis however, 41% indicated that it was an important 
issue during recovery and 41% said it was important to them at the time 
o f the study. This suggests contradictory to attribution theory, that the 
cause for the cancer may not be an important issue early in the adjustment 
process but may become so later on.
These results should however, as suggested by the authors, be interpreted 
with caution as they are patients' retrospections. A possible explanation 
for this pattern as given by the authors is that early on in the cancer the 
patients' time and attention is occupied with details of medical care and by 
emotional reactions such as fear and denial, this time must pass before 
there is time to engage in causal attribution search. This however, is a 
surprising result as the authors point out as attribution theorists emphasis 
the importance of causal attributions as essential in order to understand, 
explain and control an aversive event. Further results showed that no 
particular attributions were related to good adjustment and attributions 
o f responsibility to the self, the environment or chance showed no 
relationship with adjustment. Only other blame was significantly related 
to poor adjustment.
This study also sought to resolve the contradictory prediction regarding 
self-blame, i.e., whether such attributions were associated with good or 
poor adjustment. Self-blame was not found to be related to adjustment at 
all and therefore did not support Janoff-Bulman and Wortman's findings. 
However, self-blame was only measured in a global way, it was not 
divided into the two kinds of self-blame suggested by Janoff-Buhnan, i.e., 
characterological self-blame and behavioural self-blame, doing so might 
have revealed different results.
The authors suggest two possible explanations for why causal attributions 
were foimd to be unrelated to adjustment in this sample. Firstly, the
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importance of attributions might have been overshadowed by background 
factors such as religious beliefs and knowledge about cancer. Secondly, 
the attributions might not have served the need they are thought to serve, 
i.e., making the event feel more controllable, predictable and 
understandable, other cognitive factors might possibly have served those 
needs. This latter explanation becomes likely when one looks at the 
relationship between beliefs in psychological control and adjustment. This 
showed a strong association, control beliefs and attributions were 
however, unrelated. The overall conclusion the authors drew from this 
study was that attributions were not functionally important for the 
adjustment of this cancer population, which contradicts most theories of 
attributions. The authors further suggested that distinguishing between 
events which are ongoing (chronic) versus those that are not may clarify 
when attributions do or do not have a functional purpose and significance.
In another paper referring to the same cancer population, Taylor (1983), 
emphasised the importance of search for meaning in the event and pointed 
out that meaning is exemplified by, but not exclusively deteimined by the 
results of an attributional search, which aims to answer the question "What 
caused the event to happen?" As mentioned earlier 90% of the patients in 
this particular study made attributions for their cancer. Taylor argues, that 
this high frequency of making attributions, tied vsdth the fact that no 
specific attribution was related to better adjustment, suggests that causal 
meaning is the goal of the attributional search rather than the particular 
pathway through which it is realised. She goes on to say that the search 
for meaning involves not only why the event happened but also what its 
implications for one’s life is and will be in the future. The study results 
pointed towards this explanation, with those patients who constructed 
positive meaning from the cancer experience showing significantly better 
psychological adjustment than those who did not.
A study by Schulz and Decker (1985) examined how self-hlame and 
perceived avoidability was related to adjustment in a sample of 100 
individuals with spinal cord injury. One of the aims of this study was to 
compare the findings with the data reported by Janoff-Buhnan and 
Wortman (1977). The subjects in the study were all over the age of 40 
and had been either paraplegic or quadriplegic on average for 20 years. 
Six major categories of data were collected for the study, this included
demographic data, health status, social network/support, social 
comparisons, control/attributions and subjective well-being. Three 
standardised instruments were used to assess psychological well being, 
depression and life satisfaction, these were the Index of Psychological 
Well-Being (IPWB) an 8 item self report scale designed to measure mental 
health in adults, the Life Satisfaction Index-A (LISA-A), an 18 item self 
report scale designed to measure subjective psychological well-being and 
the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale (CES-D) a 20 
item self report scale designed to measure symptoms of depression in the 
general population. Perceived control was measured by a 5 item Likert- 
type scale Avith response possibilities ranging from 1 "not at all" to 5 
"completely". Each individual indicated the degree of control they felt 
they had to "achieve or obtain what is most important to you", "make your 
interactions Avith others end up the way you expect them to", "cope 
successfully when stressed", "solve problems" and "view the good things 
that happen to you as a result of your OAvn actions". Causal attributions 
were measured by asking the subjects what factor(s) they blamed for the 
disability, subjects were also asked whether they felt they could have 
avoided incurring the disability.
The results showed a general high level o f perceived control which was 
however unrelated to causal attributions made. The main results of this 
study regarding self-blame and adjustment showed that subjects who 
blamed themselves fo r their disability and who felt they could have 
avoided it reported higher levels o f well-being. Furthermore, self-blame 
and coping (as measured in life satisfaction) were highly related. These 
results did however, contradict Janoff-Bulman and Wortman's findings, 
their study found that victims who coped best blamed themselves but at the 
same time felt that the injury was unavoidable. What Schulz and Decker 
found was on the other hand, that better copers blamed themselves and 
fe lt that the disability was avoidable, they indeed found that self-blame 
and perceived avoidability were highly correlated. However, there are as 
Schulz and Decker pointed out, a number of differences between those 
two studies. The age difference in the subjects is Avide, m Janoff-Buhnan 
and Wortman study the subjects were young and had been injured Avithin 
the last 12 months whereas Schulz and Decker's subjects were much older 
and had lived with tlieir disability on average for 20 years. All the subjects 
in Janoff-Buhnan and Wortman's study had been injured in accidents but a
number of individuals in Schulz and Decker’s study were the victims of 
diseases such as poho. Another main difference between the studies was 
the outcome measures used, Janoff-Bulman and Wortman assessed coping 
and adjustment based on subjects’ attitudes towards their injury and how 
motivated they were to participate in physical therapy. Schulz and Decker 
on the other had used standardised instruments particularly designed to 
examine well-being and depression. The last obvious difference between 
those two studies is the sample size, Janoff-Bulman and Wortman 
interviewed 29 individuals with spinal cord injury whereas Schulz and 
Decker interviewed 100. All of these differences, or even just one, could 
account for the differences in outcomes found between those two studies.
Another study carried out by Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams (1987) also 
made comparisons with Janoff-Bulman and Wortman’s (1977) study. This 
study addressed self-blame and adaptation in 49 patients hospitalised for 
treatment of acute bum wounds. Self-blame and perceived avoidability 
were measured by using the interview items described by Janoff-Bulman 
and Wortman (1977). First the patients completed a scale where they 
answered questions about the extent of self-blame, then they were asked to 
indicate the percentage of blame they attributed to themselves, others, the 
environment and chance. In addition, in order to operationalise 
characterological versus behavioural self-blame the patients completed a 
10 point scale, with 1 being ’’I am the type of person who has bad things 
happen to them’’ and 10 ’’I chose the wrong thing to do in this particular 
situation’’. Adjustment was assessed by asking the nurses and physical 
therapists to rate the extent to which the patient actively participated in 
their therapeutic activities. This was rated on a scale from 1 "refuses to 
comply with even routine requests" to 7 "complete compliance with all 
requests". The Brief Symptom Inventory was used to assess anxiety and 
depression, feelings of control over health were assessed by the 
Multidimensional Health Locus of Control including three scales; 
intemality, chance and powerful others, patients’ religious beliefs were also 
assessed. Finally the Just World Scale was used to measure to what 
extend the patients agreed or disagreed with the idea that the world is just. 
This scale was included to provide information on the relationship between 
assignment of blame for the accident and beliefs that people get what they 
deserve.
The results showed that virtually all subjects who blamed themselves fo r  
the accident engaged in behavioural rather than characterological self­
blame. Behavioural self-blame has been suggested to have positive effects 
on adjustment (Janoff-Bulman, 1979), the results of this study did 
however, not show this kind of affect, on the contrary greater behavioural 
self-blame was found to be related to poorer compliance with nurses, 
more pain behaviour and greater depression. This study therefore 
suggested that behavioural self-blame is not adaptive in acutely burned 
adults, furthermore, it contradicted Janoff-Bulman and Wortman's (1977) 
findings where self-blame in individuals with spinal cord injury was found 
to be related to better adjustment. Other results showed that patients who 
fe lt the accident could have been avoided were more likely to blame 
themselves, patients who had stronger believes in a just world were also 
more likely to blame themselves and tended to rate the accident as more 
positive on the best-worst thing that could have happened to them. 
Finally, the majority o f patients said they had never asked the question 
"Why me", which is another result contradicting Janoff-Bulman and 
Wortman's findings.
Frey and colleagues (1985), in a study of 64 male recent accident victims 
found similar results to Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams (1987). They studied 
patients including a range of different accidents, such as traffic accident 
(42%), occupational accident (22%), sports accidents (15.6%), accident at 
home (17%) and other accidents (3%). The patients had a variety of 
injuries, ranging firom slight injury (swelling, tom muscles etc.), to badly 
injured, danger of loss of life, (e.g., wounds with dangerous bleeding, 
severe brain concussions, spinal cord injuries etc.), no patient was 
paralysed. Data collection for the study was carried out during the 
patient's hospital stay. Questionnaires were administered in group 
sessions, including all 64 participants. A questionnaire was designed 
addressing cognitions about the accident and convalescence. Assessment 
of causal attributions was carried out by asking each patient how much 
they thought each of the folloAving factors were responsible for the 
accident: chance, fate, themselves and others. All answers were rated on a 
5 point scale, where 1 = not at all responsible and 5 = very responsible. 
Patients were also asked to rate whether they tliought the accident could 
have been avoided using a response scale ranging fi'om l=definitely no to 
5=definitely yes. Concerning convalescence two factors were assessed:
the responsibility of the patient's own will and the conceived predictability 
of convalescence. Twelve different aspects of the recovery process were 
evaluated on the convalescence measure. These included, number and 
degree of complications during hospital stay, length of hospital stay, ward 
doctor's rating of the heahng process, ward nurse's ratings of the healing 
process, of the psychic well-being, of the psychic adjustment to the injury, 
to the hospital and of the patient's desire for an increase in the prescribed 
dosage of medicine and finally the patient's own rating of his/her physical 
and psychic well-being, of sleeping disturbances and of indigestion. Each 
of these processes were rated between 1 = high convalescence and 5 -  
low convalescence and in order to provide a single convalescence score, 
individual item scores were added together.
The results firom this study showed that those who believed that the 
accident could not have been prevented recovered better than those who 
thought that prevention could have been possible. Those who strongly 
believed that the accident was caused by chance and/or fate recovered 
better than those who did not and patients who held themselves 
responsible fo r  the accident recovered worse than those who were less 
ready to take responsibility themselves. Furthermore, patients who 
thought that will power was important for convalescence recovered better 
and patients who had a high degree of predictability about the course of 
convalescence recovered better than those who had little predictability. In 
their discussion Frey and colleagues compare their results to Janoff- 
Buhnan and Wortman's findings (1977). It is evident, as the authors 
pointed out, that the finding that patients who held themselves responsible 
for the accident recovered worse contradicted Janoff-Bulman and 
Wortman's findings. Frey et al argue that these results could be explained 
by the type of injury. In tlieir study none of the patients were paralysed 
whereas in Janoff-Bulman and Wortman's study all victims were paralysed 
and the injury could not be improved at all. Frey et al. pointed out that in 
their sample all of the injuries could improve and therefore the patient's 
goal was to regain the health they had prior to the accident. Thus, these 
patients did not need to have retrospective control over the event, it was 
more important to them to gain present and future control by making 
internal attributions about the future course of their recovery. 
Furthermore, the adjustment process in Janoff-Bulman and Wortman's 
study was already well advanced, while in Frey et al's study interviews
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took place only a few days following the accident. Frey and colleagues 
pointed out that this fact could be crucial, as it might be possible that with 
the passage of time the directions of causal attributions could change.
Another study carried out by Nielson and MacDonald (1988) showed, like 
the previous two, that self blame was related to poorer adjustment. This 
study examined attributions and adjustment in 58 individuals with spinal 
cord injury, 54.5% were paraplegic and 45.5% quadriplegic. Respondents 
were either administered the questionnaires directly by a researcher or 
received them through mail and were given instructions over the phone. 
Causal attributions were assessed by the same interview items used by 
Janoff-Bulman and Wortman, examining the extent to which respondents 
blamed themselves, others, their environment and chance for their injury. 
Other instruments included, the Beck Depression Inventoiy, the Millon 
Behavioural Health Inventory (MBHI), assessing general coping style 
variables (which particular variables was however not presented) and the 
individuals perceptions of psychological stressors, the Multiple Affect 
Adjective Checklist (MAACL), including 10 anxiety items, 24 depression 
items and 14 hostility items and the Social Support Questionnaire, 
identifying individuals who gave support to the respondent and assessing 
satisfaction with support received. Based on a median split on the self 
blame ratings, respondents were divided into higli vs. low self blamers.
Results showed that low self-blamers attributed their injury significantly 
more to chance than high self-blamers. High self-blamers were found to 
be morç anxious, experienced greater feelings of hostility and obtained 
higher depression scores than low self-blamers. Finally, perceived 
avoidability was associated with poorer adjustment as assessed by the 
MBHI. These findings thus suggested that those individuals who 
attributed their spinal cord injury to themselves showed poorer adjustment 
than those who attributed to external factors, such as chance. These 
results therefore contradicted Janoff-Bulman and Wortman's (1977) 
findings. They did however replicate the findings of both Janoff-Buhnan 
and Wortman and Schulz and Decker (1985), with regard to believing that 
one could have avoided the accident being related to worse outcome. 
These studies, although using the same attribution measure, did as Neilson 
and MacDonald pointed out, use different types of outcome measures, 
such as in their way of assessing coping, standardised measures (Schulz &
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Decker, 1985; Nielson & MacDonald, 1988) versus subjective rating by 
caregivers (Janoff-Bulman & Wortman, 1977). These different assessment 
tools could account for the different findings generated by the studies. 
Also the kind of sample used by Nielson and MacDonald could account 
for these result differences. All their subjects, like those in Schulz and 
Decker’s study, had hved with their injury for number of years, whereas 
the participants in Janoff-Buhnan and Wortman’s study had only been 
disabled either between 1 and 4 months or between 8 and 12 months. Like 
Frey and his colleagues (1985) argued before, Nielson and MacDonald 
also suggested that the seff-blame/adjustment relationship might be 
mediated by time. However, given the results of those four studies, self­
blame would have to start of as maladaptive just following an accident 
(Frey et al. 1985), then become adaptive from 1 up to 12 months (Janoff- 
Bulman and Wortman, 1977), but get maladaptive again somewhere on the 
way to 7.5 years following injury (Nielson & MacDonald, 1988). Schulz 
and Decker’s study (1985) however did find self blame to be related to 
better adjustment when assessed 20 years following injury, contradicting 
Nielson and MacDonald’s findings. None of these studies however, 
divided self-blame into behavioural vs. characterological self-blame which 
might have shed some light on these contradicting results. In order to 
clarify this point, one would however need a longitudinal study where by 
the process of self-blame, both behavioural and characterological, could be 
assessed from the time of illness/injury onset and repeatedly over a number 
of subsequent occasions.
Keeping with self-blame and its relationship with outcome assessment, the 
final study to be reviewed in this section is a study by Witenberg and 
colleagues (1983) investigating the relationship between patient’s 
perceptions of control and causality and staff ratings of coping and 
compliance. The patients in this study were 43 individuals undergoing 
regular chronic hemodialysis treatment and had been doing so for at least 1 
month prior to being interviewed. They were administered a semi­
structured interview designed by the investigators. The interview explored 
by open ended questions, patients causal attributions, their perceptions of 
control and sense of responsibility for the progression of the disease. In 
addition, in order to examine whether search of meaning had been carried 
out, each patient was asked if they had ever wondered ’’Why me". 
Responses to the interview were tape recorded and then scored on a 7
point Likert scale by two independent raters who were blind to the purpose 
of the study. Two standardised questionnaires were also administered, tlie 
Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS) to examine whether 
patients were trying to present themselves in a social desirable way and 
the Internal - External Locus of Control Scale (I-E), to assess what 
patients saw in control over the illness, themselves or something else. 
Coping and compliance were assessed by asking staff to rate what they 
identified as good and poor copers. Good copers where defined as those 
who tried to maintain a lifestyle as close to their pre-dialysis life as 
possible but who also accepted the limitations and requirements of the 
disease, maintained compliance wMi treatment regimen and did not show 
signs of depression or low mood. Poor copers were those who showed 
signs of the above. The findings of this study showed that better 
compliance was associated with never having thought about blame. 
Attributing the illness to heredity was related to better coping and with 
better compliance. Self-blame was not significantly related to good 
adjustment, on the contraiy self-blame showed a tendency to be related to 
poor coping. Finally, patients who had been unable to identify any cause 
fo r  their illness yet had thought about it, were rated as coping and 
complying poorly.
3.3. Causal attributions and Myocardial Infarction.
2.2.1. Causal attributions and adjustment to ML
As was pointed out in chapter one of this thesis, myocardial infarction is a 
leading cause of death in Western Societies today and therefore has long 
been a major concern for health officials and practitioners as well as for 
laymen. Many beliefs and theories have been mentioned concerning the 
aetiology of the disease. The most prominent of these theories have come 
from researchers in biomedicine which have identified a number of risk 
factors that appear to be linked with heart disease, including smoking, diet, 
obesity and drinking. These theories as well as other behefs could, and 
most likely will, influence cardiac patients in their attempt to explain what 
caused their illness. Nevertheless, despite the prevalence of this disease 
very few empirical studies as yet have been carried out in order to examine 
the nature of heart patients' own aetiology beliefs. However, as the 
following literature review will show, existing empirical data in this field
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has highlighted the importance of causal attributions made by cardiac 
patients themselves in their recovery and adjustment process. It has also 
become evident that patients' causal attributions may differ from aetiology 
beliefs and perceptions held by health professionals. Thus, patients' 
perceptions and causal beliefs may be important components in their 
medical and rehabilitation progress.
One of the earlier studies in this area was a descriptive study carried out 
by CoAvie (1976). He interviewed 27 patients diagnosed Avith a first MI a 
few days before their discharge from hospital, which was approximately 3 
weeks after admission. The aim of the study was to illustrate how the 
patients used information about their MI, in particular possible causal 
explanations, to reinterpret their individual biography in such a way that 
they were satisfied that the causal factors fitted in their case. In order to 
maximise the patient's opportunity to describe their experience, the 
interviews were mainly based on open ended questions, such as "Why are 
you in hospital?" and "Have you any ideas why it (the MI) happened?" 
The general findings of this study showed that the majority o f patients 
assumed that their illness was not a sudden unanticipated event, but 
something which could be seen to have causal antecedents, including 
strain, tension and overwork. Some of these causal attributions and 
perceptions were articulated as a result of patients talking and comparing 
ideas Avith each other and to their doctors and in that way getting feedback 
of what counted as appropriate causes. When a patient discovered 
several of these in his own biography their MI was made more intelligible. 
However, a number of patients could not reconstruct their past 
unambiguously or Avith reference to these causes, which resulted in them 
claiming not to understand how or why they had an MI. Comparing 
themselves to other patients, with reference to age, number o f M i’s, 
symptoms and medical progress enabled patients to eliminate certain 
causes and get a more comprehensive picture o f their illness. The 
findings o f this study thus clearly showed that engaging in causal search 
following an M I made the event more intelligible and comprehensible for  
these patients. As suggested by Naea de Valle and Norman (1992), these 
results could be of considerable importance if one were to establish a link 
between causal attributions and behaviour or lifestyle changes following 
MI. If patients’ causal attributions actually came from medical 
professionals, as CoAvie's results seemed to imply, and therefore are likely
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to include a range of behavioural factors, such as smoking, diet, exercise 
etc., one could speculate that these beliefs could lead to favourable 
changes which in turn resulted in preventing further problems.
Although limited, especially with regard to methodology, explorative 
research like the above, is valuable in generating ideas and hypothesis for 
future research. Another such study was carried out by Meyer (1983), 
where he used a quahtative design in order to examine the experiences and 
reactions among individuals following an MI. The participants in the study 
were 30 middle class Caucasian males which were all registered 
rehabilitation clients between the ages of 27 and 85. An hour long 
interview was carried out with each participant, using open ended 
questions covering a number of illness related areas including patients' 
causal explanations. The study findings showed that younger patients 
were most likely to attribute their illness to family history, genetics and the 
feelmg that they were predestined to illness. Middle age patients felt that 
life, stress, work, family problems and personal overload were the 
primary causes. Elderly patients on the other hand, felt that age was the 
main cause for their ML.
Fielding (1987), examined perceived causal attributions, perceived causal 
potency and perceived controllability of causal attributions, in a sample of 
148 men with a confirmed first Ml. All patients completed questions 
requesting a list of "factors you felt caused your Ml". They then listed 
factors in order of perceived pathogenicity and rated them on a scale from 
10 (most important contributing factor) to 1 (least important contributing 
factor). Finally each perceived causative factor was rated on a 4 point 
scale where 4 was "totally controllable" and 0 "totally uncontrollable". A 
total of 321 causes were cited by the patients, each cause listed was then 
classified according to type which resulted in 33 different causal 
categories. The most frequently cited causal factor was overwork 
followed by smoking and worry. Hypertension was rated as having the 
highest causal potency but over 76% of the total potency ratings were 
given to 5 categories including, smoking followed by overwork, worry, 
lack o f exercise and stress. Standard risk factors for MI (smoking, 
hypertension, cholesterol, diet, overweight, lack of exercise, age, family 
history of heart disease and drinking alcohol) composed 39.56% of 
citations, accounting for 40.10% of the total potency ratings which was
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less than that for overwork, worry and stress. Results also showed tliat 
smoking, lack o f exercise, lifestyle, overweight and diet were all rated as 
significantly more controllable than were overwork, worry, stress, other 
illness, atheroma/cholesterol, frustration/anger and family history. Family 
history, situational factors, age and hypertension were all perceived as 
totally uncontrollable. These patients seemed to emphasise psycho-social 
causes which, as Fielding pointed out, is conflicting with current medical 
opinion, which emphasises biological causes. Overwork, worry and stress 
were all rated amongst the most important causes, but at the same time 
they were looked upon as less controllable than many other factors. This 
could have implications for the patients' recovery and need for intervention 
programs in order to help patients to gain control over these factors. 
Examining patients’ causal attributions in the way the above studies have 
done, could therefore, as suggested by Fielding, provide health care 
professionals with insight into areas with which the patient may experience 
difiSculties, thus indicate possible remedial action. Furthermore, an 
understanding of patients' causal attributions could help predict whether 
difficulties m compliance or rehabihtation are likely to occur and in 
relation to what specific factors.
Another study based on qualitative methodology was carried out by 
Kroode et al. (1989), who were interested in how and if causal attributions 
differed between different groups of patients. This interest was based on 
their previous work on 17 patients with cancer who had been interviewed 
in an unstructured manner, including one compulsory question, "Could you 
tell me, what is, according to you, the cause of your illness?" The findings 
of this study showed that the majority o f patients gave more than one 
story as an explanation fo r  the cause o f their illness. One was a 
biological cause heard fi*om their physician, the other was, what the 
authors called idiosyncratic and informal explanations where the patients 
expressed their need for causality, also a need to apportion blame and self­
blame. FoUovring on firom this, questions for further research were 
evoked including a question on whether other groups of patients made the 
same kind of explanations.
In order to assess this question, Kroode et al. (1989), examined whether 
there was a difference between causal attributions made by patients with 
cancer and those made by patients with MI. They interviewed 33 patients
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with cancer 2 months after their last radiation treatment and 14 patients 
with MI just after they had completed a rehabilitation program. The 
assessment was based on an unstructured interview where tlie patients 
were encouraged to tell and talk as much as possible about their illness. 
The interviewer did however, make sure that the fbllovring 8 topics were 
covered: medical history, causal attributions, biographical data, life style 
changes since diagnosis, social comparison, information gathering, anxiety 
and the ftiture. Answers were then classified into different sub-topics by 2 
independent judges. Doubts about causal attributions and conflicts with 
others about causal attributions were also analysed. The results showed 
that all patients, both cancer and MI, had thoughts about the cause o f 
their illness. There was no difference between the groups in doubtiug 
their explanations, however, there was a difference in how doubt was 
expressed. The majority of patients with cancer like in the pilot study, 
came up with two kinds o f explanations fo r  what had caused their illness, 
i.e., a medical explanation and an idiosyncratic explanation based on 
their autobiography. Thus, cancer patients were found to show an internal 
conflict between those two explanations. Patients with M I on the other 
hand, had only one explanation fo r  the causes o f their illness which was 
based on medical stereotypes. Ml patients seemed to built up their own 
informal medical story based on medical insigjit, mostly explanations jftom 
their physicians or from elsewhere, for example the library. Cancer 
patients were more likely to be in conflict with others causal attributions 
(physician and family) than patients with MI.
In an attempt to explain these findings the authors suggested that the 
differences in causal attributions made by these two patient groups could 
be to do with the lack of knowledge about the cause and course of most 
cancers, whereas there is much more widespread knowledge about the 
causes of an MI. They also pointed out that MI patients get the possible 
causal explanations handed to tliem by there physicians, so all they need to 
do is to check what fits their autobiographies. Patients with cancer do not 
get any ready made explanations handed to them aud therefore they have 
to search for possible explanations. The findings of this study do seem to 
imply good news for patients with MI at least they do not appear to suffer 
any conflict, either internal between different causal explanations or 
external with other people. The study did however, not report exact time 
of data collection which might have given a different picture. For example
MI patients could have shown a similar conflict if they had been 
interviewed early on following the onset of their illness and not after 
having completed a rehabilitation program, which could have had a major 
effect on their causal attributions.
A study by Mumma and Corkle (1982-1983), also assessed the difference 
in causal attributions made by patients with MI on the one hand and lung 
cancer patients on the other. This was a longitudinal study, including 67 
patients with lung cancer and 71 patients with MI, assessing attributions 
made on two occasions, 1 month and 2 months following diagnosis. The 
measurement tool used in the study was an Acknowledged Awareness 
Scale. Acknowledged awareness was defined as "tAe subjecfs verbalised 
statement about his diagnosis, prognosis and treatment goals" (Mumma 
& Corkle, 1982-1983, page 314). The scale included 18 questions 
grouped into the following categories: how the subject referred to their 
condition, described their ftiture, described the purpose of their treatments, 
whether the subject referred to their own death and whether they felt their 
condition was due to personal factors. Attributions were assessed by one 
item of the awareness structured questions, asking what they believed had 
brought about their illness, and why did it happen to you? Responses were 
then coded by the interviewers based on whether the patient perceived 
his/her condition as the result, to some extent of personal factors, i.e., life 
style, habits, behaviour, personality etc. The findings of the study showed 
that at time one (approximately 1 month after diagnosis) 31 of 65 patients 
with cancer saw themselves as somewhat responsible for bringing about 
their illness. With regard to patients with MI, these numbers were 42 
against 60. At time 2 (1 month later) results showed that 29 of 50 patients 
with cancer and 41 of 51 patients with MI saw themselves as responsible 
to some extent. The causes identified by both patient groups were 
categorised as follows: don^t know, heredity, smoking, overweight/diet, 
lack o f exercise, hypertension, stress/worry/tension, exposure to noxious 
fumes/chemicals/asbestos, overexertion/working too hard, just 
happened/fate and other. The most fi*equent responses by both patient 
groups analysed together were, don't know, smoking and 
stress/worry/tension. When assessing the differences in causal attributions 
made by patients with cancer vs. patients with MI, the findings showed 
that the most fi*equent attributions made by patients with MI were related 
to life style, such as stress, smoking and overweight/diet, attributions
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which could be, like the authors pointed out, be interpreted as self-blame 
or self-responsibility for what happened to them. Patients with lung 
cancer, on the other hand, tended to attribute their illness to smoking, (a 
life style cause) or to noxious fumes or asbestos at work. Furthermore, 
more patients with lung cancer said that they did not know what had 
caused their illness. However, don't know response was among the top 
three most popular responses by both patient groups at botii assessment 
times. The authors attempted to explain this last jSnding and argued that 
patients might be reluctant to speculate on what caused their illness, that 
they might lack information regarding association between risk factors and 
disease or that they have difficulty accepting self-responsibihty for their 
illness even if they had identified a cause. These results are also 
interesting in light of the findings by Kroode et al. (1989), presented 
above. Kroode and colleagues found patients with MI to have more 
knowledge about the causes for their illness than patients with cancer, they 
did however interview patients following rehabilitation, which as was 
pointed out earlier, could have influenced tlie results. In fact, Mumma and 
Corkle’s findings could indicate, that was indeed the case, as both their 
samples showed high uncertainty as regards causal attributions for their 
illness.
A study by Rudy (1980), went further than the aforementioned studies and 
examined both patients and their spouses causal explanations for a first 
MI. This study had four main research questions: Firstly, what were the 
patients' explanations about the cause for their MI both during the acute 
illness episode and during the convalescent phase. Secondly, do patients' 
and spouses' causal explanations differ? Thirdly, do causal explanations of 
patients and their spouses change firom the acute to the convalescent 
phases of the iUness? Fourth and finally, how do patients causal 
explanations differ fi*om professional knowledge? 50 patients and their 
spouses were interviewed on two occasions, first within 48 hours after 
discharge fi"om the coronary care unit (acute phase) and again 
approximately one month following discharge firom hospital (convalescent 
phase). Causal attributions were assessed by open-ended questions, 
including probe questions related to the patient's perceptions of what 
happened and what they believed had caused their MI, The structured 
Causal Questionnaire, utilised by Croog and Richards (1977), and 
designed to determine the relative importance of beliefs in factors
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contributing to tiie MI was also administrated. This questionnaire includes 
a list of causal items and also asks the subjects to rate the importance of 
each causal factor. Finally, demographic data and information on 
medically identified risk factors for coronary artery disease was gathered 
for each patient. The results firom the study showed that at both illness 
phases, patients and spouses expressed multiple causal explanations. 
The most fi*equent causal explanation of patients and their spouses at both 
times of measure was tension in life, related to work or the home situation. 
The five causal factors which were rated as the most important by all 
participants at the acute phase were: worry, nerves, feeling tense, 
smoking, heredity and tension at work. The least important causes at the 
acute phase were: Payment fo r  sins, punishment fo r  doing wrong, 
drinking, diabetes and bad luck. During the convalescent phase the most 
important causes were: worry, feeling tense, nerves, tension at work and 
eating fatty foods. Factors which were not rated as important at the 
convalescent phase were the same as reported at the acute phase, although 
in a slightly changed order: punishment fo r  doing wrong in life, payment 
fo r  sins, diabetes, drinking and bad luck. When examining the differences 
between patients’ and spouses’ responses the results revealed that the 
majority o f patient/spouses pairs disagreed on the causal explanation 
fiiey gave for the MI. Overwork as a cause was expressed more frequently 
by spouses. The patients/spouses pairs which did not agree on the cause 
mostly showed that patients tended to respond by "don’t know" when 
asked about the cause at the acute phase while their spouse mentioned a 
causal explanation. In other disagreeing pairs, spouses more often gave 
overwork and personality as a cause than the patient. A slight majority o f  
patients changed their causal explanation between the two assessment 
times. When a patient added a new cause to the original causes given at 
the acute phase it was considered a change. The authors however, did not 
report which particular changes did appear.
Finally, in order to assess whether causal attributions made by 
patients/spouses and health care professionals differed, risk factors were 
identified for each patient, including smoking, overweight, family history, 
diabetes, hypertension, high blood lipids and exercise outside work. 
Results firom this analysis showed that the majority of both patients and 
their spouses did not name as a cause the risk factor named by the 
professionals; this was true both at the acute and the convalescent phase.
94
They were however, more likely to report the identified risk factor as 
important in contributing to the onset of the MI when asked to respond to 
questions about its importance. Other results showed that a high 
percentage o f patients reported that they had changed their smoking, diet 
and exercise behaviour, even though they had not listed these factors as 
causes o f the MI. In her conclusion the author picked upon the fact that 
these patients as well as their spouses most often mentioned tension as a 
cause for their illness. In an attempt to explain this result she pointed out 
that tension is a safe explanation because it is difficult to dispute its 
presence since it is not readily measurable, and perhaps identifying tension 
as a cause worked to decrease feelings of self-blame and made it possible 
to externalise the cause.
A study by Croog and Richards (1977), carried out 3 years prior to Rudy's 
study, showed similar results in respect to changes in smoking behaviour 
although smoking had not been identified as a cause. This was a 
longitudinal study, spanning 7-8 years of data collection, including 205 
men who had suffered a first MI and their wives. The results firom this 
study showed that those who believed that smoking could have caused 
their MI were not any more likely to have stopped smoking than those who 
did not believe in smoking as a cause, this was true at all assessment 
times. Thus, Croog and Richards (1977) as well as Rudy (1980) failed to 
find a connection between causal attributions and behaviour change.
However, with regard to tension, Koslowsky et al (1978), found similar 
results to Rudy's study, when examining perceived causes of myocardial 
infarction in a patient population of 345 men one month after discharge 
firom hospifal. Causal attributions were assessed by a list of 16 items, 
including common explanations for heart disease, such as worry, smoking, 
kind of food eaten, vrill of God etc. Patients were asked to rate each cause 
on a 3 point scale, as either "very important", "important" or "not 
important". In addition to this list several open questions exaniining 
perceived responsibility of the patient themselves, other people or events, 
were also included. The extent of perceived control in the possible 
prevention of the MI was also examined and responses coded either as 
"something" or "nothing". The results showed that the most important 
perceived cause was "being under tension at work" followed by "nerves", 
"worry", and "smoking". The least important perceived causes were
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"punishment fo r  doing wrong in life", "problems with wife" and 
"drinking". The 16 individual items were then factor analysed which gave 
4 categories of tension, supernatural, family and physical. Heredity and 
bad luck were analysed separately as they did not fit in any of the other 
factors. All these factors were then further classified into two categories 
personal and environmental. Patients reported physical and tension 
causes as more important than supernatural, family and heredity causes. 
Correlations between the factors showed that the supernatural factor was 
relatively independent of the others, tension and physical were moderately 
iutercorrelated and the family factor was related to tension but not to the 
physical factor. Finally, a multiple regression analysis found that 
individuals with high emotional stability, who were younger and had more 
skilled occupations tended to hst tension items as the most important cause 
of their MI. In their conclusion the authors pointed out that these patients 
were most likely to attribute their illness to items which could be classified 
as personal. The authors also speculated that education, influences fi*om 
the media and understanding of the disease process were possible reasons 
for why the patients were most likely to attribute to "work tension" and 
"physical causes". Furthermore, they pointed out that these data identified 
a number of target populations for rehabilitation. For example, several of 
these patients considered themselves to be under high tension at work and 
beheved that tension was important in the development of their illness. 
These attributions and beliefs could thus guide health professionals in their 
rehabilitation therapy so they could aim towards and concentrate on 
alleviating stress and help in reducing the risk of recurrence.
Another study by Affleck et al. (1987), examined relations between causal 
attributions, perceived benefits and health outcome in a sample of 287 men 
who were followed up for 8 years after their first MI. The study predicted 
firstly, that patients who attributed their MI to personal behaviours or who 
perceived benefits in their situation would be less likely to suffer another 
MI and should exhibit less long-term morbidity. Secondly, those who 
blamed other people for their illness would experience more adverse health 
outcomes. The study also addressed the question of how survival of a 
second MI would affect individuals' cause and benefit appraisals. Causal 
attributions were measured both at 7 weeks and at 8 year follow up. 
Patients were presented with a list of 13 causes of MI which were rated on 
a 3 point scale (1= not important/don't know, 2= somewhat important, 3=
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very important). Five attribution scores were then calculated by summing 
responses within each category (categories had been defined by a factor 
analysis) and divided by the number of items in the categoiy. Those five 
categories were labelled, personal behaviour, stress responses, other 
people, bad luck and heredity. Patients were also asked an open question 
on whether they saw any gains or benefits firom the MI and if so, what they 
were. Information on the severity of the MI was gathered fi'om the 
patients' physician including information on how much affect the physician 
thought the MI would have on the patients' life. In addition, the 8 year 
follow up interview included several items where patients were asked to 
describe their health status and symptoms of cardiac illness. Descriptive 
fibidings of the study showed greater attributions to stress and personal 
behaviours and less attributions to luck and to other people at both times 
of data collection. A slight majority of patients reported benefits fi’om 
their MI at both times of measure.
Overall findings showed that patients who perceived benefits fi'om a first 
MI were less likely to have a subsequent MI and showed less morbidity 8 
years later. Attributions made 7 weeks after the M l were also found to be 
predictive o f health outcomes. Blaming the M I on other people was 
related to higher incidence o f  re-infarction and attributing to stress was 
predictive of greater morbidity. Furthermore, at the 8 year interview 
results showed that men who had survived another MI were more hkely to 
report benefits and made more attributions than those who had not 
suffered another MI. In an attempt to explain the adverse health outcomes 
predicted by attributing the MI to stress, Affleck et al., pointed out that 
this could be related to that patients who were more likely to attribute to 
stress, also perceived the stress as less controllable. This in turn, could 
then lead to a sense of helplessness when it came to making adaptive life­
style changes. Affleck et al., also pointed out that these patients might 
simply have been exposed to more stress which then accounted for their 
deteriorating health. Athough an interesting and an important contribution 
to research in this field, this study, as the authors were aware off, did not 
measure many important psychological variables which could have been 
related to attributions and affect recovery, such as distress and behaviour 
change. However, like the previous study, the data from this research did 
point towards a target population for rehabilitation programs, i.e. those 
who attributed their MI to stress factors. As pointed out by Koslowsky et
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al., these attributions might therefore be important components for 
rehabilitation which could provide aid in order to reduce and alleviate 
stress.
The importance of examining patients’ causal attributions follovring MI 
was clearly supported in a study carried out by Burgess and Hartman 
(1986). They set up an intervention study using cognitive and behavioural 
approaches aimed at reducing psychological distress, altering restrictive 
beliefs, provide guidance to family to help reduce stress on the social 
network and facilitate return to work. One hundred and eighty MI patients 
were interviewed on 3 different occasions, first during the final week of 
hospitalisation, at the end of intervention 3 months after discharge and a 
final follow up approximately 13 months after admission to hospital. 
Patients wore divided into 2 groups, one receiving intervention the other 
not (controls). A variety of measurement tools was used, including a 
measure of anxiety and depression, social support network scale, open 
ended questions concerning resistance to return to work, job stress and 
security, type A personality and health beliefs. The findings of the study 
showed that the majority of patients attributed their illness to work, 
followed by smoking, diet, heredity and fate. A large majority (63%) saw 
the illness as preventable and controllable and most patients (71%) altered 
their beliefs about what caused their M I over time. A number of benefits 
were reported fi’om altering restrictive patterns of beliefs and 
presuppositions about causes, these included significantly less 
psychological distress, less dependence on family support and fewer 
deterrents to work resumption in the intervention group than in the 
controls. These findings thus support the importance of both examining 
and intervening with attributions which might lead to unjustified 
restrictions on activities by helping patients, as was done in this study, to 
repattem thoughts by refiaming, offering corrective information and 
clarifying experiences associated with the limiting thoughts.
The final study to be reviewed here was carried out by Naea de Valle and 
Norman (1992). This study sought to examine the relationships between 
causal attributions, health locus of control beliefs and reported lifestyle 
changes in a sample of 81 male pre-operative coronary artery by-pass graft 
patients. Based on previous research this study made the following 
predictions: First, that behavioural self-blame would be related to beliefs
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that one's health and illness is under one's control (i.e., internal locus of 
control beliefs - HLOC). Second, that patients who attribute their illness 
to behavioural self-blame would report greater lifestyle changes. Third, 
patients with strong internal HLOC beliefs would report having made more 
lifestyle changes. The patients who participated in the study were all out­
patients registered for coronaiy artery by-pass graft surgery. A 
questionnaire including 3 different sections was sent to each patient. The 
first section examined patients' beliefs about the causes of their illness. 
This was assessed by a list of 21 possible causes of coronary heart 
disease, including items such as, smoking, stress, worry, eating fatty foods 
etc. Each patient was asked to report which ones tliey thought might have 
caused their illness. Aiswers were rated on a 3 point scale with 1 = no, 2 
= might have and 3 = yes. Patients could also add any other causes they 
thought was relevant but had not been on the list. Finally, patients were 
asked what they thought was the main cause of their illness. The 21 causal 
items on the list were rated by 4 independent raters in order to identify 
which items could be classified as behavioural self-blame. This produced 
a behavioural self-blame scale consisting of 8 causes: smoking, drinking 
excessive amounts of alcohol, lack of exercise, being overweight, poor 
diet, eating fatty foods, overwork and over exertion or sudden exercise. 
The second section of the questionnaire consisted of one open question 
assessing lifestyle changes as a result of the illness, i.e., "Have you 
changed your lifestyle since the diagnosis? If so, how?" The third and 
final section of the questionnaire used Form B of Watlston and Wallston's 
(1978 & 1981) multidimensiond health locus of control scale. This 
instrument examines to what extent individuals believe that their health 
and ülness is influenced by "internal factors", "powerful others" and 
"chance".
The results showed that patients were most likely to attribute their illness 
to stress, work, eating fatty foods, high levels o f cholesterol, smoking and 
heredity factors. When asked about the main cause of their iUness the 
majority of patients reported stress or worry, next came smoking, heredity 
factors and 14 % said that eating fatty foods was the main cause. When 
assessing healtli locus of control beliefs results showed that patients 
expressed strong beliefs that their healtli was influenced both by internal 
factors and by powerful others. Patients were however, less likely to 
belive that their health was influenced by chance. Further analysis found a
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positive relationship between internal health locus of control beliefs and 
behavioural self-blame. Patients who believed that their health was under 
their own control were also more likely to attribute their illness to 
behavioural self-blame.
The majority of patients (83%) reported lifestyle changes, most frequently 
related to dietary changes, stress management techniques and cutting down 
or quitting smoking. When examining the relationship between 
behavioural self-blame and lifestyle changes results showed that 
behavioural self-blame was closely associated with number o f lifestyle 
changes which could aid recovery. These findings therefore contradicted 
those reported by Croog and Richards (1977) and Rudy (1980) reviewed 
earlier, where causal attributions and lifestyle changes were not found to 
be related. However, while behavioural self-blame attributions were 
clearly related to lifestyle changes, Naea de Valle and Norman found that 
patients’ general health locus of control beliefs were unrelated to reported 
changes. Health locus of control beliefs influences were only seen in 
relation to patients' attributions. In their conclusion Naea de Valle and 
Norman, pointed out the importance of these results, which seemed to 
confirm that making causal attributions may provide impetus for future 
action, especially when attributions include behavioural factors which are 
themselves modifiable. Thus, bearing in mind the link between a number 
of lifestyle behaviours and coronary heart disease, adoption of such causal 
attributions by MI patients could prove to be crucial for long term 
recovery.
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3.4. Summary of causai attribution review.
A l of the above studies have made a considerable contribution in 
confirming the important role of causal attributions in the process of 
adjustment to severe and life-threatening life events. Furthermore, a strong 
point of research in this area, includes the attempt it has made m 
comparing results across different studies. Hovyever, the cross-sectional 
and retrospective nature of most of these studies means that one needs to 
be careful in making too many and too strong conclusions. Furthermore, 
several of these studies, in particular studies on MI, have been descriptive 
and explorative (Cowie, 1976; Meyer, 1983; Fielding, 1987; Kroode et al., 
1989; Koslowsky et al., 1978), Lack of outcome assessment such as, 
levels of distress and behaviour change is also evident, which makes it 
difficult to assess the relationship between these factors and causal 
attributions. Assessment of causal attributions has also mainly relied on 
open ended questions about patients' causal ideas, multifactorial 
assessment of causal attributions, such as including both open ended 
questions and checklists, has rarely been applied. Assessment of 
adjustment has rehed heavily on subjective measures, such as caregivers 
ratings, which makes it difficult to compare results firom one study to 
another. On the other hand, all these points provide good grounds for 
further research. In particular, given that existing results seem to imply 
that causal attributions change over time (Rudy, 1980) althou^ in what 
particular way is still unclear, the need for longitudinal studies in this field 
is apparent. Existing results have also shown that causal attributions are 
related to for example, subsequent health outcome (Affieck et al., 1987). 
Thus, providing longitudinal studies would not only enable researchers to 
examine the process of causal attributions over time but also in relation to 
adjustment and other outcome variables. Relying on standardised 
measures would also provide better grounds for compatible comparisons 
between studies.
The main findings of the studies te viewed here are summarised below and 
in table 3.4.1.
Findings have shown that:
Making attributions is important, in particular following illness. 
Engaging in causal attributional search appears to make the illness more 
comprehensible and intelligible and be related to better adjustment 
(DuCette & Keane, 1984).
There appears to be support fo r  the distinction between two types o f self- 
blame, behavioural self-blame (behaviour self blame fo r  short) and 
characterological self-blame (character self blame). Majority o f  
published studies have found support fo r those two types o f self-blame, 
showing behavioural se lf blame related to better general adjustment 
while character self blame is most commonly related to poorer 
adjustment (Janoff-Buhnan, 1979; Affleck, et al., 1985; Major et al., 1985; 
Mueller & Major, 1989; Meyer & Taylor, 1986; Kdecolt-Glaser & 
Williams, 1987).
Behavioural self blame is related to lifestyle changes following illness 
(Naea de Valle & Norman, 1992).
Other-blame has consistently been related to poorer adjustment (Tennen 
& Affleck, 1990).
Patients with M I most commonly attribute their illness to stress, worry, 
work, smoking, diet and heredity factors (Koslowsky et al., 1978; Burgess 
& Hartman, 1986; Naea de Valle & Norman, 1992).
Causal attributions made early on following illness have been shown to 
predict subsequent health outcome (Affleck et al., 1987).
Finally, recovery programs have reported benefits following a change in 
attributions (Burgess & Hartman, 1986).
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Table 3.4.1. Summary of causai attribution research findings in relation to self­
blame. other-blame and general adjustment
Studvftvoe  ^ Subjects Self-biante Other-blame General adiustment
DuCette & 
Keane (1984) 
(cross-sectional)
90 patients
thoracic surgery Not reported
Janofif-Bulman 129 students 
(1979) women
(cross-sectional)
Janoff-Bulman Rape victims 
(1979)
(cross-sectional)
Character self blame 
related to depression
Not reported 
Not reported
Support for the 2 types Not reported 
self-blame; self belmviour 
vs. character self blame
Timko &
Janofif-Bulman
(1985)
(cross-sectional)
42 women 
with breast 
cancer
Character self blame 
related to believing 
that treatment was 
imsuccessful
Other blame 
related to 
believing that 
treatment was 
unsuccessful
Better adjustment if 
attribution was made
Not reported
Not reported
Both types of self-blame 
were mediated by 
perceived avoidabilily of 
cancer and its related 
cognitions
Afifleck et. al. 57 mothers of Behaviour self blame Not reported See self-blame
(1985) disabled infants related to better
(longitudinal) adjustment
Major etal. Women having Character self blame Not reported High situation blamers
(1985) an abortion related to poorer coping were more depressed
(longitudinal) (N=247) and more depression than low situation blamers
Mueller & Women having Character self blame High other blame
Major (1989) an abortion related to poorer related to poorer
(longitudinal) (N=283) adjustment adjustment
Meyer & Rape victims Behaviour self blame Not reported Not reported
Taylor (1986) related to higher
(cross-sectional) depression.
Tennen & Reviewed Not reported 22 studies showed
Afideck (1990) 25 studies other-blame and 17
(review paper) on other-blame of those found it to
be related to worse general adjustment
Linn et al. 120 patients Self-blame or other-blame were not reported individually or how they
(1982) with cancer & related to adjustment. Cancer patients were however, more likely to
(cross-sectional) 120 patients attribute to will of God or genetic factors than non cancer patients.
with other illnesses
Janofif-Bulman 29 people with Self blame related Other-blame related
& Wortman spinal cord to better coping to poorer coping
(1977) injmy outcome outcome
(cross-sectional)
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Table 3.4.1. cont. Summary of causal attribution research findings in relation to
self-blame, other-blame. general adiustment and type of attributions.
Study (type) Subjects Self-blame Other-blame General
adiustment
Taylor et al. 
(1984)
(cross-sectional)
179 patients 
with cancer
Self blame no relation 
to adjustment
Schulz & 100 people with Self-blame related to
Decker (1985) spinal cord higher levels of well 
(cross-sectional) injury being and better coping
Other-blame related 
to poorer adjustment
Not reported
Kiecolt-GIaser 
& Williams 
(1987)
(cross-sectional)
Frey et al. 
(1985)
(cross-sectional)
Nielson &
MacDonald
(1988)
(cross-sectional)
Witenberg et al. 
(1983)
(cross-sectional)
49 patients 
with bum 
wounds
64 accident 
victims
58 individuals 
with q)inal 
cord injury
43 patients 
undergoing 
hemodialysis 
treatment
Behaviour self blame 
related to poorer 
compliance with nurses 
more pain behaviour 
and higher depression
Self-blame was related 
to worse recovery
High self-blamers 
were more anxious 
and depressed and 
had greater feelings 
of hostility.
Self-blame showed a 
trend towards being 
related to poor coping 
outcome
Not reported See self-blame
Other blame not 
reported but 
attributing to chance 
and/or fate related to 
better recovery
Not reported
See other blame
See self-blame
Not reported but patients who had been 
unable to identify a cause but had thought 
about it, coped and complied poorly.
Also, attributing to heredity was related to 
better coping outcome and better 
compliance.
Summary of MI causal attribution research findings.
Cowie (1976) 27 patients Specific attributions not reported but general conclusion that the
(cross-sectional) with a first MI MI was made more intelligible and comprehensible if attributions
were made.
Meyer (1983) 30 male patients Younger patients attributed to = family history, genetics and being
(cross-sectional) with MI
Fielding (1987) 148 male 
(cross-sectional) patients with 
a first MI
predestined to illness.
Middle aged patients attributed to= life, stress, work, family 
problems and personal overload.
Elderly patients attributed to = age.
Not reported 
using those 
terms
Not reported 
using those 
terms
Not reported Most common 
to attribute to 
overwork, 
smoking and 
worry
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Table 3.4.1. cont. Summary of MI causal attribution research findings in
relation to self-blame, other-blame. general adjustment and type of attributions.
Study (type) Subjects Self-blame Other-blame General
adiustment
Kroode et al. 33 patients with MI patients have a medical explanation, cancer patients not
(1989) cancer and 14 MI patients check whether medical attribution fits them but
(cross-sectional) patients with MI cancer patients have to search for an explanation.
Mumma & 67 patients with Patients with MI were more likely to attribute to lifestyle factors than
Corkle (1982-83) lung cancer & cancer patients. Most frequent attribution responses by both groups: 
(cross-sectional) 71 patients with don't know, smoking 2tDd stress/worry/tension.
ML
Rudy (1980) 50 patients with Not reported Not reported
(longitudinal) MI and their using those using those
spouses terms terms
Attributions 
and lifestyle 
changes not 
related
Most common 
to attribute to 
tension at work 
and at home
Croog & 205 men with Self-blame or other blame not reported but those who attributed
Richards MI and their their MI to smoking were not more likely to stop smoking than
(1977)
(longitudinal)
wives those who did not see smoking as a cause.
Koslowsky et al. 
(1978)
(cross-sectional)
345 male 
patients with 
MI
Not reported 
using those 
terms
Not reported 
using those 
terms
Not reported Most important 
causes: tension 
at work, nerves, 
worry, smoking
Affleck et al. 
(1987)
(longitudinal)
287 male 
patients with 
MI, an 8 year 
follow-up 
study
Self behaviour 
blame not 
related to 
adjustment or 
other outcome
Other-blame 
related to 
higher 
incidence of 
reinfarction
Attributions 
made 7 weeks 
aJfter MI predict 
health outcome 
8 years later
Most common 
to attribute to 
stress and 
personal 
behaviours ,i.e. 
smoking, eating 
etc.
Burgess & 
Hartman (1986) 
(longitudinal)
180 patients 
with MI
Not reported 
using those 
terms
Not reported 
using those 
terms
Benefits fi'om 
changing 
patients 
attributions
Most common 
to attribute to 
work, smoking, 
diet, heredity 
and fate.
Naea de Valle 
& Norman 
(1992)
(cross-sectional)
81 male pre­
operative 
coronary 
patients
Self behaviour Not reported 
blame was related 
to number of 
lifestyle changes
Not reported Most common 
to attribute to 
stress, work, 
diet, high 
cholesterol, 
smoking and 
heredity
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Chapter 4 presents the empirical study research aims, hypothesis and 
methods and is organised in the following way:
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CHAPTER 4.
The Empirical Study: Research Aims. Hypothesis and Methods.
4.1. Aim.
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the role of coping strategies and 
causal attributions, in particular in relation to distress, following a chronic 
illness. Coping strategies and causal attributions, as the previous literature 
review has shown, have been found to relate to and predict recovery and 
adjustment to illness. However, as argued in previous chapters research in 
this area has a number of limitations, especially in relation to 
methodological issues, which need to be examined further. Another point 
regards the need for longitudinal studies. Most of the studies in this 
literature are cross-sectional but both coping strategies and causal 
attributions are thought to be concepts responsive to change. Cross- 
sectional studies are however, unable to assess change. In addition, 
longitudinal studies are better suited for assessment of chronic diseases 
wliich may require considerable long term adjustment. Considering these 
issues and based on existing findings, the empirical part of this thesis 
sought to examine coping strategies, causal attributions and distress over a 
period of one year following a first myocardial infarction. The study was 
designed to achieve the following 2 main aims:
1) To assess how the process of copmg strategies, causal attributions and 
distress changed over a period of 1 year following a first MI.
and
2) To examine how coping strategies, causal attributions and distress 
related to and predicted one another fi'om one point m time to another.
In order to achieve these aims a longitudinal study design was used which 
enabled the prediction of change, including the following hypothesis:
1) Copmg strategies will change over time.
2) Coping strategies will be concurrently related to and predict levels 
of distress. In particular, avoidant coping strategies will be related 
to lower distress at discharge but higher distress at later follow up.
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3) Causal attributions will be related to and predict coping strategies.
4) Patients will be most likely to attribute their illness to stress and 
smoking.
5) Behavioural self blame will be concurrently related to and predict 
lower levels of distress.
6) Characterological self blame will be concurrently related to and 
predict higher levels of distress.
7) Other-blame will be concurrently related to and predict higher levels 
of distress.
4.2. Methods.
Design.
The design of the present study was longitudinal. Patients with a chronic 
illness, a confirmed first myocardial infarction (WHO criteria) were 
recruited into the study within 72 hours of admission to hospital. Criterion 
for entering the study was that all patients were no older than 70 years, 
able to speak English and to participate in the study procedure and willing 
and able to give informed consent to participate in the study within those 
72 hours of admission. All patients were then followed up over a period 
of 1 year and interviewed on 4 different occasions, within 2 weeks of 
discharge firom hospital, at 2, 6 and 12 months post admission. Each 
follow-up time point was carefully selected with a particular objective in 
mind.
Firstly, within 2 weeks of discharge the patients have very recently gone 
home firom hospital and are in an environment where they need to deal 
with the situation themselves, they no longer have the security of the 
hospital surroundings.
Secondly, at 2 months post admission the patients have been at home for 
some time, but life is not back to normal yet. They are still gomg through 
a healing period and are not back to work. This time was therefore
108
.J
considered important for observation to see how and if things had changed 
since earlier and how the adjustment was being handled.
Thirdly, at 6 months post admission most patients would have passed the 
healing period and life would be just getting back to normal, they would 
recently be back to their previous activities. At this point one could assess 
how things had developed and how or if patients were settling into 
ordinary life routines.
Finally, considering that having an MI is a serious chronic condition, 
examining how patients are and have coped, their causal attributions and 
their levels of distress 1 year following the onset of the illness is of 
considerable importance. This assessment could provide information on 
valuable issues, such as what are the long term effects of the illness and 
how are they being dealt with which in turn could provide information on 
who is likely to have fiirther complications.
M l assessment was designed to be carried out in an interview form using 
pre-structured questionnaires, measuring coping strategies, causal 
attributions and distress as well as gathering demographic information.
Procedure.
The procedure started by seeking Ethical Approval from the Tayside 
Committee On Medical Ethics, which approved the study proposal in time 
for data collection to begin. Patients were recruited within 72 hours of 
admission to hospital. They were all individually approached by one of 
two researchers who explained the nature of the study and asked them if 
they wanted to participate. As the data collection for this study was 
combined with data collection for another empirical study carried out using 
the same patient population, two researchers were involved. This also 
meant that the introduction to the study was somewhat different from what 
was needed for the study described here. The introduction was based on 
explaining the other empirical study, which was a randomised controlled 
trial examining different rehabilitation methods. This involved explaining 
to the patients that if they agreed to participate in the study they would be 
randomly allocated to one of three groups providing different advice and 
care. This was carried out as described below.
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When the patients were approached the researchers introduced themselves 
and asked if they could tell the patient about a study being carried out at 
the hospital. If the patient was interested, the study was explained (see 
Appendix I) as a study interested in what was the best way to give 
information and advice to people who have just had a heart attack. The 
patients were then told about three ways of providing advice and support. 
One way was introduced as the "standard advice and care you receive 
while you are in the hospital" and that everyone entering the study would 
still get the standard care. The second possibility was introduced as 
"additional advice and support while you are in the hospital", so the 
second group would get the standard care plus additional counselling while 
they were in hospital provided by a cardiac recovery sister. The third 
possibility was introduced by saying that people might benefit from 
support after they had gone home. The third group would therefore 
receive standard care plus support from the recovery sister both in hospital 
and after they went home. She would see them weekly for up to six weeks 
after they went home. Patients were also informed that the study was 
interested in seeing how the heart attack affected their partners and they 
would also receive advice and support.
Following this introduction patients were told that if they entered the study 
they would be asked to answer some questions while they were in hospital 
(which was tlien carried out at the recruitment point) and they would also 
be seen at home 4 times, just after discharge from hospital, after 2 months, 
6 months and 1 year, they would be followed up to see how they were 
getting on. They were also assured of confidentiality and anonymity. 
Patients were then asked if they wanted to participate and given a written 
summary about the study. If they agreed to take part they were asked to 
sign a consent form (see Appendix II) and following on from there 
demographic details were written down and the first questionnaire 
introduced. At this point only level of distress was assessed and one open 
ended question which asked what patients thought had caused their MI, no 
coping data was gathered at this time. (Recruitment data is not presented 
in this thesis). The researcher read out the questions, word for word as 
they appeared on the questionnaires and wrote down the patients 
responses, this was the procedure at all times of data collection. Partners, 
defined as the person the patient identified as being the most involved in 
their recovery, were also mvited to participate (partners data was however
no
not included as a part of this thesis and will therefore not be described 
further). The recruitment session concluded by telling the patients that 
they would be contacted again at home within 2 weeks of discharge from 
the hospital. Before those 2 weeks were up the recruitment researcher 
phoned the patient to make an appointment in order to complete the first 
follow-up interview. At this time the patient was informed about the other 
researcher involved in the study and that she would be coming to interview 
their partner.
Follow up interviews with all patients, apart from one, were carried out at 
the patient's home. The one interview wliich was not carried out at the 
patients home was conducted in the hospital at the patient's own wish. All 
interview sessions concluded by thanking the patient and reminding them 
of the next interview time. Approximately 2 weeks before the 2, 6 and 1 
year follow-up interviews all patients were sent a letter (see Appendix III) 
thanking them for participating in the study and reminding them that they 
would soon receive a phone call in order to arrange a time to make an 
appointment to carry out the next interview. About a week before their 
interview was due patients were phoned and an appointment arranged. A1 
follow-up interviews lasted on average 1 hour and 40 minutes.
Study participants.
The participants in the study consisted of patients admitted to a coronary 
care unit (CCU) in a Scottish teaching hospital between January 1992 and 
February 1993. During this period of recruitment into the study, 1274 
patients were admitted to the coronary care unit, 446 were diagnosed as 
having MI of those 271 were eligible for inclusion in the study. 135 were 
approached to participate, the remaining group either died before 
recruitment, were too ill to participate or were unable to be recruited 
within the 72 hours criteria. 13 patients refused to participate in the study 
and 5 were excluded when diagnosis was subsequently changed, i.e., MI 
was not confirmed by cardiac enzymes and/or angiography.
This left 117 patients being successfully recruited and ready for follow-up 
interviews, 17 of those were lost during the follow-up period. 1 patient 
withdrew before 6 months follow-up because of wife's illness, 1 withdrew 
before discharge interview as a result of wife's upset over the questions
and 5 patients withdrew before 6 months interview vrithout giving a 
particular reason, 1 moved out of the region, 7 died, (3 before 2 month 
follow-up, 3 before the 6 months interview and one before the 1 year 
interview) and finally 1 was too ill to complete the 1 year follow-up and 1 
patient was out of the country and therefore not available to complete the 
last interview.
The final sample therefore consisted of 100 patients who were still 
participating in the study 1 year afi:er admission to hospital. This sample 
included 65 males and 35 females with a mean age of 56.03 years, the 
youngest patient being 38 yeatrs old and the oldest 70, all participants were 
white. Additional sample characteristics are summarised in table 4.2.1. 
below. As this table shows, the majority of patients were married, had 
completed secondary school and belonged to social class 3 (as defined by 
the OPCS) either non-manual or manual, with more patients being 
classified as class 3 manual workers.
X  * T * ^ « X *  k 7 4 X fX A M Il^  V ^ U r tJ I  l U ^ I U l X X J U i L .
education level and social class.
Marital Status Percentage
Married 78.8%
Widowed 9.1%
Separated/Divorced 7.1%
Single 5.1%
Education Level
Primary School 8.5%
Secondary School 73.4%
Professional Training 14.9%
University 3.2%
Social Class
Class 1 7.3%
Class 2 14.6%
Class 3 Non-manual 19.5%
Class 3 Manual 34.1%
Class 4 9.8%
Class 5 14.6%
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Chapter 5 presents information about the measures used in the empirical 
study and data coding, data analysis and data screening information. It is 
organised in the following way:
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CHAPTERS
Measures, Data Coding, Data Analysis and Data Screening.
Measures.
The present study used three main measures, one to examine coping 
strategies, another for assessment of causal attributions and the third for 
measuring levels of distress. All of these measures had been developed 
and used in pre-existing literature. An overview of the measurement 
instruments is presented below and a copy of each questionnaire is 
included in Appendix IV.
5.1. Coping Measure.
The COPE, general description.
Coping strategies were assessed using the COPE, a multidimensional 
coping inventory developed by Carver, Scheier and Weintraub (1989) to 
assess the different ways in which people responded to stress. The COPE 
was chosen for this research for the following reasons;
1. It is a standardised measure based on theoretical models.
2. It is based on previous research findings.
3. It is a very comprehensive measure of coping.
4. It can be used to measure both situational and dispositional coping.
Carver et al., set out to develop the COPE as a result of reviewing studies 
which had used the Ways of Coping Scale (WCQ) to assess people’s 
coping. As was pointed out in chapter 2 of this thesis, the WCQ examines 
two main ways of coping, emotion focused coping and problem focused 
coping. Carver et al. pointed out that although the distinction between 
emotion focused - and problem focused coping was an important one, it
was however too simple. This they based on studies which had used the 
WCQ and found that the responses given were not just based on those two 
factors but several other ones as well. For example, while some emotion 
focused coping responses included denial, others involved positive 
reinterpretation of the event and still others were based on seeking social 
support. Carver et ai., argued that these responses were all veiy different 
from one another and that they might therefore have different implications 
for an individual’s success or failure in coping. The same argument went 
for problem focused coping, which could be found to include a number of 
different activities, such as planning, taking direct action, seeking assistant 
or support etc. These different aspects of coping could also lead to 
various different coping outcomes. Therefore, Carver et al., suggested that 
in order to study these actions or thoughts individually, one also needed to 
be able to measure them separately. Furthermore, Carver and colleagues, 
considered that there were at least 3 problems regarding existing measures 
of coping. Firstly, they felt that none of the pre-existing measures gafthered 
all of the specific domains which they considered to be of theoretical 
interest. Secondly, items included in most scales were considered not to 
be focused and clear enough. They combined too many quahties in a 
single item, which leads to uncertainty about what the item measures. 
Finally, Carver et al., criticised existing measures for being constructed 
empirically rather than theoretically. Items on those fists had just been 
picked as examples of potential coping responses not because they 
presented theoretically interesting coping categories. Thus, according to 
Carver et al., it was time for a theoretically based instrument.
With these shortcomings in mind. Carver et al., developed a measurement 
tool based on two theoretical models: The Lazarus model of stress and 
Carver and Scheiefs behavioural self-regulation model (for more 
information on the behavioural self regulation model see Carver & Scheier, 
1981). They also made use of pre-existing research findings which had 
utilised various coping measures.
This resulted in the development of the COPE, a coping inventory which 
initially incorporated 13 different scales. Five scales measure various 
aspects of problem focused coping, active coping, planning, suppression 
o f competing activities, restraint coping and seeking o f social support fo r  
instrumental reasons. Five scales measure aspects of what has been
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referred to as emotion focused coping, seeking o f social support fo r  
emotional reasons, positive reinterpretation, acceptance, denial and 
turning to religion. Three scales measure coping responses which Carver 
et al., referred to as less useful ways of coping, i.Q., focus on and venting 
o f emotions, behavioural disengagement and mental disengagement. In 
addition, two other scales labelled alcohol and/or drug use and humour 
were added at a later stage, these scales were regarded as more 
exploratory.
All these scales, were designed to include 4 items and this was confirmed 
by factor analysis (excluding the alcohol and/or drug use and humour 
scales). Thus, each scale includes 4 items, with four response alternatives; 
" 1 = 1  don’t do this at all", "2 = I do this a little bit", "3 = I do this a 
medium amount" and "4 = I do this a lot". In order to obtain each scale 
total score, the responses to the 4 items that make up each scale are 
summed. Thus each scale can result in a total score of minimum 4 and 
maximum 16 points.
The COPE was developed to assess both situational coping, a response to 
a particular situation or a specific period of time, and dispositional coping, 
a typical response to stress. The way these different types of situations are 
assessed is simply by refiraming the items either in terms of what one 
usually does when under stress or what one is currently doing (or did) as a 
response to a specific situation or at a particular time.
The 15 coping scales proposed by Carver et al., are described as follows:
Problem focused:
1. Active coping refers to the process of taking action to remove or change 
the stressor.
2. Planning is thinking about and/or planning how to deal with the 
stressor.
3. Suppression o f competing activities is when one suppresses other 
activities or puts them aside in order to be able to concentrate more on 
dealing with the stressor.
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4. Restraint coping is waiting and holding back coping responses until the 
situation allows them to be of more use.
5. Seeking o f social support fo r instrumental reasons refers to getting 
assistance, information or advice about how to deal with tlie situation.
Emotion focused:
6. Seeking o f social support fo r emotional reasons is to get sympathy, 
understanding or moral support from other people.
7. Positive reinterpretation and growth is when one tries to make the best 
of the situation by looking at it in a positive way or try to learn from it.
8. Acceptance is accepting that the situation has happened and is for real.
9. Denial is rejecting the fact and reality of the stressful situation.
10. Turning to religion is engaging in religious activities.
Other:
11. Focus on and venting o f emotions refers to being aware of emotional 
distress and tiy to discharge it.
12. Behavioural disengagement is giving up or reducing any efforts in 
trying to control the stressor. It is reflected in terms which are also 
identified as helplessness.
13. Mental disengagement is when one tries to avoid thinking about the 
stressor or what one should do about it. This includes a variety of 
activities such as, daydreaming, sleeping or self-distracting oneself in 
order to prevent the stressor from interfering.
14. Alcohol and /or drug use refers to using alcohol or drugs in order to 
detach the stressor.
15. Humour, laugh or make jokes about the stressor.
Carver et al., based on their theoretical models and previous research, 
predicted that active coping, planning, suppression of competing activities, 
positive reinterpretation and restraint coping would be adaptive ways of 
coping in situations were active coping was required in order to manage 
the stressor. They also predicted that seeking of social support both for 
instrumental and emotional reasons would be adaptive as well as coping 
by religion. Focus on and venting of emotions, denial and mental 
disengagement would on the other hand be maladaptive coping in 
situations were active coping was important. These ways of coping would 
though not be maladaptive in themselves, it would depend on the situation.
Validation o f the COPE.
Carver et al., carried out 3 studies where they examined their proposed 
dimensions of coping included in the COPE. The first of these assessed 
dispositional coping by asking 978 undergraduate students how they 
usually coped when faced with stressful situations in tlieir lives. The 
responses were factor analysed which gave 11 factors. Both the social 
support scales loaded on the same factor and so did active coping and 
planning, the authors did however decide to keep them as separate scales. 
One item which was originally meant to be an aspect of the mental 
disengagement scale, i.e. alcohol and drug use, did not load on any of the 
scales but was nevertheless kept for exploratory reasons. The fifteenth 
scale called humour, was not mentioned in this analysis or the reasons for 
including it.
The second study was carried out to test the construct validity of the 
COPE. This was done by examining the association between coping and 
various personality dimensions which reflected a preference for either 
active, task-aimed coping or showed a tendency against such efforts. 
Again Carver et al., asked undergraduate students to complete the COPE 
as well as personality measures. The results supported the predictions, 
which included that active coping, planning and positive reinterpretation 
and growth would be associated with optimism (measured by the Life 
Orientation Test (LOT)). Optimists have favourable expectations for their 
future, therefore according to Carver et al., optimism should be associated
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with active coping efforts and with making the best of whatever happens. 
Active coping, planning and positive reinterpretation were also foimd to 
be positively related to self-esteem and type A behaviour (positive 
reinterpretation and growth was unrelated to type A), but inversely related 
to trait anxiety. Denial and behavioural disengagement on the otherhand, 
were found to be negatively related to optimism but positively associated 
with trait anxiety.
In this manner Carver et al., examined both the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the COPE and found support for both. Personality 
factors which are thought to be beneficial were related to coping strategies 
which were predicted to be functional, whereas less functional coping 
strategies were inversely related to these beneficial or desirable personality 
factors. The COPE was also found to show discriminant validity. Even 
though the COPE correlated as predicted with personahty factors the 
correlations were not veiy strong, therefore these factors are not identical. 
The COPE scales were also relatively unrelated to other measures of 
coping styles, monitoring and blunting, which were also included in the 
study, therefore they were not measuring the same thing, rather 
complementing each other.
As mentioned above, the COPE was designed to assess both general ways 
of coping and coping with specific situations. Thus, the third and" final 
study examined the apphcabihty of the COPE to assess situational coping 
and the relationship between those two types of coping. The dispositional 
version of the COPE (assessing how one usually copes with stressful 
situations in one's life) was administered to 128 students at the beginning 
of an academic semester. Three weeks later those same students were 
asked to answer the COPE with a particular stressful situation in mind. 
Each student was asked to think of and describe a particular stressful event 
which they had experienced within the last 2 months and complete the 
COPE with this in mind. The results showed that subjects used more 
active coping, more seeking o f social support fo r instrumental reasons, 
more positive reinterpretation and growth, more turning to religion and 
more mental disengagement as their usual way of coping than when they 
were coping with a specific situation.
The COPE scales internal consistency.
When assessing the internal consistency of the COPE, Carver and 
colleagues found it to be acceptably high, all scales, apart from one 
(mental disengagement) gave Cronbachs alpha above 0.6. In the empirical 
study described here the COPE scales were also tested for internal 
consistency. This showed that most scales (on average over the 3 times of 
measure) had internal consistency exceeding 0.6, with the majority of 
scales above 0.8 (see table 5.1.1.). For some reason though, at discharge 
patients seemed not to see the connection between the items belonging to 
the scales mental and behavioural disengagement (alpha of .38 and .28) 
while at 2 and 12 months follow-up the connection was there.
scale at each time of measure.
Coping scale Discharge 2mth 12mth
Acceptance .84 .86 .89
Restraint coping .74 .82 .68
Active coping .76 .79 .68
Seeking social support
for emotional reasons .72 .76 .78
Positive reframing .75 .65 .71
Planning .84 .72 .71
Humour .93 .93 .87
Seeking social support
for instrum, reasons .63 .60 .30
Religion .83 .86 .83
Suppression of competing
activities .57 .58 .52
Mental disengagement .38 .55 .53
Focus on and venting of
emotions .71 .88 .79
Denial .58 .58 .69
Alcohol/drug use .89 .94 .96
Beh. disengagement .28 .81 .78
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Test retest reliability o f the COPE.
Carver et al., obtained test retest reliability evidence for the COPE, using 
two samples who were tested over 6 and 8 week periods. Reliability was 
found to range from 0.42 to 0.89 for different scales with tlie highest for 
coping by religion and lowest for behavioural disengagement. These 
findings suggest, that coping strategies as measured by the COPE are 
relatively stable.
Procedure fo r  use o f the COPE.
The COPE was used at three different time points in this study, at 
discharge, 2mth and 12 mth follow up. (Another type of coping 
assessment, which results will not be reported here, was used at 6 mth 
follow-up. This included open ended questions asking patients specifically 
what they did to cope with certain aspects of the illness). At each time the 
COPE'S questions were read out to the patient and their responses noted 
down. On each assessment occasion patients were asked how they were 
coping with their heart attack at that particular time. In addition, at 12 
months follow-up they were also asked to look back over the year and 
report how they felt they had coped. Finally, also at the 12 month data 
point, 30 items of the COPE were selected, and the patients asked how 
they usually coped with stressful situations in their fives. The 30 items 
used for this assessment were the 30 most frequently reported coping 
responses given by the patients for coping with the MI. All available 
discharge data (n = 70 patients) was analysed m order to get a selection of 
items for this assessment, as the complete version of the COPE was 
considered too long. The COPE was in this manner used both to assess 
situational coping (coping with the MI) and dispositional coping (usual 
way of coping with other stressfiil situations). Tliis last part was added on, 
in order to see how and if coping with an illness, in this case MI, differed 
from how people usually coped with stressful situations in their fives.
5.2, Causal attribution measure.
In order to examine a wide range of causal attributions a variety of 
different assessment methods was used. This included an assessment of 
spontaneous attributions, provoked attributions, checklist attributions, rank
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order of attributions according to importance and finally an examination of 
causal chains. These measures were both empirically and theoretically 
constructed and partly based on methodology introduced by Paul Norman 
(1991). The instrument created including all the above methods was called 
the CAUSE.
Spontaneous causal attributions.
The attribution assessment started by an open ended question to assess 
spontaneous attributions. As was pointed out in chapter 3 of this thesis, 
attribution theory predicts that people spontaneously engage in causal 
attributional search if they are faced with an unexpected, unwanted 
negative event. This question was developed in order to test this prediction 
by examining whether patients mentioned causal attributions if asked an 
open question about their illness. Furthermore, to elicit a few ideas of the 
patient's own thoughts about their condition, rather than to evaluate their 
medical understanding or responding to questions with demand 
characteristics. This question was developed in the beginning of the study 
and initially patients were asked:
’T wonder if you could tell me what your thoughts about your illness are 
now. I am not interested in the medical facts or how the nurses and 
doctors see it, but rather what you think about it now."
This version was however discontinued after interviewing 3 patients who 
found it confusing. The researchers also found that it did not read well. A 
new version was therefore developed which was kept unchanged till the 
end of the study. Thus, spontaneous causal attributions were measured by 
the question:
" I wonder if you could tell me, when you think about your illness what do 
you think about?"
All responses were written down, word for word.
Provoked causal attributions.
The next part of the causal attribution questionnaire examined so called 
provoked attributions. This was also an open ended question but this time 
the patients were directly asked about a cause, i.e., attributions were 
provoked. The question was as follows;
"Many people who have had a heart attack, develop some sort of ideas 
about how they got it. In other words, even though we don't know all the 
causes of a heart attack, most people have some ideas or theory about why 
they have it. I wonder what kind of ideas you have had?"
(This wording was paraphrased from Taylor and colleague's (p. 492, 1984) 
cancer study).
Again all responses were written down, word for word.
Checklist attributions.
The third part of the causal attribution questionnaire consisted of a list of 
34 items (checklist attributions), including possible causes for an MI. This 
list was drawn from previous research in this area (Naea de Valle & 
Norman, 1992; Koslowsky et al., 1978). 22 items were taken from a study 
carried out by Naea de Valle and Norman (1992) where they assessed 
casual attributions made by pre-operative coronary patients. This 
attribution list was based on research findings where patients with MI 
(Baxter, 1987) had been asked open ended questions about the causes for 
their illness. Naea de Valle and Norman's list also included items which 
had been drawn from a list put together by Affleck et. al. (1987) when 
interviewing patients with cancer. The remaining 12 items, used in the 
present study, were either chosen from an attributional hst used by 
Koslowsky et al. (1978), when assessing causal attributions following a 
first MI (9 items) or added by the author (3 items).
The full 34 item list included the following 22 items from Naea de Valle 
and Norman (1992); Stress, worry, eating fatty foods, type o f work that 1 
do/did, overwork, high levels o f cholesterol, it is in the family, smoking, 
being overweight, by chance, fate, high blood pressure, poor diet.
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environmental factors, arguing with people, over exertion or sudden 
exercise, lack o f exercise, driving or being caught up in heavy traffic, 
depression, drinking excessive amounts o f alcohol, by the way other 
people treat me, and listening to other peoples problems.
The 9 items chosen from Koslowsky and colleagues (1978) included: 
Working too hard, stress at work, nerves, punishment fo r  doing wrong, 
payment fo r  sins, bad luck, will o f God, problems with my children and 
problems with my spouse.
In order to have some direct way of assessing if patients engaged in other- 
blame, blamed their own character or overall attributed the illness to 
themselves, the following three items were added to the above hst by the 
author: myself, other people and the kind o f person I  am.
Each patient was asked to indicate which ones of those 34 items they 
thought either had caused their illness, might have caused it or had not 
caused it. The responses were rated on a three point scale, adopted form 
Naea de Valle and Norman's study (1992); No, Might have and Yes. At 
discharge the 34 items were read out one at a time by the researcher and 
answers ticked off. At later follow-up the patient was handed a list with 
the items and asked to look at each one and say which ones they thought 
had either caused their illness or might have caused it. The researcher 
wrote down the answers.
After going through the checklist attributions the patients were asked if 
there was anything they would like to add to the list that they thought 
might have caused their heart attack.
Most important attributions.
The next task included in the causal attribution questionnaire was to ask 
tlie patients to rank the 3 most important causes they had said "yes" to, so 
that the most important cause was mentioned first, the second most 
important next and the third most important one last. Like before the 
responses were written down by the researcher. Initially this was carried
out by laying down cards m front of the patient including all the causes 
they had responded "yes" to while going through the checklist. The patient 
was then asked to look at the cards and pick what they thought were the 3 
most important causes for their heart attack and lay them down in order of 
importance. However, laying down the cards and sorting them out added 
from 5 to 8 minutes to an aheady very long interview, especially when 
patients had picked many causal items as definite causes. Therefore, due 
to the length of the interview this method was discontinued after the first 
10 interviews. After that the researcher read out all the causes the patient 
had said "yes" to and asked about the importance of the causes as 
indicated on the questionnaire sheet (see Appendix IV).
Causal chains.
The final part of the causal attribution questionnaire assessed Brickman 
and his colleague's idea (1975), which was later also pointed out by 
Norman (1991) in relation to coronaiy heart disease, regarding causal 
attribution chains. This was carried out in order to see if patients were 
able to identify how different causes could be related. The question was 
phrased in the following way:
"Do you think that these things have gone together to cause your illness or 
do you think one has led to another, that one cause may have caused 
another?"
All responses were noted down by the researcher. This completed the 
causal attribution assessment.
5.3. Distress measure.
Distress was measured using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale 
(HAD) developed by Zigmond and Snaith (1983). This instrument was 
developed as a self assessment mood scale specifically designed for use 
with patients with physical illness. It is very brief, includes 14 items and 
excludes somatic items which are likely to be derived from physical 
illness. It provides a measure of both anxiety and depression in two 
independent sub-scales, 7 items in each scale with four point response 
alternatives, ranging from 0 to 3. To provide a total score of either anxiety
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or depression the responses to the 7 items for each scale are added 
together, each scale can therefore have a score from 0 to 21. The scores 
are described as ''normaP if  ranging from 0-7, as ''borderline'' if they fall 
between 8-10 and "morbid!' if between 11-21. The HAD can be used both 
as separated individual sub-scales, depression versus anxiety, or as a 
combined scale giving a total score of distress. The study described here 
used both versions.
The HAD was validated using a sample of 100 patients attending general 
medical outpatient clinics. The results showed that the items in each scale 
were all significantly correlated. This also identified sub-scale scores and 
showed that the two sub-scale scores could be used to measure severity of 
both depression and anxiety. Furthermore, the scales were found to have 
discriminant validity, i.e., each scale assessed different aspects of mood 
disorder and finally scale scores were found to be unaffected by physical 
illness.
The internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) for the HAD sub-scales 
examined in the present study, was found to be above 0.7 at all times of 
measure (see table 5.3.1.).
anxiety and denression sub-scales at each time of measure.
Scale Discharge 2mth 6mth 12mth
Anxiety .83 .85 .86 .90
Depression .71 .81 .80 .86
Like the other measures used in this study, the assessment of distress was 
for each particular time point and the items on the HAD were read out by 
the researcher and ticked off on the questionnaire sheet.
As this review of the measurement tools has made clear, all responses for 
all questionnaires were written down by the researcher. This was done in 
order to allow for consistency, as initially some patients might have been 
too unwell to be able to complete the questionnaires themselves.
To conclude this discussion of the study measures, a table showing a 
summary of measures and at which time point they were used, is presented 
below.
Table 5.3.2. Summary of measures at each time point
Measures Time when used
Discharge 2 mth 6mth 12mth
COPE yes yes no yes
CAUSE yes yes yes yes
HAD yes yes yes yes
5.4. Data coding.
The data for the COPE and tlie HAD were coded as has been outlined 
above, i.e., by adding together the scores for all items in each scale. This 
gave information on how the patients were coping and their level of 
anxiety and depression as well as their overall level of distress.
The data from the causal attribution questionnaire, the CAUSE were coded 
in tlie following way:
The first task in coding the causal attribution data was to put the 
previously mentioned 34 checklist items into 7 categories. This was 
carried out in order to be able to assess the amount of self-blame, both 
character - and behaviour self-blame, as well as other categories of 
attributions. Creating such categories or scales of attributions would also
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provide a better relationship assessment between the coping scales and the 
causal attributions.
In order to do this, 10 judges, all psychologists, were given the checklist 
containing the 34 items and asked to put each item into one of 7 categories 
of: behavioural se lf blame, characterological self blame, other blame, 
circumstances, biology, chance and God. Before completing this task the 
judges were asked to do this on an individual bases and not to discuss their 
results with the other judges involved (see Appendix V).
All of the aforementioned categories apart from two, have been used 
before in the literature (see chapter 3). The categories biology and God 
were created by the author. This was done in order to make it easier for 
the judges to fit aU the items into categories. As it turned out the majority 
of the judges felt that they needed both of these categories, all agreed that 
the biology category was necessary but there were mixed feehngs about 
the category "God". Amongst the judges there were some people who 
looked at God as chance and others who considered God to be unrelated 
to chance or any other category, so the final decision was to keep it as a 
separate category.
After gathering the responses from the 10 judges, each item was put into a 
category if over 65% of the judges agreed on its place. The definition of 
the 7 categories and their content is described below:
Behavioural se lf blame: refers to when people blame their own behaviour 
for the event. This category included 11 items from the checklist; stress, 
working too hard, smoking, eating fatty foods, being overweight, poor 
diet, arguing with people, lack o f  exercise, drinking too much alcohol and 
listening to other peoples problems. Raters agreement = 65%.
Characterological self blame: was defined as blaming ones own
character or personality for the event. This included 5 items; myself, 
worry, nerves, depression and the kind o f person I  am. Raters agreement 
= 75%.
Other-blame: blaming other people for the event. This included 4 items 
from the list; other people, by the way other people treat me, problems 
with my children and problems with my spouse. Raters agreement = 80%.
Circumstances: This includes attributing to the environment or factors 
that are external to the person, including the 5 following items; type o f 
work that I  do/did, overwork, driving or being caught up in heavy traffic, 
environmental factors and stress at work. Raters agreement = 85%.
Biology: causes are focused on the individual's biological factors. This 
included 3 items; high levels o f  cholesterol, high blood pressure (BP) and 
it is in the family. Raters agreement = 100%.
Chance: Attributing to chance or fate. This included 3 items from the list; 
by chance, fate  and bad luck. Raters agreement = 100%.
God: This category refers to when people focus their attributions on God 
or religious beliefs. This included 3 items; Will o f God, payment fo r sins 
and punishment fo r  doing wrong. Raters agreement = 85%.
The internal consistency of the categories is given in table 5.4.
Table 5.4.1.
attribution checklist categories at each time of measure. (Scores: 1 =
no, 2 = might have and 3 = yes).
Category Discharge 2mth 6mth 12mth
Behaviour self blame .59 .49 .35 .25
Character self blame .59 .53 .23 .29
Other-blame .61 .65 .46 .45
Circumstances .61 .60 .57 .47
Chance .49 .54 .65 .63
Biology .19 .26 .27 .13
God .18 .63 .04 .20
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This analysis shows that in this case attempting to get all items together 
into causal attribution categories resulted in clusters of relatively 
independent causal attributions being grouped together. The same low 
internal consistency was found when using factor analysis to group the 
items. However, as pointed out by Billing and Moos (1981), psychometric 
estimates of internal consistency may have limited applicability in 
measures of this kind, as one response in each category may be sufficient 
as an explanation for the event. This might therefore account for the 
categories low internal consistency. Given the advantage of having items 
sampled together for data analysis simplicity (Carver, 1989), these 7 
categories were kept in the study in order to provide total scores of causal 
attributions.
The second part of coding the responses on the CAUSE was to code the 
answers to questions 1 and 2. The spontaneous attributions (responses to 
question 1) and the provoked attributions (responses to question 2) were 
coded in the same way. This was carried out by 2 independent raters, one 
was the author of this thesis (rater 1), the other (rater 2) a lawyer, who had 
no prior knowledge of the content of those measures or what they were 
meant to achieve. Each rater was first of all presented with the responses 
to question 1 (spontaneous attributions) and asked to put them into pre­
structured categories. Rater 1 went througli all given responses at all 
assessment times. Rater 2 picked 30 participants out of a hat at each 
assessment time and coded their responses. In order to make sure that all 
participants were picked by the second rater at least once, all 30 numbers 
which had been picked for one assessment point were excluded when it 
came to picking numbers for the next time point, etc., etc. This same 
procedure was carried out for responses to question 2 (provoked 
attributions). The instructions given to both raters were as follows:
"These are answers given by patients following their first MI. We are 
interested in coding their answers and putting them into categories 
according to the statement given below. Before you start, please read the 
statement carefiilly:
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causal attributional (CA) statement is a stàtement that explains or 
explores the reasons or causes fo r a particular event or class o f events, 
where event refers to a reported outcome or behaviour or situation, "
(Taken with permission from Christine Barrowclough PhD thesis, p. 55, 
1991).
Your task is to:
1. Please, indicate whether you think the patient has made a causal 
attribution statement by following tlie definition for a causal statement 
given above. Use the table below to list your answers.
2. If a causal attribution is made, is it one of the ones mentioned on the 34 
item list?
3. If the causal attribution is not on the list, please write what it is and if 
the patient said "Don't know" write that down.
4. Which of the 7 categories does it belong to?
and finally
5. Does the patient say "Why me", "Why did it happen" or "Both".
The raters were given the 34 item checklist and the hst including the 7 
attribution categories described previously.
The table included the following items to be completed by the raters:
Subject number.
Causal attribution is made "l=no", "2=yes".
Causal attribution number on the list, from 1 to 34.
If the causal attribution is not on the list, please state below what the 
attribution is and also state here if response was "Don't know".
Category number, 1 to 7.
"Why me=l", "Why did it happen=2" and "Both=3". (see Appendix V for 
a copy of this table).
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After both raters had completed this task their coding for all 5 tasks was 
compared and the average rater agreement for all 4 measurement times for 
spontaneous attributions was found to be; 93.2% for task 1, 95% for task 
2 and 3, 93% for task 4 and 98% for task 5. For provoked attributions 
raters agreement for task 1 to 4 was 95% and 98% for task 5.
The rest of the attribution questionnaire was used in its original form 
mostly for descriptive puiposes.
5.5. Data analysis.
The statistical analysis reported in this study were all carried out using the 
Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences (SPSS-PC) (Norusis, 1990). 
All analysis was solely carried out by the author with statistical advice 
from a statistician, Beth Pollard as well as the thesis supervisors. 
Professors Marie Johnston and Derek Johnston.
5.6. Data screening.
Prior to analysis the data was examined through various SPSS-PC 
programs for accuracy of data entry, normahty, missing values and 
outliers. To reduce extreme skewness and kurtosis certain scales were 
either square root or logarithmically transformed (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1989). Since these methods did not seem to have an effect on the results 
of the analysis, the data were used in its original form for multivariate 
analysis. Missing data included 9 patients who had not completed 
answering the COPE in relation to how they were coping at 12 mth follow 
up. This was due to unavoidable circumstances which involved new 
untrained researchers having to take over from one of the projects previous 
investigators to complete the data collection. As a result of this, data 
reported in this study is based on 91 subjects, although 100 patients 
completed all interviews. One exception, is data presented on how patients 
coped with the MI versus how they reported to cope with other stressful 
situations in their lives, for these questions full data set, including 100 
patients, was available. Few missing values were found and they were
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scattered randomly through the data set. In order to replace missing 
values, means were calculated from available data prior to analysis. 
Finally, as mentioned on the previous page the study variables were first 
analysed individually, therefore both outliers and extreme scores were 
included in those analysis, since as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1989), it is considered a better methodology to see if univariate outliers 
are also multivariate outliers before deciding what to do with them. A 
further examination of outliers and extreme scores was therefore carried 
out when other variables were included in the study. As the results of this 
analysis showed that univariate outliers were not found to be multivariate 
outliers, i.e., the same person was not extreme on all variables, at this 
point it was decided to let outliers remain in the analysis, but steps were 
taken to reduce their influence, i.e., variables were transformed with the 
techniques described above. The transformation was undertaken to try to 
change the distribution of the data as close to normal as possible. In this 
method outUers are kept in and remain on the tail of the distribution; their 
impact is however reduced. In this case the results of the analysis did 
however, remain the same before and after transformation.
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RESULTS.
Chapter 6 : Univariate Results.
The results section begins witli univariate data analysis (chapter 6), 
presenting data at each time point as well as over time. This begins by 
section 6.1. describing univariate coping results, followed by section 6.2. 
with causal attribution univariate results and finally section 6.3. describing 
distress results.
Chapter 7 : Bivariate and Multivariate Results.
Chapter 7 starts by assessing bivariate results, beginning with section 7.1. 
exaniming whether there is a sex or age difference in how patients cope, 
what kind of attributions they make and how distressed they are. The next 
section (7.2.) examines the relationship between causal attributions and 
coping strategies, both concuirent and over time. The third part (section 
7.3.) examines the relationship between causal attributions and distress 
and asks if they are concurrently related and whether causal attributions 
predict distress. Finally, the last bivariate section (7.4.) examines the 
relationship between coping strategies and distress. Chapter 7 also 
presents multivariate results (section 7.5.), where m a multiple regression 
analysis both causal attributions and coping strategies are used as 
predictors of distress. This section also presents results on what are the 
best predictors of coping strategies and causal attributions. Chapter 7 
concludes with section 7.6., presenting a summary of all of the study 
findings, including univariate, bivariate and multivariate results.
CHAPTER 6.
6.1. Univariate coping results.
This part of the data analysis examined coping strategies as assessed by 
the COPE witli the aim to examine if coping changed over time and 
whether the 15 COPE strategies could be divided into attention versus 
avoidant coping using the definition given by Suis and Fletcher (1985).
The univariate coping results are divided into the following sub­
sections:
Sub-section 6,LL shows the pattern o f coping at each time o f measure 
and how it changes over time.
Sub-section 6,L2, presents data on overall coping (all the 15 coping 
scale scores put together), and how it changed over time.
Sub-section 6,1.3, presents findings on how and i f  some types o f coping 
strategies were used more or less than others. This was analysed fo r  
each time point.
Sub-section 6,1.4, presents how different coping strategies were related 
to one another, all concurrent relationships.
Sub-section 6,1,5. assessed whether coping could be grouped into 
attention versus avoidant coping based on the definition given by Suis 
and Fletcher (1985).
Sub-section 6,1,6, shows the pattern o f attention and avoidant coping 
within each time and over time.
Sub-section 6,1,7, asks whether coping at one time predicts subsequent 
coping.
Sub-sections 6,1,8. and 6,1,9, shows whether coping with the M l differed 
from how the patients reported to cope with other stressful situations.
Sub-section 6,1,10, presents a summary o f univariate coping results.
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6.1.1. Pattern of coping across time.
The first part of the data analysis was to examine the nature of patients' 
coping reactions both within each time of measure and across different 
times. These results are presented below in table 6.1.1. and graph 6.1.1.
These findings showed that coping by acceptance had the highest mean at 
all times of measure, indicating that these patients were right fi*om the start 
and continued to be, willing to accept that they had suffered an MI. At 
discharge coping by acceptance was followed by restraint coping, i.e., 
holding back or waiting for the right time to do things. Next came the use 
of active coping, seeking o f social support for emotional reasons, 
thinking positively about the illness (positive reframing) and planning. 
At 2 months follow up this order of coping had changed shghtly, active 
coping was now reported to be used more than restraint coping which 
however still followed closely behind it. Seeking o f social support fo r  
emotional reasons and positive reframing were still reported among the 
top 5 coping strategies, but now followed by coping by humour and 
religion. At twelve months post MI patients reported to cope mostly by 
religion, seeking o f social support fo r emotional reasons, positive 
reframing, focus on and venting o f emotions, active coping and 
humour. The least used coping strategies at all times of measure were 
coping by alcohol and/or drug use and by feelings of withdrawing or 
giving up (behavioural disengagement).
These results also showed that many coping reactions were more 
prominent early in the crisis than later. Repeated measures analysis 
(MANOVA) showed a significant overall effect for 10 scales (table 6.1.2. 
& graph 6.1.1.). Restraint coping, active coping, seeking o f social 
support, positive reframing, planning, humour and suppression o f  
competing activities all these coping efforts showed a significant decrease 
across the 3 measurement points. They all appeared to be used most at 
discharge but less at 2 and 12 months post MI. Acceptance and alcohol 
and/or drug use on the other hand showed a significant increase across 
time.
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Table 6.1.1. Means, std Dev and F values for all coping scales at each time
Discharge 2mth follow UD 12mth follow UD
Cooing Strategies Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev F(DF^2) P*Acceptance 12.11 3.19 13.66 2.90 13.58 3.05 12.49 .0011
Restraint 10.78 3.29 8.35 2.88 6.23 1.90 84.59 .0011
Active coping 9.92 3.19 8.93 2.56 6.87 1,94 46.04 .0011
Supp.for emotions 9.24 3.29 8.30 3.18 7.30 2.74 14.47 .0011
Positive reframing 8.80 3.31 7.93 2.16 7.29 2.36 10.40 .0011
Planning 8.22 3.63 7.18 2.53 5.24 1.48 36.39 .0011
Humour 8.00 3.52 7.63 3.12 6.63 1.90 9.65 .0011
Supp for instr. reasons 7.85 2.88 6.60 2.33 5.60 1.51 31.19 .0011
Religion 7.44 3.66 7.32 3.87 7.98 3.70 2.71 H.V
Supp. comp, activities 7.33 2.78 6.20 1.94 5.41 1.41 23.30 .0011
Mental disengagement 6.67 2.42 6.47 2.47 6.35 2.06 .94 ns
Focus/venting emotion 6.67 2.80 7.02 3.29 6.64 2.77 .79 nsDenial 6.18 2.47 6.01 2.61 6.16 2,68 .18 nsAlcoh/drug use 4.55 1.87 4.57 1.98 5.09 2.55 3.04 .051
Behav. disengagement 4.43 1.03 4.62 1.90 4.81 1.79 2.18 ns
Means
^Significance levels for F values across repeated measurements. N=91
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Graph 6.1.1. Patients coping at discharge, 2 mth and 12 mth post MI.
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The pattern of coping was also tested for linearity and quadratic over time 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). This was carried out in order to assess 
whether each coping strategy went in a straight line either up or down over 
time. These estimates of linearity are presented below in table 6.1.2. The 
results showed that the 10 strategies that changed over time showed linear 
relationships. Eight went in a straight line down (negative t-value), 
showing a steady decline in use over time and 2 showed a straight line 
going up (positive t-value), indicating a straight increase in use over time. 
None of the relationships were found to be quadratic. These results can 
also be visualised by examining graph 6.1.1.
Table 6.1.2. Tests of linearity for each coping strategy over time.
Cooing Strategies
T-value p*
Acceptance 3.82 .001
Restraint -11.96 .001
Active coping -8.37 .001
Supp.for emotions -5.16 .001
Positive reframing -4.52 .001
Planning -8.04 .001
Humour -4.40 .001
Snpp.f advice -8.06 .001
Religion 1.78 ns
Supp. comp, activities -6.55 .001
Mental disengagement -1.49 ns
Focus/venting emotion -.096 ns
Denial -.035 ns
Alcoh/drug use 2.05 .042
Behav. disengagement 1.87 ns
♦=Significance levels for T-values. N=91
6.1.2. Overall coping across time.
Further analysis calculated an overall coping score for each measurement 
point by adding the scores for all 15 scales together. Table 6.1.3. shows 
that coping at discharge had the highest mean which then fell at 2 months 
and fell even further at 12 months post MI and these differences were 
significant as obtained by repeated measurement analysis. These findings 
therefore supported the prediction that coping would change over time.
Table 6.1.3. Means, std Dev and F values for overall coping scores at all 
measurement points (discharge. 2mth and 12mth post MD.
Discharge 2 mth post MI 12 mth post Ml
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev F (DF=2) p*
Cooing 118.23 20.09 110.79 15.54 101.17 11.90 39.61 .001
^Significance levels for overall F value across repeated measurements. N=91
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A test of linearity was also carried out for overall coping, which showed a 
significant t-value of -3.96, (p = <.001), indicating a straight line 
relationship in overall coping from one time to another.
6,1.3. Prevalence of aspects of coping.
Another aspect of this data analysis was to examine whether some kinds of 
coping methods would occur more than others. Tukey pairwise 
comparison tests, which take into account the number of comparisons 
being made, were used for this analysis (Montgomery, 1984). The 
results from these tests showed that the majority of coping strategies were 
not reported to be used significantly more or less than any other strategies. 
The only coping strategy that behaved a little different was coping by 
acceptance which was reported significantly more often than most other 
coping strategies at all times of measure. These findings are all presented 
in tables 6.1.4.(discharge coping), 6.1.5. (2 mth coping) and 6.1.6. (12 mth 
coping).
c o D in s  strategies: results from Tukev tests.
■
Coping at 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 14 12 13 12 15
discharge
1. Acceptance ;2. Restraint
3. Active coping
4. Supp. for emotion
5. Positive reframing *
6. Planning *
7. Humour *
8. Supp. for advice * *
9. Religion * *
10. Supp comp, activities * *
11. Mental disengagement * * *
12. Focus/venting emotion * * *
13. Denial * * *
14. Alcohol/drug use * * * * * *
15. Behav. disengagement * * * * * * * *
Significant difference at the .05 leveL N=91
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cooing strategies; results from Tukev tests.
Coping at 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 12 15
2 mth
l.Acceptance
2. Restraint *
3. Active coping *
4. Supp. for emotion *
5. Positive reframing *
6. Planning *
7. Humour *
8. Supp. for advice A
9. Religion *
10. Supp comp, activities A
11. Mental disengagement A
12. Focus/venting emotion A
13. Denial A
14. Alcohol/drug use A A A A
15. Behav. disengagement A A A A A
* == Significant difference at the .05 level. N=91
Table 6.1.6. Significant difference at 12 mth in the reoorted use of individual
cooing strategies, results from Tukev tests.
Coping at 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 12 15
12 mth
1. Acceptance
2. Restraint A
3. Active coping A
4. Supp. for emotion A
5. Positive reframing A
6. Planning A
7. Humour A
8. Supp. for advice A
9. Religion A
10. Supp comp, activities A
11. Mental disengagement A
12. Focus/venting emotion A
13. Denial A
14. Alcohol/drug use A
15, Behav. disengagement A A
* = Significant difference at the .05 level. N=91
How are coping strategies related?
The next 4 sub-sections are all, apart from section 6.1.6., concerned with 
how individual coping strategies were related to each other and how and if 
they could be grouped together. The first of these analysis examined 
relationships between different coping strategies within each assessment 
time (sub-section 6.1.4.). Based on those results, the next part (sub­
section 6.1.5.), examined whether the 15 individual coping strategies could
be grouped together into avoidant versus attention coping as defined by 
Suis and Fletcher (1985). The third part (sub-section 6.1.6.), assessed the 
pattern of these dimensions. Finally, the last section (sub-section 6.1.6.), 
assessed whether coping at one time predicted subsequent coping, both 
regarding consistency and change across time.
6.1.4. Concurrent relationships between coping strategies.
How did the coping strategies relate to one another within each assessment 
time? This analysis, using Pearson's correlation, examined the concurrent 
relationships between each coping strategy at all assessment times. Tables 
6.1.7., 6.1.8. and 6.1.9. display these findings.
The results showed several relationships between different coping 
strategies. Most of these relationships occurred during the early phases of 
the iUness, i.e. at the discharge assessment point and a number of these 
remained at subsequent times. Overall, these findings showed that there 
appeared to be a cluster of relationships between coping strategies which 
aU showed tendencies to pay attention to the situation/illness. These 
included relationships between coping by positive reframing, active 
coping, planning, seeking o f  social support fo r both emotional and 
instrumental reasons, suppression o f competing activities and restraint 
coping. Another type of coping relationships showing inclination towards 
avoiding the situation itself or avoiding paying attention to it, also emerged 
to some degree, although not as consistent as the aforementioned ones, at 
all assessment times. These included significant associations between 
mental disengagement, focus on and venting o f emotions, denial, alcohol 
and/or drug use and behavioural disengagement. Coping by acceptance 
was inversely related to most of these "avoidant" strategies, in particular at 
2 and 12 months post MI. Coping by humour was consistently at all times 
of measurement, not significantly related to any other coping strategy. A 
similar finding emerged for coping by religion, which was only found to 
be significantly related to one other form of coping, i.e., active coping at 2 
months post MI.
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6.1.5. Can coping strategies be grouped into avoidant versus attention
coping ?
Based on the correlation findings presented in the previous section (6.1.4.) 
and the definition of avoidant versus attention coping, put forward by Suis 
and Fletcher (1985), the next analysis involved a factor analysis of all the 
coping strategies. A two factor solution was chosen in order to see 
whether the coping strategies would group together into those two broader 
dimensions (avoidant vs. attention). This was carried out for each 
assessment time and rehability scores calculated for each factor. The 
results are presented below in table 6.1.10.
Table 6.1.10. A two factor solution for the 15 cooing strategies. N=91
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2
CoDins Strategies Discharge 2nith 12mth Discharge 2mth 12mth
Restraint coping .54168 .60415 .74035 ,22453 .11008 -.13844
Active coping .78786 . ‘79756 .75401 .22817 -.20232 -.23354
Support for emotions .37365 .51477 .58390 .34943 .21261 .12271
Positive reftaming .69916 .52367 .29422 .15093 -.11444 -.27362
Planning .70589 .65383 .73375 .15919 -.16569 .05126
Support for advice .61695 .44710 .60144 .15106 -.04499 .01804
Supp. comp, activities .71306 .66909 .70631 .33115 .25908 .29370
Acceptance .63798 .02686 -.110.32 -.48795 -.80675 -.86014
Mental disengagement .31646 .27146 .27589 .55449 .60343 .75723
Focus/venting emotions .04402 .32253 .43967 .69375 .56432 .45812
Denial -.41935 -.01201 -.11777 .57511 .70523 .79622
Alcohol/drug use .06577 -.21484 -.20966 .38110 .49760 .72974
Behav. disengagement .05194 -.28306 .13676 .39943 .40673 .73652
Religion .09812 .44669 .12067 -.04021 .04007 -.23192
Humour .19297 .11549 -.21033 -.04620 -.08941 .14798
After examining the coping strategies which loaded highest on each factor 
(loaded at least above 0.3), (see Bryman & Cramer, 1992) these results 
clearly indicated two dimensions of coping which were found to be not 
significantly intercorrelated (r=.09 at discharge, r=-.02 at 2 mth and r=-.03 
at 12 mth). One, in this case factor 1, contained items which could be 
defined as focusing attention on the source of the situation/illness and/or 
on ones reactions to the situation/illness. The other, factor 2, included 
items that focus attention away firom the situation/illness and/or on ones 
reactions to the situation/illness (Suis & Fletcher, 1985). Factor 1, which 
according to these findings and based on Suis and Fletchers (1985) 
definition, could be labeled attention coping, included 7 items. Factor 2,
labeled avoidant coping, included 6 items. Coping by acceptance loaded 
highly on both factors at discharge but belonged with factor 2 at follow up, 
it was therefore grouped with factor 2 items. Two coping strategies, 
humour and religion appeared to be independent, both these items loaded 
below 0.3 on both factors. One exception was coping by religion at 2 
months follow up, where it loaded with attention coping. In general 
coping by humour and/or religion did however, at least not in this 
population, belong to the broader dimensions of either attention or 
avoidant coping.
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated, in order to examine whether the coping 
strategies included in each factor did in fact represent a single idea of 
either attention or avoidant coping and whether they were internally 
consistent. Rehability for the attention factor was reasonably high at all 
times but the avoidant factor was less reliable in particular at discharge. 
This could be due to effects from the low rehability's of the mental and 
behavioural disengagement scales at that time (see table 5.1.1.), the 
avoidant factors rehabihty did however, increase at follow up. These 
findings are presented in table 6.1.11. below.
Table 6.1.11. Cronbach^s alpha for the two cooing factors.
_____________________________ Discharge____________ 2 mth 12 mth
Attention coping (factor 1) .80 .71 .72
Avoidant coping (factor 2) .47 .55 ,75
6.1.6. How did the patients use attention vs. avoidant coping ^nd how 
did that pattern change over time?
The next step was to examine the pattern of these broader dimensions of 
coping into attention vs. avoidant coping. This included, as was carried 
out for individual strategies before, assessing mean values and use 
repeated measure analysis (MANOVA) to test whether there was a 
significant difference between the use of each strategy over time. These 
findings which can be found in table 6.1.12. below, showed that there was 
a significant difference in both attention and avoidant coping over time. A 
test of linearity was also carried out which found a linear relationship 
between both attention and avoidant coping over time. For attention
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coping t = -12.10, p< .001, indicating that the use of attention coping 
showed a steady and straight line decline over the 3 assessment points. 
Avoidant coping on the other hand, had a t = 2.48, p .015, showing a 
significant linear relationship between avoidant coping over time but 
towards a straight Ime increase as time went on. For attention coping 
these results are not surprising, as it could be expected that patients might 
not need to be involved and pay attention to the illness as much at a later 
stage as they did towards the illness onset. Finding an increase in avoidant 
coping as time passes might perhaps mean that as patients let go of 
attention coping strategies, avoidant ones take over. This could be
examined by for example, looking at whether there is a relationship 
between attention coping at discharge and avoidant at 2 months post MI.
Table 6,1.12, Means, std Dev and F values for avoidant and attention coping at 
each assessment time.
Discharge 2 mth 12 mth
Mean std Dev Mean std Dev Mean std Dev F (DF=2) p*
Attention coping 62.14 15.47 53.49 11.20 43.93 8.45 86.87 .001
Avoidant coping 40.65 6.19 42.35 6.26 42.64 6.48 4.45 .013
The next question to be asked was whether there was a difference in the 
use of attention and avoidance coping within each thne. Analysis in the 
form of paired t-tests, based on the mean scores for each factor, found a 
significant difference in the use of these ways of coping both at discharge 
and at 2 months post MI, but not at 12 months. Attention coping appeared 
to be used more closer to the illness onset than avoidant coping, while 1 
year later these coping methods did not differ. These results are displayed 
m table 6.1.13.
6.1.13. Related T-tests comparing attention and avoidant coping within each 
time of measure.
Attention coping
Discharge 2 mth post Ml 12 mth post MI
T-value (DF=90) p T-value (DF=90) p T-value (DF=90) p 
Avoidant coning 14.45 .001 8.74 .001 1,21 ns
Although the coping data presented in this thesis has been grouped into 
those broader dimensions of attention vs. avoidant coping, coping results 
will however also continue to be presented for individual strategies.
6.1.7. Poes cooing at one time predict subsequent coping?
This section examines two questions. Firstly, is coping consistent across 
time? Secondly, does coping change across time, and if so how? This 
was assessed by correlation analysis.
Section 6.1.3. looked at one form of consistency m copmg within time, 
another way of looking at consistency is to examine the correlations 
between each coping reaction over the span of the study. Table 6.1.14. 
shows that individual coping strategies did correlate moderately highly 
with one another and most correlations were significant. Copmg at 
discharge and at 2 months appeared to be consistent but the lowest 
stabihty as could have been expected, was between discharge and 12 
months coping. When looking at coping grouped together into attention 
and avoidant coping this form of consistency continued. On the whole 
these results revealed a fair amount of consistency in coping across the 
span of study.
Table 6.1.14. Correlations between the same coning strategy across all 
measurement points (coning at discharge correlated with cooing at 2mth and 12 
mth and cooing at 2mth correlated with coning at 12mth post MB.
Copine at discharee with 2mthtwstMI & 12mthpostMI 2iuthwith 12mthmstMI
Acceptance .40** .30* .50**
Restraint .46** .10/15 .17n5
Active coping .50** .14/15 .20*
Support for emotions .46** .30* .34**
Positive reframing .36** .40** .37**
Planning .29* .26* .12/15
Humour .51** .53** .36**
Support for advice .29* .40** .34**
Religion .72** .69** .69**
Suppress other activities .15ns 23n5 .27*
Mental disengagement .38** .47** .32**
Focus/venting of emotions .39** .31* .50**
Denial .46** .32** .33**
Alcohol/drug use .10ns .39** .65**
Behavioural disengagement .25 .12n5 .73**
Attention coping .49** .40** .33*
Avoidant coping .36** .27* .57*
N = 91 2-tailcd significance; * - .01 **- .001
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This section also examined how different coping strategies were related 
over time. This was carried out both for the broader dimensions of 
attention and avoidant coping (see table 6.1.15.) and for all the 15 
strategies individually (see tables 6.1.16., 6.1.17. and 6.1.18.).
As can be seen from table 6.1.15., using attention coping at one time did 
not predict the use of avoidant coping at subsequent times. The same was 
true for avoidant coping, coping by avoidance at one time did not predict 
that the patients would use attention coping at a later time. These patients 
did therefore not seem to change from one form of coping to another over 
time as suggested earUer.
6.1.15. Correlations between attention copins at discharge and 2 mth with 
avoidant covins at 2 and 12 mth & correlations between avoidant covins at 
discharge and 2 mth with attention copine at 2 and 12 mth.
Avoidant coping 
2 mth 12 mth
Attention coning at discharge .03 ns -.03 ns
" " at 2 mth -.00 ns
Attention coning 
2 mth 12 mth 
Avoidant coning at discharge .04 ns .10 ns
" " " " at 2 mth .12 ns
Although these broader ways of coping did not seem to predict one 
another from one time to the next, it was decided to examine how 
individual strategies were related over time. Considering the number of 
comparisons being made a Bonferroni test was used to correct the 
significance level for these correlations. A Bonferroni test takes into 
account the fact that more than one comparison is being made. This is 
calculated by working out the total number of comparisons being made, in 
this case 14, and divide the chosen significance level (p<0.05) by this 
number. The result is treated as the appropriate significance level, which 
in this case resulted in a p < .0033. These results are displayed in table 
6.1.16. relationships between copmg at discharge and coping at 2 months, 
table 6.1.17., coping at discharge and at 12 months and in table 6.1.18. 
which shows relationships between 2 and 12 months coping.
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A number of significant relationships did emerge from this analysis. For 
example, coping by acceptance at discharge was related to less 
suppression of competing activities and less denial at 2 months. Using 
acceptance coping at 2 months was also associated with less alcohol 
and/or drug use, less feelings of giving up or withdrawing (behavioural 
disengagement) and less coping by humour at 12 months.
If one was coping by restraint at discharge one was likely to use active 
coping at 2 months and vice versa. Restraining oneself at discharge was 
also related to suppressing other activities and seeking support for 
instrumental reasons at 2 months, these relationships did however not 
show between 2 months restraint coping and other strategies at 12 months. 
Only one significant relationship appeared between restraint coping at 2 
months and coping at 12 months, this was when using restraint coping 2 
months post MI seemed to predict suppression of competing activities at 
12 months.
Seeking o f social support fo r  both emotional and instrumental reasons
at discharge were significantly related to a number of other forms of 
coping at 2 months, including restraint coping, active coping, seeking of 
social support for instrumental reasons and a trend towards significance 
was found between seeking of social support for instrumental reasons and 
suppression of competing activities. Tlie power of these coping strategy to 
predict other forms of coping did however not continue to coping at 12 
months neither did they show any significant relationships between 2 and 
12 months coping.
To use planning as a coping strategy at discharge was associated with 
active coping both 2 and 12 months later and those copmg by planning at 
discharge seemed to think more positively about the illness at 2 months.
Coping by mental disengagement, behavioural disengagement, focus on 
and venting o f emotions, denial and alcohol and/or drug use all these 
coping strategies seemed to be associated with and predict one another to 
some degree. They also appeared to be related to suppression of
competing activities at subsequent times and were in all cases inversely 
associated with coping by acceptance.
Finally, coping by humour or religion did not predict any other form of 
coping at subsequent times. Suppression o f competing activities showed 
a similar result, with one exception where this form of coping at 2 months 
predicted focus on or venting of emotions at 12 months post MI.
On the whole these correlation results for individual coping strategies did 
not seem to indicate that one form of what had been grouped as attention 
strategy was associated with or predicted avoidant strategy. Two 
exceptions did however mnerge, these were coping by focus on and 
venting o f emotions and behavioural disengagement at discharge, which 
both predicted seeking of social support for instrumental reasons at 12 
months post MI.
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6.1.8. Do patients cope differently with the MI than they do when 
coping with other difficult situations in their lives?
This section examined how and if coping with an MI would differ from 
how the patients usually coped (referred to as general coping) with 
difficult and stressful situations in their lives. This assessment was carried 
out at the 12 month follow up time, where the patients were asked how, 
looking back over the year, they had coped with the MI and how they 
usually coped with other stressful situations in their lives. Table 6.1.19. 
shows means and standard deviations for overall coping obtained by 
adding all 15 coping scales together both for coping with the MI and 
general copmg. As can be seen there, general coping had a higher mean 
than coping with MI, a difference that was significant.
Table 6.1.19. Means, std Dev and F values for coping with an MI versus 
coping with other difficult or stressful situations.
Coping with MI General cooing
Means Std Dev hleans Std Dev F p*
Coping 56.62 8.21 60.17 9.00 26.13 .001
*SigniüGance levels for overall F values.
As in previous sections, the 15 coping strategies were divided into 
attention and avoidant coping based on the factor analysis described in 
sub-section 6.1.5. These two forms of coping were compared for coping 
with the MI and general coping. The results, which are presented in table 
6.1.20. showed that attention coping was reported to be used significantly 
more for general coping than when coping with the MI, the reverse was 
true for avoidant coping. Avoidant coping was reported to be used 
significantly more for coping with the MI than general coping.
Table 6.1.20. and graph 6.1.2. show means for individual coping strategies 
for both types of coping. Acceptance coping as before was most frequent 
both for general coping and for coping with the MI. This was then 
followed for coping with the M I  with religious coping, active coping, 
seeking o f social support fo r emotional reasons, positive reframing and 
restraint coping. For general coping acceptance was followed by active 
coping, planning, religion, positive reframing and seeking o f support fo r  
emotional reasons. The least used coping efforts were the same for both 
coping with the MI and general coping, at the bottom were behavioural 
disengagement and alcohol and/or drug use.
Table 6.1.20. Means.std Dev and F values for cooing with MI and for generally 
cooing with difficult and stressful situations. (The COPE 30 items)
Coning with MÏ General coning
CoDins Strategies Mean Std Dev Mem Std Dev F(DF=‘99) p
Acceptance 6.92 1.67 6.88 1.38 0.6 nsReligion 4.83 2.51 4.96 2.57 2.16 ns
Active coping 4.62 1.58 5.53 1.31 32.77 .001Supp.for emotions 4.18 1.80 4.26 1.81 .57 nsPositive reframing 4.09 1.37 4.38 1.33 4.61 .034
Restraint 3.95 1.42 3.64 1.38 4.50 .036
Mental disengagement 3.64 1.43 3.50 1.20 1.15 nsPlanning 3.52 1,12 5.28 1.33 1.15 nsFocus/venting of emotions 3.61 1.63 3.55 1.45 .33 nsHumour 3.35 1.17 3.42 1.22 .92 nsDenial 3.13 1.53 2.74 .98 9.19 .003Supp for instr. reasons 3.04 1.33 4.32 1.61 45.54 .001Supp. competing activities 2.79 .97 2.97 1.07 2.38 nsAlcohol/drug use 2.52 1.31 2.48 1.18 .23 nsBehavioural disengagement 2.43 .98 2.26 .76 5.29 .024
Attention coping 26.19 5.93 30.38 5.98 56.48 .001Avoidant coping 22.25 3.52 21.41 3.23 8.36 .005
^Significance levels for F values.
Means
accept
religion
active
emot-supp,
growth
restraint
ment-dis.
planning 
emotions 
humor 
—^— denial 
A;— inst-supp. 
X— suppress 
— drugs 
# — behav-dis.
cope MI cope else
Mmimiim score = 2, Maximum score = 8.
Graph 6.1.2. Patients coping with the MI and how they cope with 
other stressful or difficult situations in their lives.
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Table 6.1.20. also shows where there were significant differences in 
individual coping strategies while coping with the MI versus general 
coping. Significant differences were found for six coping scales: Restraint 
coping, denial and behavioural disengagement were reported to be used 
more for coping with the MI. Active coping, positive reframing and 
seeking o f social support fo r instrumental reasons were on the other 
hand, used more for general coping.
6.1.9. How is coping with an MI related to general coping?
This part examined how coping with an MI related to how the patients 
coped with other stressful situations. This was assessed by correlating the 
coping strategies for coping with the MI with general coping. As in 
previous analysis including a number of comparisons, a Bonferroni test 
was used to correct the significance level, i.e., p < .0033. Table 6.1.21. 
shows a good deal of consistency in coping when examining how the same 
strategies correlate across situations, with the lowest correlation being (r = 
.39, p<.001) for acceptance and the highest (r = .93, p<.001) for rehgion. 
Using attention coping when coping wdth the MI was related to using 
attention coping in general coping, the same result was found for avoidant 
coping.
Table 6.1.21. also shows significant positive interrelations between 
situations: restraint coping, active coping, seeking of social support for 
emotional reasons, positive refiraming, planning and rehgion. Negative 
associations occurred between using acceptance and active coping when 
coping with the MI and alcohol and drug use when coping with other 
situations. Coping by denial with the MI and behavioural disengagement 
were negatively related to coping by acceptance as a general coping. 
Finally, those who used focus on or venting of emotions when coping with 
the MI seemed to be more active in seeking social support for emotional 
reasons and planning when coping with other difficulties.
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Seeking of social support for both emotional and instrumental reasons was 
also reported more at discharge than at 2 months and 12 months post MI 
but was at those times still used to some extent. Patients did appear to try 
to look for something good or positive in what happened, this coping 
reaction came quite clearly through at all times of measurement even 
though it appeared less as time passed. It could be of interest to look at 
what this kind of positive coping is related to, is it related to a better
6.1.10. Summary of univariate coping results.
These findings indicated that the process of coping following a first MI 
does change over time. Not surprisingly, the overall coping seemed to be 
most early on, which in this case was a few days following discharge fi’om 
hospital. Patients seemed to cope by acceptance right fi*om the start, in 
fact acceptance appeared as the most used coping reaction across all 
measurement points.
Restraint coping on the other hand reduced across times, it was mostly 
used as an early response to the illness but was used less as time went on.
This was as could be expected when considering the nature of the stressor.
These patients had all suffered a major health threat, i.e. an MI. It would 
therefore not be surprising that they wished to take things easy and restrain 
themselves from doing anything which might put their health at risk 
especially in the early stages of the illness. This is also advice which 
might be expected to be given by health care professionals.
Active coping and planning were other forms of coping which appeared to 
be used to a considerable extent early in the coping process, both at ^
discharge and 2 months post MI. Patients reported being actively doing 1
something about the situation and planning how to deal with it. This could 
indicate that they are motivated and willing to take action to prevent them 
from having another MI for example, by stopping smoking, changing 
eating habits and taking more exercise. These forms of coping were 
though reported less at 12 months post MI, which could either mean that 
the patients consider them at that time to be a part of their everyday life 
and not a way of coping anymore or that they have given up the changes 
they did achieve earlier and gone back to their old habits. It would 
therefore be of interest to see if this form of coping is related to long term 
behaviour change.
lifestyle or is it referring to some form of social life, such as family 
relations etc.
Religious coping did not change across time, patients either used religion 
from the start or they did not, i.e. they did not seem to become religious or 
turn to religion as a way of coping as a result of the event. Other forms of 
coping which did not change across time were mental disengagement, 
focus on or venting of emotion, denial and behavioural disengagement. 
These latter forms of coping are all ways of either avoiding or withdrawing 
from the situation which according to the findings of this study were 
methods rarely used by these patients.
One exception from these aforementioned findings was the increasing use 
over time in coping by using alcohol and/or drugs. This could however, be 
due to the fact that most of these patients are on medication early on 
following the illness onset which should maybe not be mixed with alcohol 
or other drugs. As time goes on they might not need the medication any 
longer and can therefore use alcohol and other drugs as they like. Another 
possible explanation for the increase in this way of coping is ’’social 
acceptability", it might not "look good" to be drinking alcohol or use other 
drugs when one has just had a heart attack, but as time passes this might 
be accepted.
When examining the interrelations among coping reactions several 
interesting relations emerged. As could be expected, acceptance was 
negatively related to denial at all measurement times. There also appeared 
to be some form of grouping together of coping efforts, with one group 
showing a move forward towards an aim or a goal, including coping 
actions such as restraint coping, active coping, seeking of social support, 
planning and positive reframing. The other form of grouping which 
appeared most clearly between coping at 2 months and copmg at 12 
months post MI, indicated an impulse to withdraw or avoid any efforts 
towards dealing with the situation, including coping attempts such as 
mental disengagement, focus on or venting of emotions, denial, alcohol 
and/or drug use and behavioural disengagement.
Following these results an attempt was made to group the 15 individual 
coping strategies, using the definition given by Suis and Fletcher (1985),
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into the two broader coping dimensions of attention versus avoidant 
coping. The results from this revealed that the 15 coping strategies, apart 
from humour and religion, did group together fitting those ternis. These 
are interesting results implying that the patients could score on two coping 
dimensions rather than just one. This might indicate that the patients could 
be using one form of coping to cope with one aspect of the illness, while 
using a different one when copmg with another aspect.
Further analysis showed that attention coping seemed to be used more than 
avoidant coping at both discharge and 2 months, but no difference 
emerged in the reported use of these strategies at 12 months post MI.
There was also a significant difference in the use of both attention and 
avoidant coping over time. Reports of using attention coping decreased 
over time, going in a straight line from high to low from one time to the 
next. Patients however, reported to use avoidant coping more as time 
went on, there was a significant increase in avoidant coping over time. 
This latter finding could however, be due to the increasing use over time of 
alcohol and/or drugs.
On the whole findings revealed that there was consistency in coping and 
little change appeared. Attention coping at discharge did not predict the 
use of avoidant coping at subsequent times and vice versa. When 
examining individual coping strategies the results showed that strategies 
grouped as attention coping appeared to predict the use of other attention 
strategies at subsequent times. The same was true for individual avoidant 
coping strategies, two exception were however found. Those were copmg 
by focus on and venting of emotions and behavioural disengagement at 
discharge both avoidant strategies, predicting the use of seeking of social 
support for emotional reasons, attention coping strategy, at 12 months post 
MI.
The final sub-section of these analysis assessed whether patients coped 
differently with the MI from the way they generally cope with oïher 
stressful situations in their lives. The findings revealed that patients
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reported generally coping more as a whole with other circumstances than 
they coped with the MI. Furthermore these findings suggest that to some 
extent people have different ways of coping with an illness such as an MI 
from the way they usually cope with difficulties in there lives. Attention 
coping was found to be reported significantly more for general coping than 
for coping with the MI and the reverse was true for avoidant coping. 
Certain coping strategies appeared to be used more for coping with the 
MI, such as restraint coping, denial and behavioural disengagement.
The use of restraint coping could be explained, as was pointed out earlier, 
by the nature of the stressor in this case. The other forms of coping which 
seemed to be used more as coping methods for the MI, i.e. denial and 
behavioural disengagement could also be related to the nature of the 
situation. Some patients might feel that tliere is not a lot they can do to 
deal with the illness themselves and therefore deny its existence or have 
feelings of giving up or withdrawing from it, which they might not do in 
other circumstances. This explanation might also be supported by the 
fact that active coping, positive refi’aming and seeking of support for 
instrumental reasons appeared to be used more for general coping than for 
coping with the MI.
6.2. Univariate causal attribution results.
This part of the analysis examined the nature of causal attributions when 
patients were asked either directly or indirectly what they thought had 
caused their MI. The kind of causal attributions made were explored and 
based on attribution theory (see chapter 3) it was predicted that: The 
majority o f  patients would make spontaneous attributions, and based on 
previous research: Patienfs would be most likely to attribute their illness 
to stress and smoking.
The univariate causal attribution results are divided into the following sub­
sections:
Sub-‘Section 6,2,1, reports the kind o f spontaneous attributions patients 
made, the number o f patients making spontaneous attributions and how 
that changed over time.
Sub-section 6,2,2, is in the same manner as the above sub-section 
concerned with provoked attributions, reporting what kind o f provoked 
attributions were made, the number o f patients making them and how and 
i f  that changed over time.
Sub-sections 6.2.3. to 6.2.6. all report results on checklist attributions.
Sub- section 6,2,3, reports on the number o f patients making checklist 
attributions and whether that remained the same over time.
Sub-section 6,2,4, reports results on the checklist causal categories and 
how they changed over time.
Sub-section 6,2,5, examines how the categories were related within each 
time o f measure.
Sub-section 6,2,6, asks whether causal attributions at one time predicted 
attributions at subsequent times.
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Sub-section 6,2,7, lists how the patients ranked the causal attributions 
they made in order o f importance.
Sub-section 6,2,8, reports results on whether patients saw a connection 
between the items they mentioned as causes fo r  their ML
Sub-section 6,2,9, gives a summary o f univariate causal attribution 
results.
6.2.1. Spontaneous attributions.
The first part of the causal attribution questionnaire assessed whether the 
patients made a spontaneous attribution when asked an open question on 
what came to their mind when they thought about their illness. The 
criterion used for defining an attributional statement was as follows: 
statement that explains or explores the reasons or causes fo r a 
particular event or class o f events, where event refers to a reported 
outcome or behaviour or situation** (Barrowclough, 1991, page 55). The 
reader will recall firom chapter 4 that, prior to analysing the responses were 
rated based on the above definition into whether a causal attribution was 
made (or not) and if so, what attribution it was. Responses where then 
rated further into the following 7 causal attribution categories: 
Behavioural se lf blame, characterological se lf blame, other blame, 
circumstances, biology, chance and God.
-Behavioural self blame refers to blaming ones own behaviour for the event. 
-Characterological self blame is blaming ones own character or personality.
-Other blame is when other persons are blamed for the event.
-Circumstances refers to attributing to the environment or factors outwith the person. 
-Biology includes medical condition but is neither environment or personality related. 
-Chance is attributing to chance or fate 
-God is when one attributes to God or religious beliefs.
Finally, answers which included responses such as **why me** and **why 
did this happen** were also rated.
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When analysing the answers given, the results did not support the 
hypothesis that the majority of patients would make a spontaneous 
attribution. Results did however, show that 20.7% of patients did make a 
spontaneous attribution when asked at discharge what came to their mind 
when they thought about their illness. 8.7% did so at 2 months follow up, 
12% at 6 months and 8.7% made a spontaneous attribution at 12 months 
post MI (see table 6.2.1.).
Table 6.2.1. The number (%) of patients making a spontaneous attribution ISA) 
when asked the question ”I  wonder if  you could tell me when you think about vour 
illness what do you think about?**
Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth Cochran O (DF=3) p*
Make a SA 20.7% 8.7% 12.0% 8.7% 8.67 .03
^Significance level for Cochran Q test
A Cochran Q test, a test used to compare the distribution of a dichotomous 
variable across three or more assessment times for related samples 
(Bryman & Cramer, 1992), was used to examine whether there was a 
significant difference in how many patients made spontaneous attributions 
over time. The results from this analysis are displayed in table 6.2.1. The 
findings showed that there was a significant difference in the number of 
patients making spontaneous attributions over the four measurement 
points. More patients made a spontaneous attribution at discharge than at 
follow up. Further analysis assessed, by counting the yes responses, how 
often over the four times of measure a patient made a spontaneous 
attribution. The results showed that most patients (25%) who made a 
spontaneous attribution did so only once, 9.8% on two occasions and 1.1% 
of patients made a spontaneous attributions three times.
When looking at what kind of spontaneous attributions patients made, one 
can see from table 6.2.2. that smoking, hereditary factors, working and 
stress were the most commonly mentioned causes for the MI. This did not 
seem to change across time with only one exception for over exertion or 
sudden exercise which showed a significant difference across time. 3.3% 
reported this as a cause at discharge but nobody did so at follow up.
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Table 6.2.2. The kind of spontaneous attributions patients made at each 
measurement time and the number of patients making each attribution.
Attributions Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth Cochran O (DF=3) 2**
Smokine 8.7% 3.3% 4.3% 3.3% 4.63 ns
Stress 1.1% 0.0% 2.2% 1.1% 2.00 ns
Overwork 2.2% 1.1% 0.0% 2.2% 2.53 ns
Workine too hard 2.2% 2.2% 0.0% 1.1% 2.20 ns
In the familv 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 1.1% 0.47 ns
Drinkine alcohol 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.00 ns
Poor fUet 1.1% 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.00 ns
Exertion/exercise 33% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.00 .02
Tvoe of work 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 3.00 ns
Stress at work 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 3.00 ns
Other aitributiorts * 2.2% 1.1% 1.1% 2.2% 0.66 ns
* other attributions included: "my temper", "overdoing it" (discharge), "lifestyle" (2mth), "pushing m yself, 
"irregular eating", "doing too much " (6mth) and "overeating" and "x-ray o f leg" ( 12mtii).
^^Significance level for Cochran Q test.
After categorising the spontaneous attributions results showed that most 
patients blamed their own behaviour for the MI (see table 6.2.3.). This 
was followed by attributing to circumstances, biology and self character 
blame, other attribution categories were not used and no significant 
differences were found across time. Of those patients who while making a 
spontaneous attribution attributed to self behaviour blame, 18.5% did so at 
only one assessment period, 6.5% twice and 1.1% three times. All the 
patients who spontaneously attributed to circumstances did so once, 4.3% 
of patients once attributed to biology and 1.1% did so on two occasions.
Table 6.2.3. The number of patients spontaneously attributing to each 
attribution category at each measurement time.
Categories Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth Cochran O fDP=31 JBlBeh. self blame 15.2% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 7.38 ns
Ch. self blame 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.00 ns
Other blame 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Circumstances 3.3% 0.0% 2.2% 2.1% 3.33 ns
Biology 0.0% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 0.75 ns
Chance 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
God 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
* Significance level for Cochran Q te s t
As mentioned earlier, when analysing the results of the responses to the 
above question answers which included remarks such as **why me** and 
**why did the M I happen ** where also noted. This assessment found, as 
can be seen in table 6.2.4., that 7.6% did say **why me** at discharge, 
8.6% at 2 months follow up, 9.8% at 6 montlis and 3.2% did respond 
**why me** at 12 months post MI. Further 14.1% did say **why did the M I 
happen** when asked at discharge, 10.8% said the same at 2 months
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follow up, 7,6% at 6 montlis and 4.3% wondered **why did the M I 
happen** at 12 months post MI.
Table 6.2.4. Number (%>) of patients responding '^ whv me'* and ^^ w.hv did this 
happen ** when asked: ' 7 wonder if  you could tell me, when you think about vour 
illness what do you think about?**.
Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth Cochran O tDF=31 p*
**Whyme" 7.6% 8.7% 10.9% 4.3% 3.35 ns
"Why did this happen" 15.2% 10.9% 7.6% 4.3% 7.55 .05
* Significance level for Cochran Q test
It can also be seen from table 6.2.4. that there was a significant difference 
in the number of patients responding by saying **why did the M I happen** 
across the time points of measurement. This response showed a 
significant decrease over time. The reverse was true for responses saying 
**why me** even though this was not a significant result, there appeared to 
be a slight increase in wondering **why me** over time with a drop at 12 
months post MI. Of the patients who wondered **why me** 18.5% did so 
once, 4.3% twice and 1.1% at all assessment points. The majority of 
patients (27.2%) responded **why did the M I happen** on one occasion, 
3.3% twice and 1.1% at all times.
If all these results are tak^iv together it can be seen that a number of 
patients did either make a spontaneous attribution or wondered why it 
happened at all assessment times (see table 6.2.5.).
Table 6.2.5. Number 1%) of patients making a spontaneous attribution ISA) or 
wondering whv they had an Ml at each measurement time.
Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mthMake a SA 20.7% 8.7% 12.0% 8.7%
"Why me" 7.6% 8.7% 10.9% 4.3%
"Why did this happen" 15.2% 10.9% 7.6% 4.3%
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6,2.2. Provoked attributions.
The second part of the causal attribution questionnaire examined whether 
patients made causal attributions when asked openly and directly about 
what they thought had caused their illness. These attributions were 
referred to as "provoked attributions". Prior to analysing the answers were 
rated in the same way as the spontaneous attributions (see chapter 4).
The results from this analysis showed that the majority of patients made a 
provoked attribution, 81.5% at discharge, 83.7% at 2 months, 84.8% at 6 
months and 88% at 12 months follow up, but there was not a significant 
difference over time (see table 6.2.6). Majority (67%) of patients made a 
provoked attribution at all assessment times, 14% twice but the rest less 
often. Most patients (14%) who responded **don*t know** did so only 
once and only 2.2% responded in this manner at all times.
Table 6.2.6. Number (Vo) of patients making a provoked attribution (PA) and 
answering ”don*t know” at each measurement time, when asked the uuestion 
**Manv people who have had a heart attack, develop some sort of ideas about how 
they sot it In other words, even thoush we don't know all the causes for a heart 
attack, most people have some ideas or theory about whv they had it I  wonder 
what kind of ideas you have had?
Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth Cochran O (DF=3) 22
Make a PA 81.5% 83.7% 84.8% 88.0% 2.41 ns
Don't Know 18.5% 16.3% 15.2% 12.0% 1.44 ns
* Significance level for the Cochran O test
Table 6.2.7. shows what kind of provoked attributions patients made and 
the most commonly mentioned causes were stress, smoking, and 
hereditary factors. There also appeared to be a significant difference, at 
least for some of the causes, in how many patients mentioned each one 
over the 4 times of measurement. Among these were smoking, with fewer 
patients attributing to it at 2 and 6 months. Attributing to stress showed a 
steady increase over time and so did attributing to hereditary factors. 
Overwork was mentioned more at discharge than at follow up. Poor diet 
was mentioned more at 6 and 12 months and more patients attributed to 
over exertion or sudden exercise at 2 months follow up than at other 
times. Finally, mixture of attributions called other attributions in table 
6.2.7., showed a significant difference over time. Over 20% of patients 
did mention a provoked attribution which fell into this group at discharge
and 6 months but less at 2 and 12 months, with the lowest number at 2 
months follow up.
Table 6.2.7. The kind of provoked attributions patients made at each 
measurement time and the number (Vo) of patients making each attribution.
Attributions 
Smoking 
Stress 
Overwork 
In the familv 
Worry 
Poor diet 
Fatty foods 
Stress at work 
High cholesterol 
Being overweight 
Drinking alcohol 
Lack of exercise 
Working too hard 
High BP 
Diabetes 
Exertion/exercise 
Type of work 
Mvseif 
Bv chance 
Fate
Punishment f  wrong 
Problems w children 
Problems w. spouse 
Nerves 
Depression 
Arguing w. people 
Other attributions**
* Significance level for Cochran O test
**Other attributions included the following items:
At discharge: "age", "lack of control", "irregular eating", "dramatic fever", "doing too much", "frustration", 
"lifestyle”, "unfit", "stressful week", "angina", "tablets", "excitement", "guilt", "walking frame", "operation", 
"sensitivity", "my temper", "overeating", "obsession with work", and "pain".
At 2 mth: "lifestyle", "irritability", "old age", "irregular eating", "irregular sleep", "abuse of body", "overeating", 
and "wrong diet".
At 6 mth: "age", "ill use of body", "tiredness", "overdoing things", "family problems", "anger", "travel", mothers 
illness", "easily irritated", ""angina", ""medical treatment", "overeating", "excitement", "irregular eating", "my 
temper", "being short of money", "parents" and "not enough rest".
At 12 mth: "lack of knowledge", "not enough relaxation", "wear and tear", "overeating", "medical prpblems", 
"tablets", "age", "broke my finger", "noise", "November a bad mth", "my temper", "narrowing of the arteries" and 
"walking from town every day".
Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth Cochran O fDF=31
33.7% 29.3% 28.3% 39.1% 8.45 .03
26.1% 34.8% 39.1% 41.3% 9.07 .02
13.0% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4% 9.38 .02
8.7% 18.5% 13.0% 10.9% 8.26 .04
7.6% 7.6% 8.7% 6.5% .38 ns
5.4% 4.3% 10.9% 13.1% 10.13 .01
4.3% 3.3% 3.3% 5.4% .84 ns
4.3% 4.3% 6.5% 2.2% 2.66 ns
3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 4.3% .27 ns
3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 5.4% 1.12 ns
3.3% 2.2% 3.3% 2.2% .50 ns
2.2% 4.3% 4.3% 5.4% 2.28 ns
1.1% 1.1% 3.3% 3.3% 2.18 ns
1.1% 1.1% 2.2% 2.2% .75 ns
1.1% 1.1% 0.0% 1.1% 3.00 ns
0.0% 7.6% 2.2% 4.3% 9.72 .02
0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 2.2% 4.80 ns
0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.00 ns
0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.00 ns
0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.00 ns
0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.00 ns
0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.Q0 ns
0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.00 ns
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 3.00 ns
0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 2.00 ns
0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 3.00 ns
20.7% 8.7% 21.8% 14.2% 8.41 .03
The provoked attributions were also rated into the seven attribution 
categories (see chapter 4). The number of patients attributing to each 
category can be seen in table 6.2.8. Most patients blamed their own 
behaviour and there was a significant increase in self behaviour blame over
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the 4 times of measurement. Characterological self blame was 
significantly more at discharge and 12 months than at the other 2 times of 
measure. There was also a significant difference in attributing to 
circumstances over time, with most patients attributing to this category at 
discharge but less at follow up. Finally, attributing to biology seemed to 
be popular at all times of measurement and it did not show a significant 
difference over time. Most patients (59.8%) made provoked attributions 
to self behaviour blame at either 3 or 4 assessment times, 17% only twice 
and 15% on one occasion. The patients who made provoked attributions 
to self character blame did so either only once (11%) or twice (2.2%) and 
nobody more often than that. The same was true for all the other 
categories, most patients attributed only once or twice to each category.
Table 6.2.8. The number (%) of patients making provoked attributions to each 
attribution category at each measurement time.
Categories Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth Cochran O ®P=31 J i lBeh. self blame 55.4% 69.6% 67.4% 76.1% 13.89 .003
Ch. self blame 7.6% 0.0% 2 J% 5.4% 9.15 .02
Other blame 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 0.0% 2.00 ns
Circumstances 25.0% 12.0% 13.0% 10.9% 12.94 .001
Biology 12.0% 22.8% 19.6% 20.7% 5.9 ns
Chance 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.00 ns
God 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0 ns* Significance level for Cochran Q test
As when rating the spontaneous attributions responses saying **why me** 
and **why did the M I happen ** were also noted when rating the provoked 
attributions. In this part only 1.1% of patients wondered **why me** at 2 
months follow up, but no patient answered in this manner at any other 
point of measurement.
6.2.3. Checklist attributions.
Causal attributions were also examined by a list of 34 items of possible 
causes for an MI which the patients choose fi*om. Table 6.2.9. below 
shows that patients most commonly mention stress and smoking as a 
cause for their MI at all four measurement points. At discharge and 2 
months post MI this was followed by attributing to myself, worry, eating 
fatty foods and hereditary. The order of the most commonly mentioned 
attributions changed slightly at 6 months and 12 months post MI, with 
eating fatty foods moving up next to smoking followed by high levels o f
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cholesterol Attributing to m yself and worry fell significantly at 6 
months and 12 months and so did attributing to hereditary factors.
The least mentioned attributions were: payment fo r sins, punishment for  
doing wrong, by the way other people treat me, problems with my 
spouse and children and environmental factors.
Datients choosing each item ("might have” and "ves" resDonses grouned
together).
Attribution Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth Cochran 01DF=3> HiStress 69.6% 71.7% 60.9% 60.9% 6.14 ns
Smoking 58.7% 55.4% 46.7% 53.3% 7.26 ns
Myself 58.7% 51.1% 12.0% 8.7% 89.21 .001
Worry 57.6% 55.4% 32.6% 28.5% 34.38 .001
Fatty food 47.8% 48.9% 43.5% 44.6% 1.72 ns
Hereditary 42.4% 42.4% 29.3% 25.0% 26.60 .001
Bv chance 41.3% 29.3% 2.2% 6.5% 63.28 .001Fate 39.1% 28.3% 6.5% 5.4% 50.96 .001
Mv nersonalitv 37.5% 29.3% 7.6% 3.3% 52.85 .001
Working too hard 35.9% 30.4% 14.1% 15.2% 25.88 .001
Lack of exercise 35.9% 32.6% 20.7% 20.7% 13.48 .003
Tvne of work 34.8% 33.7% 12.0% 12.0% 36.85 .001
Overwork 33.7% 23.9% 10.9% 15.2% 26.53 .001
High cholesterol 32.6% 32.6% 26.1% 26.1% 2.95 ns
Bad luck 32.6% 23.9% 12.0% 7.6% 27.80 .001
Stress at work 29.3% 30.4% 17.4% 18.5% 11.61 .008
Being overweight 29.3% 25.0% 26.1% 25.0% 1.32 ns
Will of God 27.2% 20.7% 8.7% 2.2% 36.79 .001
Nerves 25.0% 25.0% 7.6% 7.6% 27.92 .001
Poor diet 23.9% 19.6% 15.2% 7.6% 13.27 .004
Over exertion 22.8% 20.7% 7.6% 6.5% 20.71 .001
Arguing w neonle 20.7% 15.2% 5.4% 6.5% 17.47 .001
High BP 19.6% 26.1% 20.7% 16.3% 6.30 ns
Listening to other n. 17.4% 6.5% 0.0% 3.3% 31.58 .001
Drinking alcohol 16.3% 9.8% 13.0% 7.6% 7.22 ns
Caught/heaw traffic 14.1% 7.6% 7.6% 2.2% 14.29 .002
Other neonle 13.0% 10.9% 5.4% 2.2% 10.91 .01
Depression 12.0% 12.0% 4.3% 7.6% 6.22 ns
Environmental fact. 12.0% 5.4% 0.0% 0.0% 22.36 .001
Problems w children 10.9% 13.0% 5.4% 4.3% 13.09 .004
Problems w spouse 9.8% 6,5% 9.8% 4.3% 4.50 ns
Other p. treatment 8.7% 5.4% 1.1% 1.1% 11.91 .007
Punishment f. wrong 7.6% 8.7% 2.2% 2.2% 8.20 .04
Payment for sins 4.3% 6.5% 0.0% 1.1% 8.80 .03
" Significance level for Cochran Q test
In fact table 6.2.9. shows that there was a significant change for 25 of the 
34 items on the list over time. For all of those 25 items there appeared to 
be a decrease in the number of patients reporting them as a cause for the 
MI at follow up.(see also graphs 6.2.1a., 6,2.1b. & 6.2.1c).
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Graph 6.2.1a. Causal attributions 11 ton items as ranked bv patients at 
discharge, chosen from the 34 item list at all 4 times of measurement (% of 
patients choosing each item) ("ves" and "might have * responses grouped 
together).
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The items which patients did seem to consistently attribute their MI to, i.e., 
the ones that did not show a significant change across time, were: stress, 
smoking, eating fatty foods, high levels o f  cholesterol, being overweight, 
high blood pressure, drinking excessive amounts o f alcohol, depression, 
and problems with my spouse.
When given the chance to add other causal attributions which miglit not 
have been covered by the list, very few patients mentioned something else 
(see table 6.2.10.), but 2.2% reported diabetes as a cause.
Table 6.2.10. Number of patients reporting there was something the list did not 
cover when given the opportunity to add something else.
Discharge 2 mth post MI 6 mth post MI 12 mth post MI
Something else 7.6% 5.4% 2.2% 8.7%
Diabetes 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%
6.2.4. Causal attribution categories for checklist attributions.
The 34 items firom the causal attribution list were grouped together by 10 
judges, into the same seven categories as have been used before, of: 
Behavioural se lf blame, characterological se lf blame, other blame, 
circumstances, biology, chance and God (see chapter 5). Means and 
standard deviations for each category are presented in table 6.2.11.
Table 6.2.11. Means and std Dev for the checklist causal attribution categories at 
each assessment time.
Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth
Checklist categories Mean ,Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Min Max*
Behaviour self blame 16.89 3.59 16.47 3.18 15.72 2.91 15.82 2.75 11 33
Character self blame 7.99 2.37 7.79 2.28 6.24 1.55 6.11 1.52 5 15
Other blame 4.64 1.35 4.59 1.37 4.41 1.08 4.33 1.50 4 12
Circumstances 6.87 2.13 6.70 2.12 5.88 1.66 5.91 1.58 5 15
Biology 4.54 1.47 4.55 1.49 4.45 1.61 4.33 1.50 3 9
Chance 4.84 1.78 4.33 1.67 3.38 1.09 3.38 1.11 3 9
God 3.58 .94 3.52 1.11 3.21 .60 3.08 .37 3 9
* The number of items in each category varies, the minimum and maximum figures g^ven are 
possible min. and max. scores, not actual findings.
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Sign tests were used to examine whether there was a significant difference 
between times within the same category. This test compares the number 
of positive and negative differences between two scores from the same 
sample and ignores the size of these differences (Bramer & Cramer, 1992). 
These analysis showed a number of significant findings, which are 
displayed in table 6.2.12.
Behavioural se lf blame, characterological se lf blame, circumstances, 
chance and God: The same result was found for all these categories with 
significantly more patients attributing to behavioural self blame, 
characterological self blame, circumstances, chance and God at discharge 
and 2 months than at the other two times of measurement.
Other blame: Patients blamed others for their illness significantly more at 
discharge, 2 and 6 months than at 12 months follow up.
Biology: No significant results were found between times for attributing 
to biology items.
Table 6.2.12. Sign tests comparing differences between the same causal 
attribution category over the four measurement points (negative 
differences-increases in ratings, positive differences~decreases in ratings).
Time of 
measure
Behaviour 
hJanie 
+ - ties
self
p*
Character self 
blame
+ - ties p
Attribution 
Other blame
+ -ties p
Catégorie»
Circumstances
+  - ties p
Biolwv 
+ - ties P
Chance 
+ - ties P
God
+ - ties PDischarge & 37 37 18 ns 34 37 21 ns 12 15 65 ns 27 29 36 ns 28 27 37 ns 26 43 23 .05 12 17 63 ns
2mth
Discharge & 20 52 20 .001 11 61 20 .001 8 18 66 ns 10 46 36 .001 24 27 41 6 52 34 .001 6 26 60 ,001
6mth
Discharge & 28 47 17 .001 8 61 23 .001 3 22 67 .001 10 41 41 .001 20 32 40 ns 9 53 30 .001 3 30 59 .001
12mth 
2 mth & 27 45 20 .04 13 6415 .001 10 16 66 ns 13 34 45 .003 21 25 46 ns 6 41 45 .001 4 17 71 .001
6 mth 
2 mth & 26 47 19 .01 9 61 22 .001 4 19 69 .002 11 35 46 .001 21 34 37 ns 6 40 46 .001 2 19 71 .001
12 mth 
6 mth & 32 36 24 21 21 50 3 11 78 .05 12 14 66 ns 13 18 61 10 8 74 1 8 84
12 mth
6.2.5. How did the checklist attributions categories relate to each 
other ?
The seven attribution categories were correlated to assess the relationship 
between them at each time of measure. As table 6.2.13. shows, both self 
behaviour blame and self character blame were, as well as being positively 
related to each other also related positively to other blame and 
circumstances both at discharge and 2 months follow up and also to
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biology but only at discharge. The only other significant relationship 
found at discharge and 2 months was between chance and tlie category 
God. At 6 months there were no significant relationships between the 
categories. Finally, at 12 months the only significantly related categories 
were characterological self blame and other blame (r=.32**, p<.001).
Table 6.2.13. Correlations between causal attribution checklist categories within 
each assessment time. (N=91. 2-taiIed significance *=.01. **=.000
At Discharge At 2 mth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Beh. seg  blame - _
2 Ch. self blame .49** - .39** -
3 Other blame .31* .39** - .25* .42** -
4 Circumstances .38** .23 -.05 - .40* .24* ns -
5 Biology .28* .08 .04 .16 - .15 .10 -.05 -.03 -
6 Chance .05 -.02 -.07 .08 - -.15 .00 -.09 .11 .02
7 God -.00 .00 .17 -.12 -.03 .24* - .01 .12 .06 .06 -.02 .40**
6.2.6. Do causal attributions at one time predict causal attributions at 
subsequent times; consistency and change?
In order to examine the consistency in checklist causal attribution 
categories over the 4 times of measure the categories were correlated. The 
results are displayed in tables 6.2.14. to 6.2.19. which shows that the 
categories were considerably related over tlie 4 times of measure 
indicating a consistency in causal attributions. The stabihty shown in 
significant relationships is high for most categories except for chance and 
God. Attributing to chance at discharge was not significantly related to 
attributing to chance at later follow up. Chance at 2 months although 
significantly related to attributing to chance at 6 months, was not related to 
chance at 12 months. There also appeared to be low stability in attributing 
to God, with the category God at discharge not significantly related to 
God at 6 and 12 months follow up.
This analysis also assessed whether one form of causal attributions at one 
time predicted another at subsequent times. These results are also 
displayed in tables 6.2.14. to 6.2.19. Significant findings showed that 
blaming one's own behaviour at discharge was related to 
characterological self blame and circumstances at 2 months. Those who 
blamed their own character at discharge were likely to blame their own 
behaviour at 2 months and other people at 6 months. Also blaming one’s
character at 2 months was predictive of blaming others at 12 months. 
Other blame at discharge was associated with both behavioural self - and 
characterological self blame at 2 months. Although there was consistency 
in other blame over time, these results seemed to point towards change as 
well, so that while others were blamed at discharge patients were blaming 
themselves at 2 months. Attributing to circumstances was not predictive 
of any other type of attribution at subsequent times. Thinking that there 
were biological causes for the MI at discharge was predictive of 
behavioural self blame at 2 months and those who thought biology was the 
cause at 2 months post MI were less likely to attribute to circumstances at 
6 months. Finally, attributing to chance and God seemed to be predictive 
of one another at most times.
Table 6.2.14. Correlations between causal attribution categories at discharge and
2 mth. fN=91.2-tailed significance: *-.01. '*’*-.001')
Discharge attributions 2 mth attributions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l.Beh. self blame .66** .29* .10 .29* .09 -.13 -.08
2.Ch.self blame .37** .49** .25 .17 -.01 -.13 .06
3. Other blame .32* .31* .50** .07 .08 -.03 .16
4. Circumstances .24 .19 .06 .61** -.06 -.00 -.02
S.Biology .29* .07 -.14 .08 .61** .00 -.076. Chance -.12 -.07 -.17 -.07 -.06 .16 .00
7. God -.02 .08 -.07 -.05 -.05 .27* .35**
Table 6.2.15. Correlations between causal attribution categories at discharge and 
6  mth. (N=91. 2-tailed significance: *-.01. **-.001')
Discharge attributions 6 mth attributions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7LBeh seg  blame .47** .05 .20 .00 -.00 -.13 -.08
2.Ch self blame .21 .37** .26* -.08 -.01 -.04 .18
3. Other blame .05 .20 .44** -.16 .18 .05 .08
4. Circumstances .06 .23 .05 .41** -.11 -.13 -.08
5.Biology .22 .08 -.00 -.25 .55** .00 -.13
6.Chance -.02 -.02 -.04 .09 -.00 .22 ,03
7. God -.10 .10 .03 -.08 -.01 .17 .21
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Table 6.2.16. Correlations between causal attribution categories at discharge and
12 mth. fN=91. 2tailed significance: "-.01. *"-.001)
Discharge attributions 12 mth attributions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l.Beh. semblante .44** .20 .12 .08 .05 .07 -.24
2. Ch. self blame .10 .41** .22 .04 -.03 -.00 -.04
3. Other blame .03 .20 .39** -.20 .07 -.02 .06
4. Circumstances .13 -.08 .00 .46** -.10 -.00 -.15
S.Biology .21 .11 -.00 -.13 .47** .10 -.07
6. Chance .15 .08 -.03 -.05 -.08 .06 .13
7. God -.03 .15 -.14 -.14 -.09 .06 .06
Table 6.2.17. Correlations between causal attribution categories at 2mth and 6
mth. (N=91. 2-taHed significance: *-.01. **-.0011
2mth attributions 6 mth attributions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l.Beh self blame .50** .11 .19 -.01 .09 -.13 -.13
2.Ch self blame .18 .36** .20 -.08 -.10 -.02 -.01
3. Other blame -.02 .23 .39** -.06 -.09 -.06 -.10
4. Circumstances .09 .23 .02 .32** -.09 -.08 -.15
S.Biology .12 .06 -.12 -.31* .59** -.00 -.05
6. Chance -.11 -.00 -.11 .01 -.00 .31* .28*
7. God -.05 -.00 .10 -.07 -.09 .08 .49**
Table 6.2.18. Correlations between causal attribution categories at 2mth and 12 
mth.
2mth attributions
1N=91.2-taiIed significance; *-.01. **-.0011
12 mth attributions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l.Behsey blame .47** -.13 .24 .10 .11 -.13 -.21
2.Ch self blame .13 .42** .28* .00 -.04 -.16 -.13
3. Other blame -.04 .22 .46** .09 -.04 -.15 -.11
4. Circumstances .14 .00 .08 .42** -.02 -.05 -.07
5.Biology .09 .12 .00 -.25 .52** .00 -.07
6 Chance -.07 .02 -.00 -.14 -.05 .20 .31*
7. God -.11 -.02 -.06 -.14 -.01 .26 .26*
Table 6.2.19. Correlations between causal attribution categories at 6mth and
12mth.
6mth attributions
CN=91. 2-tailed significance: *-.01. **-.0011
12 mth attributions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l.Beh. self blame .44** .05 -.10 .05 .23 .02 -.15
2.Ch self blame .02 .39** .16 .15 .04 -.03 -.01
3.0ther blame .05 .24 .43** -.00 .02 -.01 -.09
4. Circumstances .05 -.23 -.12 .62** -.17 -.11 -.05
S.Biology .10 .09 .07 -.16 .68** .10 -.07
6. Chance -.00 -.09 -.11 -.12 -.05 .33** 41**
7. God -.22 -.06 .00 -.16 .05 .44** .44**
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6.2.7. Most important attributions.
The patients were also asked to rank the checklist attributions they had 
made in order of importance. Table 6.2.20, displays their ranking order at 
all four measurement points. At discharge smoking was ranked by 28.2% 
of patients as the most important cause, followed by worry and stress, this 
appeared to be similar at 2 months post MI, but at 6 months and 12 months 
stress took the place of smoking and was ranked as the most important 
cause by 28.3% and 29.3%, followed by fatty foods. Furthermore, 
smoking did not appear among the three most important causes at 12 
months post MI.
Table 6.2.20. Patients ranking of causal attributions bv importance at discharge. 
2 mth. 6 mth and 12 mth post MI.
Importance Discharge 2 m th post M I 6 mth post M I 12 mth post MI
F irst smoking (28.2%)* stress & smoking (both 25%) stress (28.3%) stress (29.3%)
Second worry (15,2%) worry (15.2%) fatty foods (14.1%) fatty foods (16.3%)
Third stress (6.5%) smoking ( 9.8%) smoking ( 9.8%) stress (13.0%)
* The highest %  of patients making the ranking.
6.2.8. Causal chain.
The last question on the causal attribution measure asked the patients 
whether they thought one cause might have caused another. This was 
carried out to examine if the patients would see a connection between the 
causes they had identified. Table 6.2.21. shows that over 30% of patients 
at all four measurement points did recognise a specific connection between 
different causes, for example that eating fatty foods caused high levels of 
cholesterol. Between 32% and 42% did say that the causes were 
combined or had all gone together to cause the illness but did not say that 
they were connected. Further 9% to 22% said the causes they had 
mentioned were not connected.
Table 6.2.21. Do patients see a connection between different causes when asked;
you think these thines have 2one tosether to cause vour illness or do you think 
one has led to another, that one cause may have caused another?**
Causal chain Discharge 2 mth 6 mth 12 mth
See a specific connection 35.9% 31.5% 35.9% 38.0%
Combination/ail gone together 37.0% 35.9% 32.6% 42.4%
No. no connection 9.8% 22.8% 16.3% 14.1%
Don't know 7.6% 3.3% 9.8% 1.1%
Not applicable* 9.7% 6.5% 5.4% 4.4%
* Not enough causes mentioned to ask the question
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6.2.9. Summary of univariate causal attribution results.
When examining the spontaneous attributions the results did not support 
the prediction that the majority of patients would make a spontaneous 
attribution when asked an open question about their illness. Wondering 
about the causes for their illness did not seem to be the first thing that 
came to most patients’ minds. Nevertheless, a fairly large number of 
patients did either refer to a cause or wondered why it had happened.
The results did however show that the majority of patients made a 
provoked attribution. Over 80% of patients at all 4 measurements did 
make an attribution when asked what they thought had caused their MI. 
This might indicate that most patients had engaged in a causal search and 
had some form of explanation ready when asked. Previous research in this 
field has revealed similar results, where majority of individuals with life - 
threatening illness or injury have been found to make and report 
attributions about the origin of their condition (Taylor et al., 1984; Janoff- 
Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Schulz & Decker, 1985; Affleck et al. 1987).
There was not a significant difference in the number of patients making 
provoked attributions at follow up but fewer patients made checklist 
attributions. The checkhst has as many as 34 items to choose fi*om and 
this could simply mean that the patients had narrowed down the possible 
causes they attributed or that they were less motivated to search for a 
cause as time passed. The fact that fewer patients made spontaneous 
attributions at follow up could mean, as attribution theory suggests 
(Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967) that searching for a cause became less 
important later on than it was earlier on in the adjustment process.
The kind of attributions made by most patients were very similar for all 3 
types of measure. Stress, smoking, hereditary factors, eating fa tty  foods 
and work items were among the top 10 causes mentioned spontaneously, 
provoked and checkhst chosen.
These results could indicate that these patients have knowledge of what 
are thought to be the main causes for an MI. They could also support, as 
attribution theory suggests that patients are more likely to attribute to 
factors they have some control over (Heider, 1958). Attributing the illness
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to factors such as smoking and eating fatty foods, gives patients some 
sense of control, i.e. they could have the power to change their own 
behaviour which makes them  in control rather than the illness.
When assessing the relationships between the attribution categories both 
within each time and over time, the results showed that a number of 
different categories were related. For example, both at discharge and at 2 
months follow up when the categories were examined within each time, 
there were significant relationships between self behaviour blame, self 
character blame, other blame, biology and circumstances. These 
relationships did however not emerge at subsequent times, perhaps 
patients were more likely to stick to one form of causal explanation as time 
passed.
How the causal attributions were related over time was also examined. 
The results found that consistency appeared to be high, attributing to a 
category at one time was in most cases significantly related to attributing 
to that same category at subsequent times. Changes were however also 
found, including for example, blaming your own behaviour at discharge 
being predictive of characterological self blame and attributing to 
circumstances at 2 months and other blame at discharge being associated 
with both behavioural self blame - and characterological self blame at 2 
months.
Finally, majority of patients were unable to identify a connection between 
the items they had mentioned as a cause for their illness. However, if the 
results to that last question are analysed together, over 70% of patients 
said that the causes were either connected or combined.
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6.3. Univariate distress results.
This includes one short section on how distressed, i.e. anxious and 
depressed, (measured by the HAD), the patients were at each assessment 
time and how and if that changed over time.
6.3.1. How anxious and depressed were the patients?
The levels of anxiety, depression and overall distress is displayed in table
6.3.1. The findings showed that the means for these patients were within 
the non-disordered range (a score firom 0-7) for both anxiety and 
depression and overall distress at all assessment times and no significant 
differences were found between times.
Table 6.3*1. Means, std Dev, and F values for anxiety, depression and distress at 
each assessment time.
Discharge 2 m th 6 mth 12 mth
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev F(DF=3l P*
Anxiety 5.40 4.44 5.89 5.35 4.98 4.82 4.87 4.96 .86 ns
Depression 4.39 3.30 4.15 3.90 3.56 3.69 3.94 4.07 .79 ns
Distress 9.80 7.09 10.03 8.92 8.54 8.17 8.87 8.66 .51 ns
"Significance levels for F  values across repeated measurements. N=91.
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CHAPTER 7.
Bivariate and Multivariate Results,
Bivariate Results.
7.1. Is there a sex or age difference in how patients cope, what kind of 
attributions they make and how distressed they are?
As the above title implies, this section assessed whether male and female 
patients used different coping strategies, if they made different kinds of 
attributions and whether they experienced different levels of distress (sub­
section 7.1.1.). This was also examined for age (sub-section 7.1.2.).
7.1.1. Sex differences in coping, causal attributions and distress.
Analysis in the form of t-test, found only one significant difference when 
assessing the difference between males and females use of attention and 
avoidant coping. This difference was found at discharge in attention 
coping (t=2.28, p<.025) male patients were more likely to use attention 
coping at discharge than females. No other significant results were 
found.
Mann-Whitney tests were used to examine sex difference in causal 
attributions (checkhst categories were used in this analysis). The findings 
showed a significant sex difference in the following causal categories: in 
attributing to characterological se lf blame both at 2 months (z=-2.33, 
p<.01) and at 12 months (z=-2.77, p.005), attributing to biology at 2 
months (z=-2.45, p<.01), God at discharge (z=-2.35, p<.01), in seeing 
circumstances as a cause at all times apart firom at 2 months (discharge: 
z=-2.08, p<.03, 6mth: z=-3.45, p<.001, 12mth: z=-2.10, p<.03) and finally 
in blaming others at both discharge (z=-2.97, p<.001) and at 2 months 
post MI (z=-2.06, p<.03). Female patients were more likely to attribute to 
all the above categories apart fi*om circumstances, male patients showed a 
preference for that category.
T-tests were used to examine whether men and women patients differed on 
anxiety, depression and overall distress levels. No significant results were 
found, indicating that men and women were equally anxious, depressed 
and distressed on all occasions.
7.1.2. Age differences in coping, causal attributions and distress.
Examination of age differences were assessed by correlating age with 
coping, attributions and distress variables. The first of these analysis 
showed that there were no significant relationships between attention or 
avoidant coping and age, this was true at all assessment thnes. What kind 
of coping patients used did not seem to be related to how old they were.
The same result was found when assessing age differences in anxiety, 
depression and overall distress levels. How old patients were did not seem 
to be associated with their levels of distress, this same result was found at 
all times of measurement.
What kind of causal attributions patients made did, on the other hand 
appear to have somethmg to do with age, a few significant relationships 
emerged. For this analysis, like for sex, the checkhst attribution categories 
were used and the findings showed that younger patients were more likely 
to blame their own behaviour for the MI at all times apart from at 2 
months(discharge: r=-.32, p<.01, 6mth: =-.27, p<.01 and at 12mth: r=-.39, 
p<.01). Although the relationship between younger age and self-behaviour 
blame was not significant at 2 months it showed a trend towards 
significance (r=-.26 ns). Younger patients were also more likely to 
attribute the MI to circumstances at discharge (r=-.32, p<.01), but not at 
other assessment times. Finally, older patients were more likely to 
attribute to God at 12 months post MI (r=.30, p<.01).
7.1.3. Summary of sex and age differences in coping, causal 
attributions and distress.
Male and female patients seemed to use similar coping strategies at all 
assessment times. Only one significant difference was found, where males
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showed a higher use of attention coping at discharge than females did. For 
causal attributions the difference between the sexes was more prominent. 
These results showed that more women were likely to blame their own 
character than men, more women were also hkely to attribute to biology, 
God and other people. More men on the other hand, were inclined to 
attribute their MI to circumstances. No sex differences were found in 
levels of distress.
How old patients were did not seem to be related to what form of coping 
they used or how distressed they were. Patients age did however, to some 
extend seem to be associated with what kind of attributions they made. 
Younger patients were more likely to blame their own behaviour for the 
MI and this was true at all assessment times. They were also more likely 
to attribute to circumstances but only at discharge. Finally, at 12 months 
older patients were more likely to attribute the MI to God.
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7.2. Relationship between causal attributions and coping strategies.
This section examines the relationship between causal attributions and 
coping strategies with the aim to test the prediction, based on Leventhal's 
self regulation model (see chapter 2), that causal attributions would 
predict how patients coped This section is divided into 4 sub-sections:
Sub“Section 7,2,1. examines relationships between causal attributions 
and coping strategies within each assessment time, i.e., concurrent 
relationships.
Subsection 7.2.2, asks whether causal attributions at one time "predict" 
coping at subsequent times.
Subsection 7.2.3, is concerned with reversed "causality", i.e., it asks 
whether coping at one time "predicts" causal attributions at subsequent 
times.
Subsection 7,2,4, presents a summary o f the relationships found between 
causal attributions and coping strategies.
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7.2.1. Are causal attributions and coping strategies related?
The first part of examining the relationship between causal attributicms and 
coping strategies consisted of coirelating all causal attribution checkhst 
categories with attention and avoidant coping as well as with each 
individual coping strategy. This was first carried out to examine 
concurrent relationships. Bonferroni test was used to correct significance 
levels, providing a p < .0033, trends towards significance are however also 
reported.
It was evident from these analysis that causal attributions and coping 
strategies appeared to be related. This included behavioural se lf blame 
(r=.25, p<.01) and other blame (r=.28, p<.01) at discharge being related 
to avoidant coping. Characterological se lf blame (r=.28, p< 01) at 2 
months was also related to avoidant coping at that same time. All other 
relationships between causal attributions and attention and avoidant coping 
were non-significant (r < .16 in all cases).
As mentioned above relationships between causal attributions and 
individual coping strategies were also assessed, table 7.2.1. displays 
significant findings and trends towards significant jfrom this analysis. As 
can be seen there, attributing the MI at 2 months to behavioural se lf 
blame was significantly related to coping by using mental disengagement.
Attributing to God at discharge showed a trend towards being related to 
religious coping at that same time.
Although characterological se lf blame was not significantly related to any 
coping strategy at discharge it did show a number of significant 
relationships with coping at 2 months follow up. Among these were 
positive relationships with mental disengagement, behavioural 
disengagement, and focus on and venting o f emotions. All these ways of 
coping seemed to be positively related to blaming ones own character for 
the MI but coping by acceptance was negatively related to 
characterological self blame, indicating that those patients who blamed 
their own character for the illness were less likely to cope by acceptance. 
At 12 months post MI characterological self blame was still positively 
related to mental disengagement.
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Other concurrent relationships between causal attributions and coping 
strategies wère for example, attributing to circumstances at discharge 
showing a trend towards association with coping by positive reframing at 
that time and a significant relationship with behavioural disengagement 
at 2 months. Attributing to other blame at discharge was positively 
related to coping by focus on and venting o f emotions. Finally, 
attributing to chance at 12 months post MI showed a positive trend 
towards association with coping by turning to religion.
Table 7.2.1. Concurrent correlations between causal attributions and Æoping 
strategies.
Attributions Correlations Coning strategies
God
Circumstances 
Other blame
Discharee
.26 trend (p<01) 
.25 trend (p<01) 
.31*
Religion
Positive refiraming
Focus on and venting of emotions
Beliaviour self blame 
Character self blame
Circumstances
2 m onths 
.32*
.33*
.26 trend (p<.01) 
-.29*
.26 trend (p<01) 
.29*
Mental disengagement
Behavioural disengagement 
Acceptance
Focus on and venting of emotions 
Behavioural disengagement
Character self blame 
Chance
12 m onths
.27*
.26 trend (p<.01)
Mortal disengagement 
Religion
2 - tailed significance (Bonferroni corrected * p < .0033)
7.2.2. Do causal attributions predict coping?
The relationships between causal attributions and coping strategies 
previously reported were all concurrent relationships. Another way of 
gaining a better understanding of whether causal attributions influence 
coping is to use causal attributions at one time to predict coping strategies 
at a another, i.e. to test prospective predictions from the one to the other. 
Like before this was examined for attention and avoidant coping as well as 
individual coping strategies.
The reported correlations are partial correlations which allow a test 
between two variables while holding another constant, which in this case 
is the same variable (at previous time) as is being predicted. This was 
carried out in order to see whether the relationship between causal
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attributions at one time and coping at subsequent times would be affected 
by coping at previous times. Considering the number of comparisons 
made in these analysis a Bonferroni test for correction of significance 
levels should have been applied here. However, as the method of partial 
correlations was already being used applying a Bonferroni test as well 
would have resulted in a too stringent test. Results firom these analysis 
therefore report and discuss significant partial correlation findings but the 
Bonferroni corrected significance level is also reported in each table.
Tables 7.2.2. and 7.2.3. display all significant results from tliese findings 
with zero order correlations included in brackets.
The only causal attribution which successfully significantly predicted 
avoidant coping was characterological se lf blame. Blaming one's own 
character at one time was predictive of using avoidant coping at 
subsequent times (see tables 7.2.2. & 7.2.3.). There was only one 
exception firom this rule, i.e. characterological self blame at 2 months did 
not significantly predict avoidant coping at 12 months, the correlation was 
however not very low (r=.22ns) which might suggest a trend towards I
association. No causal attributions significantly predicted attention coping I
and all correlations were low (r<. 16 in all cases). j]
When looking at individual coping strategies the first task was to examine 
the relationship between causal attributions made at discharge and coping 
strategies at 2 and 12 months post MI (see table 7.2.2.).
Attributing to behavioural se lf blame at discharge was not related to any 
coping strategy 2 months after the MI however, those patients who blamed 
their own behaviour at discharge were less likely to use coping by religion j
at 12 months. Behavioural self blame at 2 months also showed a 
relationship with mental disengagement at 12 months but this j
relationship became non-significant when controlling for mental 
disengagement at 2 months, behavioural self blame did therefore not !
account for the change in coping by mental disengagement.
ICharacterological se lf blame was significantly related to a number of j
coping strategies used both at 2 and 12 months. At both times it was |
negatively related to acceptance but positively related to mental and {
behavioural disengagement. Blaming one’s own character at discharge j
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was also associated with coping by denial and alcohol and drug use at 12 
months post MI.
Attributing to God at discharge was positively related to coping by 
religion at 2 months follow up. The relationsliip between attributing to 
God at discharge and religion at 12 months became non-significant when 
controlling for religion at 2 months, showing that this association was fully 
explained by the previous relationship.
Circumstances was the final causal category at discharge related to 2 and 
12 months coping. At 2 months it was associated with behavioural 
disengagement and at 12 months it related to mental disengagement
cooing strategies at 2 mth and 12 mth follow no (zero order correlations!.
Attributions Cooine strateeies
2 m th 12 m th
Behaviour self blame Religion-.22*(-.24*)
Mental disengagement .18ns (.29*)
Character self blame Acceptance -.23* (-.29*) Acceptance -.30* (-.35**)
Mental disengagement .30*(.41 **) Mental disengagement .42* (.52**) 
Behaviour disengagement .34*(.39**) Behavioural disengagement .40* (.41*)
Denial .30* (.33**)
Alcohol/Drugs use .29* (.39*)
God Religion .25* (.28**) Religion. 16ns (.22*)
Circumstances Behaviour disengagement .36* (.40**) Mental disengagement .30* (.40*)
C haracter self blame Avoidant coping .24*(.29*) Avoidant coping .30* (.39**)
2 - tailed significance; * - .01 ** - .001 (Bonferroni corrected significance == p < .0033)
Causal attributions at 2 months did only show two significant relationships 
with coping strategies at 12 months. One was characterological se lf 
blame which was positively related to mental disengagement^ the other 
was circumstances negatively related to coping by humour (see table
7.2.3.).
At 6 months again only two causal attribution categories showed 
significant relationships with coping strategies at 12 months but at this 
time a few more coping strategies were involved (see table 7.2.3.). 
Characterological se lf blame was positively related to mental and 
behavioural disengagement, focus on and venting o f emotions, denial
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and alcohol and drug use and as before it was negatively related to 
coping by acceptance. The other causal attribution category at 6 months 
related to coping at 12 months post MI was attributing to chance being 
positively related to focus on and venting o f emotions.
Table 7.2.3. Partial correlations between causal attributions at 2mth and 6 mth 
and cooing strategies at 12 mth follow u p  (zero order correlations!.
z  mm attnDuiions
Character self blame
iz  mm comns straiemes
Mental disengagement .24* (.32*)
Circumstances Humour -.24* (-.23*)
Character self blame Avoidant coping(.22ns)
6 mth attributions# 12 mth conins strategies#
Character self blame Mental disengagement (.27*)
Acceptance (-.34**)
Focus on and venting of emotions (.26*)
Behavioural disengagement (.41 **)
Denial (.28*)
Alcohol and/or drug use (.27*)
Chance Focus on and venting of emotions (.27*)
Character self blame Avoidant coping (.33**)
(#no coping data at 6 mth therefore not partial correlations) 2 - tailed significance:* - .01 ** - .001
(Bonferroni corrected significance = p < .0033).
7.2.3. Do coping strategies predict causal attributions?
The next step was to examine the question of reverse ’’causality", this time 
using analysis in which coping strategies at one point in time were used to 
predict subsequent causal attributions.
To start with the broader coping dimensions of attention and avoidant 
coping were used as predictors of subsequent causal attributions. These 
results showed three, all positive, significant relationships. One between 
avoidant coping at discharge and behavioural se lf blame at 12 months 
(see table 7.2.4.), the second between avoidant coping at 2 months and 
behavioural se lf blame at 6 months and the third again between avoidant 
coping at 2 months but tliis time with characterological se lf blame at 6 
months (see table 7.2.5.).
The next part of these analysis examined correlations between individual 
coping strategies at discharge and causal attribution categories at 2, 6 and 
12 months post MI.
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As can be seen from table 7.2.4. coping by behavioural disengagement at 
discharge was associated with characterological se lf blame at 2 months 
follow up but this relationship became non-significant when controlling for 
the effects of characterological self blame at discharge. Coping by 
humour at discharge showed patients less likely to attribute to 
circumstances at 6 months follow up and positive reframing was related 
to less attributions to chance at 6 months.
Table 7.2.4. Partial correlations between cooing strategies at discharge and 
causal attributions at 2 mth. 6 mth and 12 mth follow uo (zero order correlations 
are presented in brackets!.
Coping strategies Causal attributions
2 mth 6 mth 12 mth
Behavioural disengagement Character self blam e. 12ns (.27*)
Humour Circumstances -.23*(.-25*)
Positive reframing Chance -.24*(-.26*)
Avoidant coping Beh. self blame .22* (.27*)
2 - tailed significance: * - .01 ** - .001 (Bonferroni corrected significance = p < .0071)
Table 7.2.5. shows the relationship between 2 months coping strategies 
and 6 and 12 months causal attributions. Coping by mental 
disengagement was related to attributing to biology and characterological 
se lf blame at 6 months post MI. There was also a significant relationship 
between coping by mental disengagement and characterological self blame 
at 12 months, this relationship did however seem to be explained by 
characterological self blame at 2 months and did therefore not continue to 
be significant when this was controlled for. Other coping strategies 
positively related to characterological self blame at 6 months were 
behavioural disengagement, denial and alcohol and/or drug use. 
Coping by acceptance was related to less characterological self blame at 6 
months and denial was associated witli attributing to other blame but 
acceptance was related to less other blame at 6 months.
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Table 7.2.5. Partial correlations between cooing strategies at 2 mth and causal 
attributions at 6 and 12 mth follow uofzero order correlations in brackets!.
Copine strateeies Causal attributions
6 mth 12 mth
Mental disengagement Biology .24*(.22*)
Mental disengagement Character self blame .25* (.32**) Character self blame . 12ns (.24*)
Behaviour disengagement II II II .39**(.45**)
Denial II II II .33**033*)
"___" Other blame .27** (.31*)
Alcohol/drug use Character self blame .45** (.45**)
Acceptance II II II -.32** (-.36*)
Other blame -.32**(-.38**)
Avoidant coping Behaviour self blame .26*028*-)
Avoidant coping Character self blame .30*039**)
2 - tailed significance: * - .01 **-.001 (Bonferroni corrected significance = p < .0071 )
7.2,4. Summary of reiationships between causal attributions and 
coping strategies.
The two main questions to be examined in this analysis were how and if 
causal attributions were related to coping strategies and whether one 
predicted the other, in particular whether causal attributions predicted 
coping strategies.
While first assessing concurrent relationships, findings showed that 
behavioural se lf blame and other blame were related to avoidant coping 
at discharge and characterological se lf blame at 2 months was related to 
avoidant coping at that same time. No significant relationships were 
found between causal attributions and attention coping. When examining 
concurrent relationships between individual coping strategies and causal 
attributions the findings replicated the above results and showed 
relationships between individual avoidant strategies, such as mental - and 
behavioural disengagement, focus on and venting o f emotions and 
behavioural se lf blame and with characterological se lf blame. A few 
other relationships also emerged, including attributing to God at discharge 
being related to religious coping, attributing to circumstances, also at 
discharge, associated with positive reframing and at 2 months with 
behavioural disengagement Other blame at discharge was related to 
focus on and venting o f emotions and finally, attributing to chance at 12 
months was related to coping by religion.
m
The second question of this analysis was concerned with whetiier causal 
attributions at one time predicted how patients coped at subsequent times. 
The main finding from this analysis showed that characterological se lf 
blame predicted avoidant coping at all, apart fi'om at 2 months, 
subsequent assessment times. No causal attributions significantly 
predicted attention coping. Examination of how causal attributions 
predicted individual coping strategies showed again that characterological 
self blame was the best predictor of avoidant coping strategies, such as, 
mental - and behavioural disengagement, focus on and venting o f  
emotions, denial and alcohol and/or drug use. Other relationships which 
remained significant after controlling for concurrent relationships, 
included: Attributing to circumstances at discharge being related to 
behavioural disengagement at 2 months and to mental disengagement at 
12 months. Seeing God as a cause at discharge was also related to coping 
by religion at 2 months. Furthermore, those who attributed to 
circumstances at 2 months seemed to be less likely to use coping by 
humour at 12 months and attributing to chance at 6 months was related to 
coping by focus on and or venting o f emotions at 12 months.
The main findings from using coping strategies as predictors of causal 
attributions showed that using avoidant coping was predictive of 
behavioural self blame - and characterological self blame. This included 
using avoidant coping at discharge being predictive of behavioural self 
blame at 12 months and avoidant coping at 2 months being predictive of 
behavioural self blame and characterological self blame at 6 months. 
When examining individual coping strategies and their relationships with 
causal attributions those strategies which make up the broader dimensions 
of avoidant coping were found to be significantly related to causal 
attributions. On the whole, the strongest relationships were between 
coping at 2 months and causal attributions at 6 months, where individual 
avoidant strategies seemed to predict and account for change mostly in 
characterological self blame and other blame.
Taken together the main results from this analysis seemed to indicate that 
avoidant coping and characterological se lf blame predicted each other 
from one time to the next.
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7.3. Relationships between causal attributions and distress.
The relationship between causal attributions and distress is examined in 
this section and based on previous research (see chapter 3) it set out to test 
the following hypothesis:
Behavioural self blame will be related to and predict less distress.
Characterological self blame will be related to and predict higher distress.
Other blame will be related to and predict higher distress.
This section like the previous one, is divided into 4 sub-sections:
Sub-section 7.3.1. examines concurrent relationships between causal 
attributions and distress.
Sub-section 7.3.2. presents results on whether causal attributions 
predicted distress. /
Sub-section 7.3.3. asks whether distress predicts causal attributions.
Sub-section 7.3.4. gives a summary o f relationships between causal 
attributions and distress.
7.3.1. Are causal attributions and levels of distress related?
This point of analysis examined concurrent relationships between causal 
attributions and distress. When the 7 causal attributions categories were 
correlated with anxiety and depression at discharge, results showed that 
both anxiety and depression were positively related to behavioural se lf 
blame, characterological se lf blame and other blame (see table 7.3.1.). 
This result showed that patients who blamed themselves, either their own 
behaviour or their character were more anxious and more depressed. This 
is contradictory to the prediction made above which stated that 
behavioural self blame would be related to less distress. On the other 
hand, it does support the other two predictions, characterological self 
blame and blaming others for the Ml were related to higher distress. 
Characterological self blame was m fact related to higher levels of both 
anxiety and depression at all assessment times. Other blame although not
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related to distress levels at 2 months, was also found to be associated with 
distress at 6 months. These findings also showed that attributing to 
circumstances at discharge was positively related to anxiety and to overall 
distress.
Table 7.3.1. Correlations between causal attributions and distress; concurrent
relationshlos.
Discharge 2 mth
Anxiety Depression Distress Anxiety Depression Distress
Self beh. blame .34** .34** .38**
Self ch. blame .40** .30** .39** .30** .37** .35**
O ther blame .23* .25* .26*
Circumstances .26* ns .23*
6 mth 12 mth
Anxiety Depression Distress Anxiety Depression Distress
Self ch. blame .41** .35* .39** .33** .38* .35**
O ther blame .28* .29* .29*
2 tailed significance *-.01 **-.001
7.3.2. Do causal attributions predict levels of distress?
The pattern of associations between causal attributions and distress was 
also examined by testing prospective predictions the same way this was 
carried out before between causal attributions and coping strategies, i.e., 
causal attributions at one time were used to predict levels of distress at 
subsequent time, while holding constant levels of distress at previous time.
The one causal attribution which was found to be related to anxiety, 
depression and overall distress was characterological s e lf blame. Zero 
order correlations (displayed in brackets in table 7.3.2.) showed that 
characterological self blame was significantly associated with and 
predictive of both anxiety and depression, as well as overall distress, at all 
assessment times. However, these relationships did change considerably 
when controlling for distress levels at previous times and most 
relationships became non-significant. This seemed to indicate that distress 
levels at previous times were intervening variables between 
characterological self blame at one time and distress levels at subsequent 
times. In some cases previous distress levels could even be thought of as 
causal variables relating to subsequent distress which mostly eliminated 
the effects of characterological self blame on distress. Discharge 
characterological self blame appeared to show the strongest relationships 
with subsequent distress levels, its relationships with distress remained
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significant, although lower, after controlling for distress levels at 
discharge.
Table 7.3.2. Partial correlations between causal attribution categories and
in brackets!.
Discharge attributions 2 mth
C haracter self blame
Anxiety
.18ns(.43**)
Depression 
.39** (.46**)
Distress
,24*(.49**)
C haracter self blame .27*(.49**)
6 mth
.32*(.48**) .27*(.50**)
Character self blame .21ns(.46**)
12 mth
.41 **(.55**) .28*(.53**)
2 mth attributions 
Character self blame
Anxiety
.14ns(.33**)
6 mth 
Depression
-,00ns(.37**)
Distress
.07ns(.43**)
Character self blame .14ns(.33**)
12 mth
-.05ns(.32**) .04ns(.34**)
6 mth attributions 
Character self blame
Anxiety
.10ns(.39**)
12 mth
Depression
.llns(.42**)
Distress
.09ns(.43**)
2 tailed significance * -.01 ** - .001
7.3.3. Does distress oredict causal attributions.
In this analysis distress at one time was used to "predict" subsequent 
causal attributions. This analysis showed evidence that distress predicted 
a number of attribution responses (see table 7.3.3, and 7.3.4.).
When examining the relationship between anxiety and attributions, zero 
order correlations showed that being anxious at discharge was 
significantly related to behavioural se lf blame and characterological se lf 
blame both at 2 and 6 months post MI, it was also related to 
characterological self blame at 12 months follow up. Furthermore, anxiety 
at discharge was associated with other blame at 6 months. All of these 
relationships did however become non significant when partial correlation 
was used to control for attributions, showing that anxiety at discharge did 
not account for the change in behavioural self blame , characterological 
self blame and other blame at subsequent times. Being anxious at 2 
months follow up seemed to predict characterological self blame at both 6
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and 12 months. The same was true for levels of anxiety at 6 months which 
predicted characterological self blame at 12 months. When controlling for 
attributing to characterological self blame at 2 and 6 months, unlike before, 
anxiety at 2 months and 6 months remained significantly related to 
characterological self blame at subsequent times, indicating that levels of 
anxiety accounted for changes in characterological self blame. Finally 
anxiety at 2 months significantly predicted other blame at 6 months.
Being depressed at discharge, examining zero order correlations, was 
related to behavioural se lf blame and characterological se lf blame at 2 
months and to characterological self blame at 12 months but less 
depression at discharge was related to more attributions to chance at 12 
months post MI. AH these relationships, apart Jfrom depression at 
discharge and characterological self blame at 12 months, remained 
significant after controlling for attributions. Depression at both 2 and 6 
months continued to be related to characterological self blame at 
subsequent times. Although depression at 2 months was found to be 
related to other blame at 6 months, it did not predict the change in other 
blame and the relationship became non significant after controlling for 
other blame at 2 months.
Overall distress at discharge was not found to be predictive of change in 
behavioural self blame, characterological self blame and other blame at 
subsequent times. Overall distress at 2 months was on the other hand, 
found to be related to these causal attributions at subsequent times even 
after controlling for concurrent associations. This same result was found 
for overall distress at 6 months which accounted for change in 
characterological self blame at 12 months.
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Table 7.3.3. Partial correlations between causai attribution categories and 
distress: Distress as a ”predictor” of causal attributions (zero order correlations 
in brackets!.
Distress
at discharge
Anxiety
Depression
Distress
Causal attributions
2 mth
Bek. self blame Ch. self blame
.00ns(.31**) 
.22*039**) .27*(.45**)
.18ns(.40**) .14ns(.40**)
Distress Causal attributions
at discharge 6 mth 12 months
Anxiety
Depression
Distress
Beh. self blame ClLseg blame Other blame
.17ns(.36**) .21ns(.37**) .09ns(.26*) 
ns ns ns 
,08ns(.30**) .17ns(.34**) .08ns(.26*)
Ch. self blame Chance
.08ns(.31**) ns 
.17ns(.34**) -.22*(-.22*) 
.14ns(.49**) ns
2 tailed significance * - .01 ** - .001 (Bonferroni corrected significance = p <.0071)
Table 7.3.4. Partial correlations between causal attribution categories and
distress: Distress as a "nredictor” of causal attributions tzero order correlations
in brackets!.
Distress Causal attributions
2 m th 6 m th 12 mth
Anxiety
Depression
Distress
Ch. self blame Other blame
.48**(.53**) .23*(.26*) 
.51**(.55**) .19ns(.27*) 
.51**056**) .22*(.27*)
Chself blame
.19ns(.30**)
.25*(.39**)
.22*(.35**)
Distress Causal attributions
6 mth 12 mth
Anxiety
Depression
Distress
Ch.self blame 
.33**045**) 
.21ns(.36**) 
.29**(.42**)
2 tailed significance * - .01 ** - .001 (Bonferroni corrected significance = p < .0071)
7.3.4. Summary of relationshius between causal attributions and
distress.
The first part of these analyses examined how and if causal attributions 
were related to levels of distress within each assessment time. The main 
findings fi'om this analysis showed that blaming one's own character was 
related to more anxiety, more depression and higher levels of overall 
distress at all assessment times. This result therefore supported the
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prediction that characterological self blame would be related to higher 
levels of distress. The prediction that other blame would be related to 
higher levels of distress was also supported, blaming others was found to 
be related to higher levels of anxiety, depression and overall distress both 
at discharge and at 6 months. Finally, contrary to the prediction made, 
behavioural se lf blame at discharge was related to both anxiety and 
depression as well as to overall distress.
When testing prospective predictions, using causal attributions at one time 
to predict distress at subsequent times, tlie results showed that only 
characterological se lf blame predicted and appeared to account for 
changes in levels of distress. In fact, blaming your own character at 
discharge was the only time when characterological self blame was 
significantly associated with anxiety, depression and overall distress at 
subsequent times, after controlling for concurrent distress.
This analysis also asked whether distress predicted what form of causal 
attributions were made. On the whole these findings showed that distress, 
including both anxiety and depression at 2 months were related to 
characterological se lf blame at both 6 and 12 months and to other blame 
at 6 months. Six months distress was also related to characterological self 
blame at 12 months. These relationships were all significant after 
controlling for concurrent attributions.
The main overall result from these analysis showed support for the 
prediction that characterological self blame would be related to and predict 
higher levels of distress. Behavioural self blame did not on the other hand, 
show association with or predict lower levels of distress. Finally, the last 
prediction stating that other blame would be related to and predict liigher 
levels of distress, was partially supported. Other blame botli at discharge 
and at 6 months was related to higher distress levels at these times.
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7,4, Relationships between coping strategies and distress.
How the coping strategies related to distress was tested in the analysis that 
follows. This tested the prediction that avoidant coping would be related 
to and predict higher levels o f distress. However, taking into account the 
"time X strategy" hypothesis mentioned in chapter two, (i.e., avoidant 
coping being related to less distress in the short term but to higher distress 
in the long term), it was predicted that avoidant coping would be related 
to and predict higher levels o f distress at 2, 6 and 12 mth but not at 
discharge.
As in previous sections, this section is divided into 4 sub-sections:
Sub-rsection 7.4.1. examines how coping strategies and distress levels 
were related within each assessment time, i.e., concurrent relationships.
Sub-section 7.4.2. asks whether coping predicts distress.
Sub-section 7.4.3. examines whether distress at one time predicts coping 
at subsequent times.
Sub-section 7.4.4. presents summary o f relationships between coping and 
distress.
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7.4.1. Are coping strategies and levels of distress related?
Correlations between coping strategies and distress showing concurrent 
relationships are presented in table 7.4.1. Wliile first assessing how 
attention and avoidant coping related to distress the analysis showed that 
attention coping was not at any time significantly related to concurrent 
levels of distress. Avoidant coping on the other hand, was significantly 
related to higher levels o f distress at all assessment times. These findings 
therefore support the prediction made but not the "time x strategy" 
prediction. Avoidant coping was related to liigher distress at discharge as 
well as at follow up, although the correlation was not as high at discharge.
Like in previous analysis, this part also examined how individual coping 
strategies were related to distress. The findings showed that many 
associations were consistent across repeated measurements. Distress 
including both anxiety and depression, was positively related to mental 
and behavioural disengagement at all assessment times. Overall distress 
was also positively related to denial at discharge and including both 
anxiety and depression at 2 and 12 months. Distress was related to 
alcohol and/or drug use at all times of measure except for at discharge as 
it was only related to anxiety at that time. Distress was inversely related to 
coping by acceptance at all times of measure, including both anxiety and 
depression levels at 2 and 12 months.
Other associations differed across the span of the study. These included 
anxiety and coping by religion being inversely related at discharge but not 
significantly so at other times. Depression was inversely related to 
planning at 2 months but not at other assessment times and only at 12 
months follow up was positive reframing inversely associated with 
overall distress. Anxiety at 12 months was related to seeking o f social 
support fo r instrumental reasons and both anxiety and depression were 
related to suppression o f competing activities at that time. Distress was 
positively related to focus on and venting o f emotions both at 2 and 12 
months follow up but not at discharge.
203
1J
Table 7.4.1. Significant correlations between cooing strategies and distress at 
each measurement point; concurrent relationships.
Coping strategies_________Discharee_______________ 2 mth 12 mth__________
Anx. Dep. Distress Anx. Pep. Distress Atix. Dep. Distress
Attention coping .08ns -.04ns 02ns -.06ns -,15ns -.10ns .14ns .14ns .14ns
Avoidant coping .29* .21ns .28* .54** .53** .56** .50** .49** .51**
Acceptance -.23* -.39** -.39** -.41** -.54** -.53** -.56**
Positive reframing -.24*
Planning -.25*
Supp. for instr. reasons .24*
Religion -.24* -.23*
Supp. competing
activities .29* .25* .28*
Mental
disengagement .27* .34** .33** .34** .31** .34** .46** .51** .50**
Behavioural
disengagement .23* .27* .28* .49** .50** .52** .46** .34** .41**
Focus on and
venting of emotions .44** .44** .46** .41** .42** .43**
Denial .23* .31** .26* .29* .45** .34** .41**
Alcohol/drug use .27*_____________________ .25* .32* .29* .31** .31** .32**
2 tailed significance * - .01 ** - .001
7.4.2. Do coping strategies predict levels of distress?
This analysis used coping strategies at one assessment point as
"predictors" of distress at a later time (results are displayed in table 7.4.2.). 
Attention coping at discharge and 2 months did not show a significant 
relationship with either anxiety or depression at any of the subsequent 
times. The same result occurred for avoidant coping, it did not predict 
distress levels at 2, 6 or 12 months, and did therefore not support the 
prediction made at the beginning of this section.
In order to examine this further, the relationship between individual coping 
strategies and subsequent distress was also assessed. Although a number 
of significant zero order correlations did emerge between coping strategies 
and levels of distress, indicating that coping might have some impact on 
distress, only two of these remained significant after controlling for 
concurrent distress. One of these was using active coping at discharge 
which seemed to account for tlie change in depression at 12 months, 
showing less depression at 12 months if active coping had been used at 
discharge. The other was coping by mental disengagement at 2 months 
which was related to the change in anxiety and overall distress at 6 
months.
subseauent times: coDine strategies "predicting” distress. (Zero order
correlations are oresented in brackets).
CoDins Strategies Distress at 6 mth Distress at 12mth
at discharee Anx. Dep. Distress Anx. Dep. Distress
Attention coping 
Avoidant coping
(.10ns)
.16ns(.24*)
(-.04ns)
( l7 n s)
(.04ns)
(.22ns)
(-.07ns) (-.03ns) 
(.07ns) (,11ns)
(-.05ns)
(.09ns)
Mental disengagement 
Behavioural disengagement 
Active coping 
Accentance
.14ns(.24*)
.16ns(.22**)
(ns)
(ns)
(ns) .08ns(.22*) 
.16ns(.27*).15ns(.25**) 
(ns) (ns) 
(ns) (ns)
(ns) (ns) 
(ns) (ns) 
-.24*(-.24*Xns) 
-,15ns(-.27*)
(ns)
(ns)
(ns)
-.15ns(-.28*)
Coning Strategies at 2 mth Distress at 6 mth
Anxiety Depression Distress.
Attention coping (.06ns) (-.02ns) (02ns)
Avoidant coping .19ns(.43**) .llns(.46"") .15ns(.47*")
Acceptance -.16ns(-.37**) -.14ns(..37**) -.14ns(-.38**)
Supp. of competing activities .19ns(.27*) (ns) .16ns(.23*)
Mental disengagement .31**(.47**) .16ns(.36**) .25*(.44**)
Focus/venting of emotions .06ns(.35**) .06ns(.34**) .04ns(.36**)
Denial .02ns(.22*) .07ns(.25*) ,02ns(.24*)
Alcohol and/or drug use (ns) .12ns(.34**) .06ns(.27*)
Behavioural disengagement -.02(.31**) -.04ns(.39**) -.06ns(,36**)
Coning Strategies at 2 mth Distress at 12 mth
Aivdety Depression Distress
Attention coping (-.09ns) (-.05ns) (-.08ns)
Avoidant coping .19ns(.39**) .16ns(.46**) .17ns(.43**)
Acceptance -.10ns(.33**) -.17ns(.38**) -.13ns(-.37**)
Mental disengagement .10ns(.33**) .20ns(.38**) .14ns(.37**)
Focus/venting of emotions .08ns(.36**) .15ns(.37**) .09ns(.38**)
Denial .04ns(.24*) .07ns(.22*) .04ns(.24*)
Behavioural disengagement .03ns(.35**) .10ns(.45**) .03ns(.41**)
2 tailed significance * - .01 .001
7.4.3. Does distress predict coping?
As with causal attributions the question of reverse "causality" was also 
examined between coping strategies and distress, using distress at one 
point in time as a "predictor" of coping strategies at subsequent times. As 
before considering the number of comparisons made, Bonferroni corrected 
significance level is provided. However, as previously mentioned, as this 
results in a too stringent test, significant partial correlation findings are 
presented and discussed. These results are shown in tables 7.4.3. and
7.4.4.
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Anxiety and depression as well as overall distress did not predict attention 
coping at subsequent times. Nevertheless, when examining the impact of 
distress on individual coping strategies, 2 coping strategies grouped into 
the broader dimension of attention coping, seemed to be predicted by 
distress, these included suppression o f competing activities and seeking 
o f social support for emotional reasons.
The results were different when it came to avoidant coping, anxiety, 
depression and overall distress at one time predicted and accounted for 
change in avoidant coping at all subsequent assessment times. This was 
also clear when analysing individual coping strategies, levels of distress 
were associated with and predicted change in those coping strategies 
which had been grouped as avoidant coping. This included anxiety and 
depression as well as overall distress being inversely related to acceptance 
and positively associated with mental - and behavioural disengagement, 
denial, focus on and venting o f emotions and alcohol and/or drug use.
The findings fi’om these analysis could therefore conclude that distress did 
predict how patients coped.
Table 7.4.3. Correlations between distress at discharge and cooing strategies at 2 
and 12 months follow u p ; Distress ^predicting” cooing strategies. (Zero order 
correlations in brackets!.
2mth coping strategies Distress at discharge
Anxiety Depression Distress
Attention coping (.11ns) (.06ns) (10ns)
Avoidant coping .42* *(.40**) .31**(.33**) .38**(.41**)
Acceptance -.27*(.34**) -.25*(-.31**) -.28**(-.36**)
Supp. of competing activities .30**(.32**) .26*(.27*) .31*(.33**)
Mental disengagement .35**(.41**) .26*(.34**) .34**(.41**)
Focus/venting of emotions .28**(.34**) .20ns(,23*) .27*(,32**)
Behavioural disengagement .25*(.28*) .28**(.34**) .29**(.33**)
12 mth cooing strategies Distress at discharge
Anxiety Depression Distress
Attention coping (-.05ns) (-.04ns) (-.05ns)
Avoidant coping .22*(.28**) (.15ns) (.24ns)
Acceptance -.43**(-.48**) -.21 *(-.27*) -.37**(-.43**)
Supp. of competing activities .25*(.27*) .26*(.26*) .28**(.29**)
Mental disengagement ,23*(.31**) .15ns(.26*) .21 *(.32**)
Focus/venting of emotions .21 *(.27*) (.18ns) .21ns(.25*)
Denial .16ns(.22*) (ns) (ns)
Behavioural disengagement .43**(.44**) .31**(.33**) .42**(.43**)
2 tailed significance *-.01 **-.001 (Bonferroni corrected significance = p < .0033)
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strategies at 12 months follow un: Distress "oredicting" cooing strategies. (Zero
order correlations in brackets!.
12 mth coning strategies Distress at 2 mth
Anxiety Depression Distress
Attention coping (-.11ns) (-.11ns) (-.12ns)
Avoidant coping (.35**) (.40**) (.39**)
Acceptance -.31**(-.44**> -35**(-.47**) -.34**(-.39**)
Seeking of supp. for emotional reasons .25*(.24*) .29**(.28**) .27**(.26*)
Suppression of competing activities (.19ns) .19ns(.22*) .17ns(.21*)
Mental disengagement .25*(.34**) ,30**(.37**) .29**(.37**)
Focus/venting of emotions .30**(.47**) .34**(.47**) .33**(.44**)
Denial .19ns(.27*) .24*031**) .22*(.29**)
Behavioural disengagement .29**(.53**) .27*(.56**) .30**(.56**)
12 mth coning strategies Distress at 6 mth"
Anxiety Depression Distress
Attention coping (-.10ns) (-.13ns) (-.11ns)
Avoidant coping (.40**) (.39**) (.42**)
Acceptance (-.36**) (-.39**) (-.39**)
Seeking of supp. for emotional reasons (.31**) (.32**) (.33**)
Mental disengagement (.36**) (.36**) (.38**)
Focus/venting of emotions (.38**) (.40**) (.40**)
Denial (.33**) (25*) (.31**)
Alcohol and/or drug use (.27*) (.29**) (.29**)
Behavioural disengagement (.42**) (.50**) (.47**)
2 tailed significance * - .01 ** - .001 "No cooing data at 6 mth therefore no oartial correlations (no concurrent
relationshios with distress at 6 months).
7.4.4, Summary of relationshios between conins strategies and
distress.
These findings showed that avoidant coping was significantly related to 
more anxiety, depression and more overall distress at all assessment 
times. These results did therefore not support the "time x strategy" 
hypothesis which a number of other studies have shown. The reason for 
this could however, lie in the time of data collection. The present study 
first assessed coping more than 2 weeks from the illness onset, while other 
studies which have shown avoidant coping to be related to lower distress 
in the short term, have assessed coping within 3 days of illness/event 
onset. Looking at individual coping strategies and how they were 
concurrently related to distress showed that avoidant coping strategies, 
such as mental - and behavioural disengagement, denial and alcohol and 
drug use were all positively related to both anxiety and depression. 
Although attention coping defined in its broad term was not found to be 
significantly related to levels of distress, individual coping strategies which 
had been grouped as attention coping, showed some relationships with
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distress. This included for example, planning and depression inversely 
related at 2 months, positive reframing inversely associated with overall 
distress, seeking o f social support fo r instrumental reasons related to 
anxiety at 12 months follow up and suppression o f competing activities 
related to both anxiety and depression at 12 months.
The next analysis involved assessing whether coping at one time predicted 
distress levels at subsequent times. On the whole this did not seem to be 
the case. Neitlier avoidant or attention coping predicted anxiety, 
depression or overall distress. Although a number of relationships did 
emerge when examining individual coping strategies and their relationship 
with distress, the majority of these became non existent or at least non 
significant after controlling for concurrent distress. Two exceptions were 
however found, one was the use of active coping at discharge being 
related to less depression at 12 months, the other was coping by mental 
disengagement at 2 months which was obtained to be related to anxiety 
and overall distress at 6 months follow up.
The question of reverse "causality" , where distress at one time was used 
to predict coping at subsequent times, gave different results. In this case 
distress appeared to be a better predictor of how patients coped than vice 
versa. This was particularly true for distress and avoidant coping, anxiety, 
depression and overall distress predicted avoidant coping at all 
subsequent assessment times. The more distress patients were 
experiencing at one time the more likely they were to use avoidant coping 
at subsequent times even after controlling for concurrent coping.
Overall, this section could therefore conclude that there was a relationship 
between coping strategies and levels of distress and distress appeared to 
be a stronger predictor of coping than vice versa.
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Multivariate results.
7.5. What are the best predictors of distress, coping and causal 
attributions?
The aim of the final part of the result section was to use multiple 
regression analysis to firstly, examine how and whether causal attributions 
and coping strategies explained and predicted levels of distress over the 
span of the study (sub-section 7.5.1.). Secondly, to examine what were 
the best predictors of coping strategies at each assessment time (sub­
section 7.5.2.), and finally, to assess the best predictors of causal 
attributions across the study (sub-section 7.5.3.).
Note: As these analysis were all carried out for exploratory purposes, those variables which 
were significantly related to the independent variable before the Bonferroni corrections were 
also included.
7.5.1. How are causal attributions and coping strategies related to 
levels of distress?
This analysis was concerned with concurrent relationsliips, where stepwise 
multiple regression analysis was used to examine which variables, coping 
strategies or causal attributions, were most useful in explaining levels of 
distress. This analysis was carried out for all three assessment times, i.e., 
discharge, 2 months and 12 months, where both causal attributions and 
coping strategies were measured as well as distress. The independent 
variables used in each analysis were chosen because they were known to 
be significantly related to levels of distress, as revealed in previous 
correlation analysis.
The first of the equations was used to examine how characterological se lf 
blame, behavioural se lf blame, other blame and avoidant coping at 
discharge were related to anxiety, depression and overall distress at that 
same time. The question to be answered was which one of these 
independent variables would explain the most of the variance in levels of 
distress. While first examining anxiety, the results showed that 
characterological self blame explained 24% of the variance in anxiety (see 
table 7.5.1.) the other attributions and avoidant coping did not significantly
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add anything to that explanation. This result indicated that 
characterological se lf blame had the biggest impact on levels of anxiety, 
the more patients blamed their own character for the MI the more anxious 
they were. A very similar result was found for depression and overall 
distress. Characterological self blame explained 16% of the variance in 
depression at discharge and other variables did not enter the equation and 
characterological self blame explained 25% of the variance in overall 
distress without other variables in the equation. Behavioural self blame 
was however, close to significance (T=1.76, p<.08) in relation to overall 
distress, indicating that it had some impact on overall distress levels.
Table 7.5.1. Causal attributions and coping strategies and their relationship with 
anxiety, depression and èverall distress at discharge.
Anxiety
Overall adjusted R square =.24, p<.001
Beta T p
Character self blame .49 6.01 .001
Depression
Overall adjusted R square = .16, p.000
Beta T p
Character self blame .41 4.77 .001
Overall distress
Overall adjusted R square =.25, p<.001
Beta T p
Character self blame_______ .50 6.22 .001______________________________________________
The next regression analysis assessed the relationship between causal 
attributions, coping strategies and distress levels at 2 months. Like before, 
independent variables were chosen for the analysis if they had been 
significantly related to levels Of distress. This resulted in a regression 
equation using characterological se lf blame and avoidant coping as 
independent variables and anxiety, depression or distress as dependent 
variables. The results showed that avoidant coping and characterological 
self blame together explained 30% of the variance in anxiety at 2 months, 
32% of the variance in depression and 34% of the variance m overall 
distress. Avoidant coping had the bigger impact of tlie two but 
characterological self blame added to the prediction, showing that using 
avoidant coping and blaming one's own character for the Ml was related to 
higher anxiety, depression and overall distress (see table 7.5.2.).
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Table 7.5.2. Causal attributions and copîng strategics and their relationships
with anxiety, depression and overall distress at 2 months.
Anxiety
Overall adjusted R square =.30, p<.001
Beta T p
Avoidant coping .48 5.85 .001
Character self blame .18 2.30 .02
Depression
Overall adjusted R square = .32, p.OOl
Beta T p
Avoidant coping .45 5.58 .001
Character self blame .24 3.04 .002
Overall distress
Overall adjusted R square =.34, p<.001
Beta T p
Avoidant coping .49 6.11 .001
Character self blame .22 2.79 .006
The final regression analysis using both causal attributions and coping 
strategies to explain the concurrent variance in levels of distress included 
12 months follow up data. Here as before, independent variables were 
those who had been significantly related to the dependent variable. This 
included avoidant coping and characterological se lf blame as the 
independent variables and anxiety, depression or overall distress as the 
dependent ones. Like at 2 months the results from this analysis showed 
that avoidant coping and characterological self blame at 12 months were 
both involved in explaining the variance in levels of distress at 12 months. 
As at 2 months avoidant coping had a bigger impact on distress levels than 
characterological self blame but as previously both were positive, 
indicating that using avoidant coping and blaming ones own character 
explained a significant amount of the variance in anxiety, depression and 
overall distress. Coping by using avoidant strategies and attributing the 
MI to characterological self blame at 12 months explained 25% of the 
variance in anxiety, 30% of the variance in depression and 30% in the 
variance of overall distress.
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Table 7.5.3. Causal attributions and cooing strategies and their relationships
with anxiety, depression and overall distress at 12 months.
Anxiety
Overall adjusted R square =.25, p<.001
Beta T PAvoidant coping .39 4.63 .001
Character self blame .25 3.04 .002
Depression
Overall adjusted R square = .30, p.OOl
Beta T PAvoidant coping .36 4.56 .001
Character self blame .35 4.32 .001
Overall distress
Overall adjusted R square = 30, p<001
Beta T PAvoidant coping .39 4.85 .001
Character self blame .31 3.80 .002
Concurrent relationships between causal attributions and levels of distress 
were also examined at the 6 months follow up point. At tliis time patients 
coping strategies were not assessed and were therefore not included in 
these analysis. Two kinds of attributions at 6 months, characterological 
self blame and other blame, were significantly related to anxiety, 
depression and overall distress, these were therefore used as independent 
variables in the regression analysis. The aim of this analysis was to 
investigate which one of these two attributions better explained the 
variance m levels of distress, findings are displayed in table 7.5.4. The 
results showed that characterological self blame had a greater impact than 
other blame on anxiety and depression as well as on overall distress. 
Other blame did not enter the equation, showing that it did not add 
anything to the explanation of distress levels, it did however, come close 
to significance with overall distress (T=1.67, p<.09). Characterological 
self blame at 6 months explained 23% of the variance in anxiety, 21% of 
depression and 25% of overall distress.
Table 7.5.4. Causai attributions and their relationships with anxiety* depression
and oyerall distress at 6 months.
Anxietv
Overall adjusted R square =.23, p<.001
Beta T PCharacter self blame .49 5.99 .001
Depression
Overall adjusted R square = .20, p.OOl
Beta T PCharacter self blame .46 5.56 .001
Overall distress
Overall adjusted R square =.24, p<001
Beta T PCharacter self blame .50 6.18 .001
7.5.2. Summary of concurrent reiationships between causal 
attributions, coping strategies and levels of distress.
The findings firom these stepwise multiple regression analysis showed that 
at discharge characterological self blame was the only significant variable 
that explained levels of distress at that time. At 2 and 12 months results 
showed that avoidant coping was most highly related to distress levels, 
characterological self blame did however, remain as a significant factor in 
explaining distress at those times also. Furthermore, characterological self 
blame at 6 months had a bigger impact on distress than other blame at that 
time.
On the whole, these results showed that in this population of patients with 
MI, blaming one's own character for the illness and/or using avoidant 
coping explained between 20 and 34% of the variance in their concurrent 
levels of anxiety, depression and overall distress.
7.5.3. What are the best predictors of distress: causal attributions or 
coping strategies?
In order to examine this question, lets first refer back to the bivariate 
results between coping strategies and distress on the one hand, and 
between causal attributions and distress levels on tlie other. These results 
showed that the broader dimensions of attention and avoidant coping were
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not found to be related to distress at subsequent times. Only two 
relationships were found between coping at one time and distress levels at 
subsequent times. One was between active coping at discharge and 
depression at 12 months. The other was between coping by mental 
disengagement at 2 months and anxiety and overall distress at 6 months. 
The only causal attribution found to be related to anxiety, depression and 
overall distress at subsequent times, was characterological se lf blame at 
discharge. Characterological self blame at other times was not 
significantly associated with distress levels at subsequent times after 
controlling for concurrent distress.
Multiple regression analysis are statistical techniques set out to examine 
the relationship between two or more independent variables and one 
dependent variable. Furthermore, the general consideration for choosing 
independent variables for a regression analysis is that they are significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). 
Considering that few significant relationships were found between causal 
attributions and distress and coping strategies and distress, and based on 
the above criterion, it was considered unnecessary to carry out a multiple 
regression analysis where causal attributions and coping strategies were 
used as predictors of subsequent distress levels. This sub-section wül 
therefore conclude by referring to bivariate results where the main finding 
was, that characterological se lf blame at discharge and no other 
attribution, was associated with distress at all subsequent times. 
Furthermore, how patients coped had httle impact on their subsequent 
levels of distress, showing only two individual coping strategies related to 
subsequent distress, i.e., active coping at discharge and depression at 12 
months and mental disengagement at 2 months and anxiety plus overall 
distress at 6 months.
7.5.4. What is the best predictor of how patients cope: distress or 
causal attributions?
In this sub-section of multivariate analysis, stepwise multiple regression 
was used to examine what were the best predictors of coping. As the aim 
of this analysis was a prediction equation, stepwise regression was used in 
order to evaluate which subset of either distress or causal attributions was 
most usefirl in predicting coping strategies. In each regression analysis
those variables which were significantly related to coping at the bivariate 
level were used as the independent variables.
First of these analysis assessed whether characterological se lf blame and 
overall distress at discharge predicted avoidant coping at 2 months after 
accounting fo r avoidant coping at discharge. In order to examine this, 
avoidant coping at discharge was first entered into the equation, this 
showed that avoidant coping at discharge correlated with avoidant coping 
at 2 months explaining 11% of the variance in 2 months avoidant coping. 
This analysis also showed that both characterological self blame and 
overall distress would add to the prediction and explain more of the 
variance in avoidant coping at 2 months if they were entered next (self ch. 
blame = T =2.38, p<.01, distress = T=.3.36, p<.001). Following this, 
characterological self blame and overall distress were entered using the 
stepwise procedure. The results firom this analysis showed that overall 
distress had a greater impact on 2 months avoidant coping than 
characterological self blame and the overall explained variance of avoidant 
coping at 2 months was raised to 20% (see table 7.5.5.)
oredict avoidant coning at 2 months after controlling for avoidant coning at
discharge?
Avoidant coping at 2 months
Dischai^e Beta T p
Avoidant coping .34 3.66 .001 > (Overall adjusted R square =.11, p<.001)
Overall distress .31 3.36 .001
Overall adjusted R  square=.20, p<.001 (after adding overall distress)
The next of these analysis assessed whether characterological se lf blame 
and anxiety at discharge predicted avoidant coping at 12 months after 
accounting fo r avoidant coping at discharge. The same procedure was 
used as in previous analysis and in this case avoidant coping at discharge 
predicted 4% of the variance in avoidant coping at 12 months. Both 
characterological self blame and anxiety were found to add to the 
prediction if they had been entered next (self ch. blame= T =.5.55, p<.001, 
anxiety = T = 2.25, p<.02). After entering characterological self blame 
and anxiety the overall prediction of 12 montlis avoidant coping was raised
to 27%. Stepwise regression showed that characterological self blame was 
enough to account for this increase and anxiety did not enter the stepwise 
equation (see table 7.5.6.).
Table 7.5.6. Do characterological self blame and anxiety at discharge predict 
avoidant cooing at 12 months after controlling for avoidant coning at discharge?
Avoidant coping a t 12 months 
D isc h a i^  Beta T p
Avoidant coping .22 2.23 .02 > (Overall adjusted R square = 04, p<02)
Cliaracter self blame .51 5.55 .001
Overall adjusted R  square=.27* p<.001 (after adding character self blame)
Although levels of distress at 2 months were significantly related, at the 
bivariate level, to avoidant coping at 12 months, causal attributions at 2 
months were not significantly correlated with eidier attention or avoidant 
coping at 12 months. It was therefore unnecessary to perform a multiple 
regression analysis between these two time points. Thus, the last of the 
prediction equation analysis for coping included assessing whether 
characterological se lf blame and overall distress at 6 months predicted 
avoidant coping at 12 months. As coping data at 6 months was not 
included in the thesis, this analysis did not need to account for concurrent 
avoidant coping. Stepwise regression showed that characterological self 
blame and overall distress at 6 months together predicted 24% of the 
variance in avoidant coping at 12 months. Characterological self blame 
appeared to have the bigger impact on avoidant coping of the two. These 
results indicated that attributing to characterological self blame and higher 
distress levels predicted some of the variance in use of avoidant coping at 
12 months.
Table 7.5.7. Do characterological self blame and overall distress at 6 months 
predict avoidant coning at 12 months?
Avoidant coping at 12 months
6 months Beta T p
Cliaracter self blame .33 3.19 .001
Overall distress .25 2.43 .01
Overall adjusted R  square=.24, p<.001
7.5.5. Summary of relationships between causai attributions and 
distress at one time and coping strategies at subsequent times.
The findings fi*om these analysis showed that avoidant coping at discharge 
was the strongest predictor of avoidant coping at two months. This was 
however, not true while predicting avoidant coping at 12 months. 
Characterological self blame at discharge was in this case found to be a 
stronger predictor than previous avoidant coping. On the whole, both 
characterological self blame and levels of distress at one time were found 
to predict a significant amount of the variance in avoidant coping at 
subsequent times. Characterological self blame appeared to be a stronger 
predictor than distress at all times, the only exception was at discharge 
where overall distress showed a stronger impact on avoidant coping at 2 
months than characterological self blame did.
The main findings of these analysis would point towards the conclusion 
that it is not just the use of avoidant coping m the past that predicts the use 
of avoidant coping in the fiiture, other variables, in this case blaming one’s 
own character for the illness and how distressed one is, have an impact on 
future coping as well. Furthermore, blaming one’s own character for tlie 
event is more likely to predict the use of avoidant coping than levels of 
distress.
7.5.6. What is the best predictor of the kind of attributions patients 
make: distress or coping strategies?
This analysis was concerned with predictors of causal attributions. As in 
sub-section 7.5.5. stepwise multiple regression analyses were carried out j
while accounting for concurrent relationships and like before, independent |
variables chosen for each equation were those which had been j
significantly related to the dependent variable at the bivariate level.
The first equation was carried out to assess whether levels o f anxiety at !
discharge and the patients* sex would predict characterological self 
blame at 2 months, while accounting fo r characterological se lf blame at 
discharge. The results showed that characterological self blame at i
discharge correlated with characterological self blame at 2 months j
explaining 28% of the variance. These results also indicated that whether j
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the patient was a male or a female would add to the prediction of 
characterological self blame if it were to be entered next (T=.2,03, p<.04). 
After entering sex and anxiety levels at discharge in a stepwise procedure, 
30% of the variance in characterological self blame at 2 months was 
explained (see table 7.5.8.), anxiety did not enter the equation.
Table 7.5.8. Da levels of anxiety at discharge and patient sex predict 
characterological self blame at 2 months after coiitrolling for characterological 
self blame at discharge?
Characterological self blame at 2 months 
Discharge Beta T p
Character self blame .52 6.22 .001 > (Overall adjusted R square = 28, p < 001)
Sex .17 2.03 .04
Overall adjusted R  square=.30, p<001 (after adding sex)
The next equation examined whether patients age and their levels o f  
anxiety at discharge predicted behavioural se lf blame at 2 months after 
accounting fo r behavioural se lf blame at discharge. This analysis 
showed that blaming one’s own behaviour at discharge predicted 34% of 
the variance in behavioural self blame at 2 months, this also showed that 
age would add to the prediction if entered (T=.-2.31, p<.02). Age and 
anxiety levels were entered next mto a stepwise regression, which showed 
that age added to the prediction leaving 39% of the variance in behavioural 
self blame at 2 months explained. Age, being young, had an impact on 
attributing the MI to behavioural self blame but discharge levels of anxiety 
did not enter the stepwise equation.
Table 7.5.9. Do levels of anxiety at discharge and patient age predict behavioural 
self blame at 2 months after controlling for behavioural self blame at discharge?
Behavioural self blame at 2 months 
Discharge Beta T p
Behavioural self blame .49 5.88 .001 > (Overall adjusted R  square = 34, p<.001)
Age -.25 -2.89 .004
Overall adjusted R  square=.39, p<.001 (after adding age)
Only one variable at discharge was related to behavioural self blame at 12 
months, this was avoidant coping and only sex was related to 
characterological self blame at 12 months. These bivariate results 
therefore did not call for a multiple regression analysis. The same was true 
for relationships between coping, distress, sex and age at 2 and 6 months 
and causal attributions at 12 months, too few bivariate significant 
relationships were found to carry out a regression analysis, which as 
mentioned earlier requires more than one independent variable. This 
leaves only the following two prediction equation for causal attributions:
Firstly, including avoidant coping, sex and anxiety at 2 months 
predicting characterological se lf blame at 6 months, after accounting 
fo r characterological se lf blame at 2 months.
Secondly, using avoidant coping, age and anxiety at 2 months as 
predictors o f behavioural se lf blame at 6 months, after having 
accounted fo r behavioural se lf blame at 2 months.
While first assessing the predictors of characterological self blame at 6 
months, the results obtained that characterological self blame at 2 months 
predicted 10% of the variance in characterological self blame at 6 montlis. 
Avoidant coping and levels of anxiety were also found to add to this 
prediction if entered next (avoidant coping, T=4.91, p<.001, anxiety = 
T=5.03, p<.001). Stepwise regression equation showed that levels of 
anxiety and avoidant coping together added to the prediction so that 
overall variance explained in characterological self blame at 6 months was 
34%. Levels of anxiety had greater impact on 6 months characterological 
self blame than avoidant coping and sex did not enter the equation (see 
table 7.5.10.). These results seemed to indicate that although 
characterological self blame at discharge predicted characterological self 
blame at 2 months it did not have the strongest impact on blaming ones 
own character at 6 months, levels of anxiety and the use of avoidant 
coping together appeared to be better predictors of 6 months 
characterological self blame.
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Table 7.5.10. Do levels of anxiety and avoidant cooing at 2 months and patient 
sex predict characterological self blame at 6 months after controlling for 
characterological self blame at 2 months?
Characterological self blame at 6 months
2 months Beta T PCharacter self blame .33 3.37 .001
Avoidant coping .29 2.83 .005
Anxiety .31 3.00 .003
Overall adjusted R  souare=.34. p<.001 Cafter adding avoidant coping and anxiety)____________________
The last regression equation presented here examined whether avoidant 
coping, anxiety and age at 2 months predicted behavioural se lf blame at 
6 months, while having accounted fo r behavioural se lf blame at 2 
months. The findings firom these analysis obtained that behavioural self 
blame at 2 months predicted 28% of the variance in behavioural self blame 
at 6 months. However, avoidant coping was also found to predict 
behavioural self blame at 6 months in addition to previous behavioural self 
blame, leaving the overall predicted variance at 32%. Anxiety and age did 
not add to that prediction (see table 7.5.11.).
Table 7.5.11. Da levels of anxiety, avoidant coping at 2 months and patient age 
predict behavioural self blame at 6 months after controlling for behavioural self 
blame at 2 months?
Behavioural self blame at 6 months 
2 months Beta T p
Behaviour self blame .51 5,84 .001 > (Overall adjusted R square = 28, p<.001)
Avoidant coping .20 2.37 .01
Overall adjusted R  sauare=.32. d<.001 (after adding avoidant coping)______________________________
7.5.7. Summary of relationships between coping, distress, age and sex 
at one time and causal attributions at subsequent times.
The general findings fi*om these analysis showed that the best predictor of 
characterological self blame at one time was characterological self blame 
at previous times. The same result was found for behavioural self blame, 
the best predictor of attributing the MI to one's own behaviour at one time 
was behavioural self blame at previous times. However, avoidant coping 
and/or levels of anxiety, sex and age at one time did significantly explain 
some of the variance in both characterological self blame and behavioural 
self blame at subsequent times. This included sex adding on to the 
prediction of characterological self blame at 2 months. Age also
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signifîcantiy contributed to the prediction of behavioural self blame at 2 
months, showing that the younger the patient, the more hkely he or she 
was to attribute to behavioural self blame at 2 months follow up. Using 
avoidant coping at 2 months was found to significantly explain the 
variance in both characterological self blame and behavioural self blame at 
6 months. Levels of anxiety at 2 months were also found to predict 
attributing the illness to characterological self blame at 6 months. To 
conclude, these findings indicate that causal attributions at one time are the 
strongest predictors of causal attributions at subsequent times. 
Nevertheless other factors add to this prediction, in particular avoidant 
coping and levels of anxiety.
In an attempt to present the overall findings fi*om the multivariate results in 
a visual form, figure 2 below provides a diagram of the results.
This shows that sex explained some of the variance in characterological 
self blame, which in turn explained both concurrent and subsequent 
variance in both higher levels of distress and the use of avoidant coping.
Being distressed at one assessment time explained a significant amount of 
the variance in using avoidant coping at subsequent times and avoidant 
coping at 2 months was found to explain a significant variance in both 
blaming one's own character and behaviour at 6 months post MI. Finally, 
age explained a significant amount of the variance in behavioural self 
blame.
age
sex
Avoidant
coping
Higher distress
Behavioural self 
blame
Characterological self 
blame
Figure 2. A diagram of the multivariate results (see text above^ l.
7.6. Summary of univariate, bivariate and muitivariate results.
This section presents a summary of the main findings of the study. 
Univariate results are presented first, then bivariate and finally 
multivariate.
tlnivariate coping results:
1. The process of coping following a first MI did change over time, 
with overall coping being most early on after the illness onset. Ten out of 
15 coping strategies showed a significant decrease across time.
2. The most commonly reported coping strategy at all 3 assessment 
times was acceptance, followed by restraint coping at discharge, active 
coping at 2 months and coping by religion at 12 months.
3. The least reported coping strategies at all assessment times were 
coping by using alcohol and/or drugs and feelings o f withdrawing or 
giving up (behavioural disengagement),
4. In a two factor solution, 13 of the COPE's 15 coping strategies 
grouped together into the two broader dimensions of attention versus 
avoidant coping as defined by Suis and Fletcher (1985). Coping by 
humour and rehgion did not load with the other items.
5. Attention coping was used significantly more than avoidant coping 
at discharge and at 2 months, but no difference was found in reported use 
of attention versus avoidant coping at 12 months post MI.
6. Reported use of attention coping decreased over time, while the use 
of avoidant coping increased as time passed.
7. When assessing if the patients reported to cope differently while 
coping with their illness than when they had to cope with other difiSculties 
in their lives, the results showed that they used attention coping 
significantly more when coping with other things than when coping with 
the MI and the reverse was true for avoidant coping.
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Univariate causal attribution results:
8. The majority of patients did not made a spontaneous attribution 
when asked an open question about their illness.
9. Over 80% of patients made a provoked attribution at all 4 
assessment times, when asked openly and directly about what they thought 
had caused their illness.
10. Patients made fewer attributions as time passed.
11. The most commonly mentioned causes for the MI were: stress,
smoking, hereditary factors, eating fatty foods and work items.
12. Consistency over time in what patients attributed their MI to
appeared to be high, attributing to one type was related to attributing to
that same type again at a later time. Changes did however, also emerge, 
for example attributing to behavioural self blame at discharge was 
associated with characterological self blame at 2 months and seeing 
circumstances as a cause also at 2 months and other blame at discharge 
was associated with both characterological self blame and behavioural self 
blame at 2 months.
13. Majority of patients were unable to identify a connection between 
the items they had mentioned as a cause for their illness.
Univariate distress results:
14. Patients were within the normal range for anxiety, depression and 
overall distress at all assessment times.
Bivariate results:
Sex differences in causal attributions, coping strategies and distress 
levels:
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15. Male and female patients used similar coping strategies, only one 
significant sex difference was found, where men appeared to use more 
attention coping at discharge than women did.
16. Women were more likely to blame their own character for the MI 
than men, women were also more likely to attribute to biology, God and 
other people.
17. Men were more likely to attribute the MI to circumstances than 
women.
18. No sex differences were found in levels of distress.
Age differences in causal attributions, coping strategies and distress 
levels:
19. How old patients were did not seem to be related to what form of 
coping they used or how distressed they were. It did however, seem to 
matter in relation to what form of attributions patients made. Younger 
patients were more likely to blame their own behaviour for their illness, 
they were also more likely to attribute to circumstances at discharge. 
Older patients on the other hand, were more hkely to attribute the MI to 
God.
Relationships between causal attributions and coping strategies:
20. Behavioural self blame and other blame were related to avoidant 
coping at discharge and characterological self blame at 2 months was 
related to avoidant coping at that same time. No significant concurrent 
relationships were found between causal attributions and attention coping.
21. Characterological self blame at one time predicted avoidant coping 
at all subsequent times, with one exception, the relationship was not 
significant at 2 months. No causal attributions significantly predicted 
attention coping.
22. When using coping strategies as predictors of causal attributions the 
results showed that avoidant coping at discharge was predictive of
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behavioural self blame at 12 months and avoidant coping at 2 months w^ as 
associated with both characterological self blame and behavioural self 
blame at 6 months.
Relationships between causal attributions and levels o f distress:
23. When assessing concurrent relationships, characterological se lf 
blame was found to be related to higher levels of anxiety, depression and 
overall distress at all assessment times. Other blame was also related to 
higher distress levels both at discharge and at 6 months and finally 
behavioural se lf blame at discharge was related to both anxiety and 
depression as well as to overall distress.
24. After controlling for concurrent distress levels characterological 
se lf blame at discharge was found to be predictive of higher levels of 
anxiety, depression and overall distress at all subsequent times.
25. Using distress levels at one time to predict causal attributions at 
subsequent times after controlling for concurrent attributions, showed that 
distress including both anxiety and depression at 2 months were related to 
characterological self blame at 6 and 12 months and to other blame at 6 
months. Furthermore, 6 months distress was also related to 
characterological self blame at 12 months.
Relationships between coping strategies and levels o f distress:
26. Avoidant coping was significantly related to higher anxiety, 
depression and overall distress at all assessment times. On the other hand, 
avoidant coping at one time did not predict distress levels at subsequent 
times. Attention coping did not show significant relationships witli distress 
levels within each assessment time or across times.
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27. Anxiety, depression and overall distress predicted avoidant coping 
at all subsequent times but were not significantly related to attention 
coping.
Multivariate results:
Explaining levels o f distress:
28. Blaming one's own character for the illness and/or using avoidant 
coping explained between 20 and 34 % of the variance in concurrent 
levels of distress.
Explaining coping strategies:
29. Using avoidant coping in the past was not the only predictor of 
avoidant coping in the future, characterological se lf blame and levels o f  
distress also significantly predicted subsequent avoidant coping, leaving 
20 to 24% of the variance in later avoidant coping explained.
Explaining causal attributions:
30. Causal attributions at one tune were the strongest predictors of 
causal attributions at subsequent times. However, other variables added to 
these predictions, in particular avoidant coping and levels of anxiety.
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CHAPTER 8
Summary. Comments and Discussion.
Chapter 8 presents a summary and discussion of the study findings. It 
summarises and discusses what the results showed, ideas about why things 
happened the way they did, how it related to the research expectations and 
what was surprising about the findings. The measures are also discussed, 
in particular in relation to how well or badly they formed. Furtheimore, 
chapter 8 includes a discussion on how the results related to previous 
findings and to the general research hterature on this topic, how they 
related to theory and finally what sort of implications they might have for 
further research, theory and for care of patients with MI.
8.1. How did the study findings relate to the research 
expectations/hypothesis?
This first section will briefly summarise the predictions tested in the 
current research and present results regarding each one, which wiU then be 
discussed in more detail later.
The present study sought to examine the nature of coping strategies and 
causal attributions, how these factors interacted with each other and 
related to and predicted levels of distress over a period of 1 year in 
patients following a first MI. Based on previous research findings, models 
and theories, the study set out to test the following 7 hypothesis:
1. Coping strategies will change over time.
2. Coping strategies will be concurrently related to and predict levels 
o f distress. In particular, avoidant coping will be related to less 
distress at discharge but higher distress at later follow up.
3. Causal attributions will be related to and predict coping strategies.
4. Patients will be most likely to attribute their illness to stress and 
smoking.
5. Behavioural self blame will be concurrently related to and predict 
lower levels o f distress.
6. Characterological self blame will be concurrently related to and 
predict higher levels o f distress.
7. Other blame will be concurrently related to and predict higher 
levels o f distress.
Six of these 7 hypothesis were either fully or partially supported by the 
study findings. Coping was found to change over time and avoidant 
coping was concurrently related to levels of distress, coping was however, 
not found to predict subsequent distress. Certain causal attributions were 
shown to be both related to and predict how patients reported to cope with 
the illness. The most commonly reported causes for the MI were stress 
and smoking. Furthermore, characterological self blame and other blame 
were found to be concurrently related to higher levels of distress and 
blaming one's own character was found to predict higher subsequent 
distress. The only hypothesis, which was not supported by the present 
results was the prediction that behavioural self blame would be related to 
and predict lower levels of distress, on the contrary behavioural self blame 
at discharge was related to higher distress. All these and other findings 
will be discussed further in the following sub-sections.
8.2. What did the results show and how does that relate to previous 
research findings?
Coping.
While first summarising coping results and how they related to previous 
research findings, the results of this study showed that reports of coping by 
acceptance were significantly higher than reports of other coping scales. 
Previous studies on coping have reported similar findings. For instance, in 
a study by Heim et al. (1993), where they assessed coping reported by 
patients with breast cancer over a period of 3 to 5 years, acceptance was 
among the most reported coping strategy at all times. Carver and
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colleagues (1993) showed similar results. They used the COPE in 
assessing coping responses reported by women with breast cancer over a 
period of 1 year and found that reports of coping by acceptance were 
significantly higher than any other scale at all assessment times. These 
findings have therefore been replicated across different study populations, 
in these cases for both patients witli MI and cancer.
After grouping the coping strategies into attention versus avoidant coping, 
the results showed that avoidant coping strategies were significantly 
related to higher levels of distress at all assessment times however, 
avoidant coping at one time was not found to predict levels of distress at 
subsequent times. Attention coping was not found to be significantly 
related to or predictive of distress levels at any time. These results both 
support and contradict previous research findings. Coping has previously 
been found to be botli related to and/or predictive of distress, in particular 
passive or avoidant coping strategies have been found to be related to 
higher distress, while attention and more active coping strategies have 
been found to be related to lower distress levels (Carver et al., 1993; 
Stanton & Snider, 1993; Dunkel-Schetter et al., 1992; Jahanshahi, 1991; 
Frank et al., 1987; Bombardier et al., 1990; Harkapaa, 1991; Weickgenant 
et al., 1993; Agren et al., 1993). The study presented here showed that 
avoidant coping strategies were related to higher levels of distress at all 
times, which rephcates the majority of previous research findings. On the 
other hand, coping was not found to be predictive of subsequent distress, 
which contradicts most previous findings. This might therefore be 
considered as a surprising result, however recent research (Weinman, et 
al., 1994; Earl et al. 1994) on coping with chronic illness has shown that 
coping is not predictive of illness outcome, which supports the present 
findings. These latest findings in this area, including this one, seem to 
suggest that how patients cope has no direct predictive power in relation to 
outcome following illness, but might more likely be mediated by other 
factors and has therefore not been found to be directly predictive of 
distress. In fact the present study showed support for reverse "causahty", 
i.e., it showed that higher anxiety, depression and overall distress at one 
time were predictive of avoidant coping at all subsequent times, a finding, 
as far as the author is aware of, not reported in previous studies. The more 
distressed tlie patients were at one time, the more likely they were to use 
avoidant coping strategies at subsequent times.
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The present study also assessed the "time x strategy" hypothesis, put 
forward by Suis and Fletcher (1985), in relation to avoidant copmg and 
adjustment. Previous research findings have shown that avoidant coping is 
adaptive, as far as adjustment is concerned, in the short-term but 
maladaptive in the long-term (Suis & Fletcher, 1985; Holmes & 
Stevenson, 1990; Smith et al., 1990). This result has also found support in 
longitudinal studies on coping with MI (Agren et al. 1993). Furthermore, 
cross-sectional studies, also examining coping shortly following MI onset, 
have shown copmg by denial to be related to less distress (Froese et al., 
1974; Havik & Maeland, 1988). These findmgs were however, not 
replicated in the present study, as pointed out above, avoidant coping was 
related to higher levels of distress at all assessment times. This could be 
due to, as was argued in chapter 7 (sub-section 7.4.4.) the time of the 
coping data collection. The present study first assessed coping 2 weeks 
following the illness onset and failed to find a relationship between 
avoidant coping and less distress, while other studies, which have shown 
avoidant coping to be related to lower distress, have in most cases 
assessed coping within 3 days of illness onset (Suis & Fletcher, 1985). 
However, when taking a closer look at the correlational results presented 
here, between avoidant coping and concurrent levels of distress (see table 
7.4.1.), it can be seen that the correlations between avoidant copmg and 
levels of distress at discharge are much lower than between avoidant 
copmg and distress levels at later follow up (r = .28 at discharge vs. r as 
high as =56 at later follow up). Thus, although avoidant coping did not 
show a relationship with lower distress at discharge, it was not as strongly 
related to distress at that time as subsequently, in fact it did not show a 
significant relationship with discharge levels of depression.
Coping strategies were found to change over time, with overall coping 
being most early on following the illness onset, a result also found in 
Carver et al's (1993) study. Furthermore, patients were found to report 
different ways of coping for coping with the MI fi’om the way tliey cope 
with other stressfiil situations in their lives. They were found to use 
avoidant coping significantly more for coping with the MI, while they used 
attention coping significantly more when coping with other stressful 
situations. These results provide further support for the idea, tliat coping is 
a continuous, transactional process which is modified by experience both
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within and between stressfiil episodes, rather than a stable unchangeable 
trait (see chapter 2, sub-section 2.1.2.). The present study could however, 
be criticised for the way it assessed how patients coped with other 
stressful situations in their lives. They were not given any specific idea to 
keep in mind when they answered this question. They were simply asked 
to say how they usually coped with other stressful situations in their lives. 
As Lazarus (1993a) pointed out, this type of assessment is open to 
criticism.
Lazarus argues that by asking in this open way, subjects might be 
responding by given just a vague impression about how they would prefer 
to cope, which might be iofluenced by what they think is socially desirable 
or ideal way of coping, not actually what tliey have thought or done. This 
kind of criticism could however, apply to any form of psychological 
assessment, where people might try to present themselves in a desirable 
way. Lazarus responds to that by reasoning that ''if subjects must 
remember or relive an actual incident and coping thoughts and actions 
employed, there is a good chance that they actually thought or did what 
they reported!' (Lazarus, 1993a, page 242). In this manner, asking the 
patients how they were coping with the MI would, according to Lazarus, 
give a "true" response, whereas asking them how they usually coped with 
(any) other stressful situations might not present a "true" response.
Whether one agrees with that or not, the results of the study presented 
here, could imply that this was the reason for the finding that patients 
reported to use attention copmg more, and avoidant coping less (a more 
acceptable or better way of coping), for coping with other stressful 
situations in their lives than when coping with the MI. The present study 
had no way of knowing what patients had in mind when they answered 
this question, each patient would therefore have had a different situation in 
mind. It is however, likely that they did not think of another illness as the 
nature of the question required them to think of other stressful situations. 
A way to prevent this difficulty in the future and gain a "truer" response, 
might be to ask each participant to think of a particular situation and in that 
way assess and compare coping strategies across different encounters.
Whether the finding that patients coped differently with their illness as 
opposed to other stressful life events, is a valid finding or not, the result
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remains that coping with the MI did change over time, providing support 
for the process oriented coping approach. This finding could also be 
interpreted as a support for a "true" response because if patients had been 
trying to present their coping in a desirable or socially acceptable way, one 
could have expected the same desirable response at all assessment times.
Causal attributions.
The attributional findings of the present study showed that among the most 
commonly mentioned causes for the MI were stress, smoking, hereditary 
factors, eating fatty foods and work items. This is not a surprising result 
as most studies assessing attributions following MI have shown similar 
findings (Fielding, 1987; Mumma & Corkle, 1982-83; Rudy, 1980; 
Koslowsky et al., 1978; Affleck et al., 1987; Burgess & Hartman, 1986; 
Naea de Valle & Norman, 1992). These results could indicate, as was 
pointed out in chapter 6 (sub-section 6.2.9.) that these patients have 
knowledge of what are thought to be the main causes for an MI and are in 
an agreement with medical opinion. However, stress comes up as the 
most frequently reported cause both in this and previous research. This, as 
Fielding (1987) pointed out, is conflicting with current medical opinion, 
which emphasis biological causes rather than psycho-social ones. Rudy 
(1980) argued in an attempt to explain this finding, that attributing to 
tension or stress is a safe explanation because it is difficult to dispute its 
presence since it is not easily measurable. Thus, Rudy (1980) suggested 
that by identifying stress as a cause might perhaps work to decrease 
feelings of self-blame and at the same time make it possible to extemahse 
the cause. This might indeed be the case, it would however, not fit with 
the identification of an externalised cause used in this research, as the 
judges who grouped the individual attributions for this study, grouped 
stress as a part of behavioural self blame.
Whatever the reason for this popular psycho-social cause might be, the 
significance of its importance can best be evaluated in relation to illness 
outcome. In this respect, attributing to stress has been found, at least in 
one study, to be predictive of greater morbidity in patients with MI 8 years 
following the illness onset (Affleck et al., 1987). Another study (Fielding, 
1987), found that patients with MI commonly attributed their illness to 
stress but at the same time rated it as less controllable than many other
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factors. Bearing these results in mind and considering the common belief 
by patients with MI, conformed in this study, that stress is a cause for their 
illness, it has to be considered valuable in rehabilitation and other health 
care to assess patients causal attributions which in turn might identify 
difficulties patients may experience.
Another present finding which was found to be related to previous 
research results (Meyer, 1983) showed that younger patients were more 
likely to attribute their MI to their own behaviour than older patients. 
Older patients were on the other hand more likely to attribute to God. This 
result is interesting considering the medical understanding of the causes for 
an MI (Jowett & Thompson, 1989). These results seem to fit the medical 
explanation, i.e., the older one gets the more likely they are to suffer an 
MI, while younger people are less prone to have an MI unless they 
practice risk factor behaviour. It could also be speculated that this result is 
due to a sense of vulnerability perceived more by younger patients. By 
attributing the illness to their ovm behaviour younger patients might feel in 
more control, i.e., they could change their behaviour for example by 
reducing risk factors, which might make them feel less vulnerable for 
reoccurrence of the illness, whereas for older patients the matter is in the 
hands of God.
Women were more likely to blame their own character for their illness than 
men, women were also more likely to attribute to biology, God and other 
people. These results could imply that women simply make more 
attributions than men, which could be due to the fact that women are less 
likely to suffer an MI than men are (Jowett & Thompson, 1989), and 
therefore their need for causal search might be greater than for men. It 
might be easier for male patients to find a cause as they have more people 
to compare themselves with, i.e., more men have MI than women, while 
women might be more confused in their causal search which results in 
more attributions being made.
Attributing to behavioural self blame was found to be related to higher 
distress levels at discharge. Considering that stress was grouped in the 
behavioural self blame category and keeping in mind previous research 
findings presented earlier, showing that attributing to stress was related to 
worse adjustment, the first explanation for this result might imply that this
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was due to attributions to stress alone. However, when testing this idea, 
attributing to stress on its own was not found to be related to higher levels 
of distress at discharge or at any other assessment time.
A possible explanation for this finding could however be, that attributing 
to behavioural self blame early following an illness onset is related to 
higher distress, while at a later stage this form of attributing is no longer 
associated with distress. This would hnply a "time x attributions" 
hypothesis as regards attributing to behavioural self blame and illness 
adjustment. As was pointed out in chapter 3 of this thesis, previous 
research, in particular studies assessing causal attributions following 
accidents have on the one hand, found self blame to be related to better 
adjustment when assessed 1 month to many years following the injury 
(Janoff-Buhnan & Wortman, 1977; Schulz & Decker, 1985. On the other 
hand, other studies have shown self blame to be associated with worse 
adjustment when examined close to the events onset (Kiecolt-Glaser & 
Wilhams, 1987; Frey et al., 1985). None of tliese studies did however, 
divide self blame into behavioural self blame vs. characterological self 
blame which could account for these differences, although the results 
found in the present study did not seem to support that idea. Nevertheless, 
it has to be considered a possibihty that these results could be due to tlie 
way behavioural self blame has been examined and categorised across 
different studies. If speculating, why attributing to behavioural self blame 
early following a negative event, such as MI, seems to be related to worse 
adjustment, this might imply that patients are distressed because of worries 
at an early stage about their ability to change their behaviour which if not 
carried out, could result in further health complications or illness 
recurrence. At a later stage blaming one's ovm behaviour for an event 
might be related to feelings of control, in particular if behaviour 
modification has been achieved, which in turn leaves this type of 
attribution no longer associated with distress. This explanation might 
apply as regards illness like MI and other curable illnesses, which in many 
cases require patients to make lifestyle changes. However, to be 
conclusive in tliis matter all these points need further examination.
Blaming one's own character for the MI was found to be related to higher 
distress at all assessment times. Characterological self blame at discharge 
was also found to be predictive of higher distress at all subsequent times.
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This finding replicates previous study results, which have shown that 
attributing an illness or other events to one's own character is associated 
with more distress (Janoff-Buhnan, 1979; Timko & Janoff-Buhnan, 1985; 
Major et al., 1985; Mueller & Major, 1989). This is an exciting result, as 
it appears that the research literature is on its way to identify a maladaptive 
causal attribution. This has been explained for example, by Janoff-Bulman 
(1979), as a result of perceived controllability over the factor(s) being 
blamed. Attributing to characterological self blame is predicted to be 
related to lack of control believes, which could therefore lead to worse 
adjustment, a kind of helplessness feeling. Also, Janoff-Bulman (1979) 
suggested that people who see their own character as a cause for a 
negative event are concerned with the past, not how they can avoid 
negative outcomes in the future, rather what it was about them that led to 
or resulted in a negative outcome. Characterological self blame could also 
be associated with poorer adjustment as a result of how unchangeable it 
might feel. Blaming one's own character, includes attributions to one's 
personality and character, i.e., how a person perceives themselves to be, 
which hardly allows any space for modification or control.
The results further showed that characterological self blame as an early 
response to an MI seemed to be particularly maladaptive, as it predicted 
subsequent distress. This point is worth further examination as it could 
have implications for rehabilitation.
As with characterological self blame, the attribution research literature 
could be on its way to identify a maladaptive attributional response as 
regards other blame. The present study, found other blame to be related 
to higher levels of distress both at discharge and at 6 mcmths post MI. 
This finding supports pervious research (Taylor et al., 1984; Affleck et a l, 
1987; Tennen & Affleck, 1990), which in the majority of cases has found 
blaming other people to be related to higher distress and worse general 
adjustment. As was outlined in chapter 3 (sub-section 3.1.10.), various 
explanations have been put forward in order to explain this finding, such as 
the psychodynamic theories of immaturity and the tlieory of excuse 
making. Considering that there is little evidence for other blame as a 
response to chronic illness, although the evidence that does exist has 
shown other blame to be linked witli poorer recovery and adjustment 
(Taylor et a l, 1984; Affleck et a l, 1987), the present finding could
235
perhaps best be explained by excuse theory. As outlined in chapter 3, 
excuse theory suggests that people try to distance themselves as 
responsible for a negative outcome and therefore, in order to externalise 
the cause they shift attributions from themselves to others. Bearing in 
mind what Tennen & Affleck (1990) argued to be among important 
components of other blame, i.e., the presence of another person at the time 
of the event and the authority, ability and knowledge of the person, excuse 
theory seems to fit best with other blame in the case of chronic illness. As 
chronic illness is unlikely to have a set starting point which the patient 
could link to another person, the patients might be more likely to be trying 
to distance themselves as responsible by blaming other people. This 
however, is associated with worse adjustment, in this case higher distress, 
as excuse theory points out, because even though the patient might see 
themselves as unlinked to the illness onset they are still faced with an 
illness. As the present study did not directly test excuse theory and its 
relation to other blame, the above points have to be considered only as 
speculations and in need of further examination. Nevertheless, the result 
remains that blaming other people for the illness was related to higher 
distress and therefore has to be considered an important empirical finding, 
in particular in the hght of previous research findings. A point worth 
addressing in relation to implications for cardiac rehabihtation.
8.3. How well did the measures perform?
As there is a growing interest in how assessment is carried out both in 
relation to coping strategies (see for example Parker & Endler, 1992) and 
causal attributions (see for example Tumquist et al, 1988 and Norman, 
1991) and how well or badly assessment tools perform, this section will 
briefly comment on the assessment instruments used in the present study.
The COPE (Carver et al., 1989), was used to examine how patients were 
coping witli the illness. As presented previously (see chapter 5), the 
COPE is a multidimensional coping assessment tool, designed to examine 
a variety of coping strategies. Patients main criticism of the COPE in this 
study, was how long and repetitive it was, they complained that they felt 
they were answering the same questions over and over again and that the 
questions sounded "silly" and boring. Most patients (over 60%) became
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irritated while answering the COPE and said they didn't understand the 
meaning of the questions. Some questions were particularly difficult, such 
as "I try to grow as a person as a result of this experience". As the COPE 
was not created and developed using a British population, it is likely that 
the wording of this question and a few others did not apply to the study 
participants. It might be that the COPE needs to be standardised for a 
British population in order for it to be used in a more successful 
administrative way.
At the 6 months follow up point the author decided to apply a different 
method in assessing coping. This was carried out mainly for three reasons: 
Firstly, concerns over the COPE’s vahdity, in other words, the author had a 
"bad" feeling that the COPE was not picking up how patients were 
actually coping with the illness. Secondly, it was considered important to 
examine how patients were coping with particular aspects of the illness, 
such as changing eating habits, stopping smoking etc. Thirdly, as a 
number of the patients asked (in an irritated voice), if they had to answer 
the COPE again, after having completed it on two occasions already, the 
author considered it "wise" not to include the COPE in the 6 months data 
collection, in case patients might refuse to continue participation in the 
study. As the 6 months coping data was not included in the findings 
presented in this thesis, the methodology used will only be described here 
briefly in order to explain its relationship to the COPE. This coping 
assessment was based on open ended questions asking each patient what 
they had done to manage a specific task, such as "What did you do to stop 
smoking?" All responses were tape recorded. The author then hstened to 
each recording, wrote down the responses and then coded them into either 
attention or avoidant coping. This data has not been analysed further, 
however based on the responses given the author felt confident that the 
COPE was actually performing well as regards assessment of coping, i.e., 
in the authors opinion the responses could have fitted into the 15 coping 
scales provided by the COPE, implying that the COPE was capable of 
detecting most forms of coping reported by this patient population.
Other issues in favour of the COPE, is the result of the two factor solution 
carried out in the present study including the COPE's 15 coping scales. 
This analysis showed that 13 of the coping scales presented by the COPE 
grouped together and fitted the distinction into attention coping on the one
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hand and avoidant coping on the other. This is an exciting result which 
implies that various different coping strategies do indeed group into two 
broader dimensions of coping, at least following illness, and the COPE is 
proving to be a valid measure of these two dimensions. It would be 
interesting to see whether this could be replicated in other studies using the 
COPE, and across different patient populations.
The general conclusion which could be drawn from the present study as 
regards the COPE as an assessment tool, implies that the COPE is a vaHd 
measure of coping but difficult to administer as a result of how long and 
repetitive it is.
The causal attribution assessment instrument (the CAUSE) used in this 
study, was a success story all the way, in particular as regards 
administration. No complaints were noted about this measure, on the 
contrary patients seemed quite happy and interested in answering the 
causal attribution questions. Whether that was due to how good the 
assessment tool was or simply because patients enjoyed wondering about 
what had caused their illness, remains to be said. However, keeping 
attribution theory in mind (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967), which predicts 
that majority of people will engage in attributional search following a 
negative life event, the latter explanation is probably more likely. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the CAUSE was an easy instrument to 
administer and quick to complete. Furtiiennore, this assessment tool 
examined causal attributions in a variety of ways, including both open 
ended and checklist questions. By using open ended questions before 
demonstrating a Hst of causes, it was possible to examine the patient's own 
causal thoughts and avoid demand effect created by using a list only.
The CAUSE has not been systematically standardised or validated 
however, if considering the present study and bearing in mind the judges' 
agreement while grouping the causal items, tlie instruments' consistency 
over time and its cross-validation across spontaneous, provoked and 
checklist assessment methods, the CAUSE'S validity could in fact be 
considered reasonably good. Furthermore, it is based on previous 
assessment tools which have been successfully used in previous research 
assessing causal attributions following illness (see chapter 5). The 
response format is not on an interval scale, which might be considered not
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to go in the instruments' favour. This kind of a response scale can 
sometimes be restricting as regards statistical analysis of the data. 
However, this was not found to be the case in the present study as the 
number of statistical methods available for non interval data includes a 
range of appropriate methods for the analysis which were required in this 
study.
Thus, the general conclusion drawn from the present study, would be to 
recommend the CAUSE as an assessment tool of causal attributions 
following MI.
Finally, no complaints were noted concemiug the distress measure, the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale ( HAD) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), 
which appeared to be easy to understand and administer.
8.4. How did the study findings relate to theory and what theoretical 
implications might they have?
One of the main theoretically based predictions of the present study was 
that causal attributions would predict patients' coping strategies. This 
prediction based on Leventhal's self regulation model (Leventhal et al., 
1984) was supported as far as characterological self blame and avoidant 
coping was concerned. Characterological self blame at one time was 
predictive of avoidant coping at subsequent times. The model does 
however, also predict that as a result of appraising the effectiveness of 
coping the representation (including causal attributions) can be changed, 
and in this manner coping could influence causal attributions. This was 
tested in the current research which showed that avoidant coping at 2 
months predicted both self character and behavioural self blame at 6 
months and using avoidant coping at discharge was found to be associated 
with behavioural self blame at 12 months. On the whole these findings 
seem to support Leventhal's self regulation model, however only as regards 
certain causal attributions and certain coping strategies. These results 
according to the model imply that blaming one's own character at 
discharge predicted avoidant coping at 2 months. The 2 months coping 
was then appraised and could therefore affect causal attributions at 6 
months, which it did, suggesting that 2 months avoidant coping was
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appraised as effective coping in some ways, i.e., leading to 
characterological self blame again at 6 months. However, in other ways it 
might have been appraised as ineffective, leading towards a change in 
causal attributions, i.e., the result that 2 months avoidant coping also 
predicted behavioural self blame at 6 months.
In general the research findings revealed in the present study could be 
taken as a support for Leventhal's self regulation model, at least as far as 
certain kinds of attributions are concerned, m this case characterological 
self blame and avoidant coping.
While referring back to Janoff-Bulman's (1979) explanation for why 
characterological self blame is related to higher levels of distress, the same 
explanation could account for why characterological self blame is related 
to and predictive of the use of avoidant coping. Those who blame their 
own character are likely, according to Janoff-Bulman's prediction (1979), 
to perceive little control over the illness and be concerned witli the past 
rather than the future. As this nature of characterological self blame 
hnphes that little can be done as a response to the event this miglit lead to 
the use of avoidant coping strategies, including feelings of withdrawing or 
giving up.
Patients' coping strategies were found to divide into two broader 
dimensions of coping, attention vs. avoidant coping, which were in turn 
shown to be related to different kinds of attributions and levels of distress. 
This finding clearly has hnpHcations for coping theory, in particular in the 
light of how the present results related to previous research findings, which 
in most cases have found avoidant coping to be linked to worse illness 
outcome (see previous discussion page 227). One of the main views of 
coping theory has been to divide coping into emotion vs. problem focused 
coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980), and assess coping in this manner in 
relation to outcome variables. Although, the present results do not 
minhnise the importance of the distinction into emotion vs. problem 
focused coping, they do provide, along with previous study findings, 
fiuther support and emphasise the importance of looking at and referring to 
coping in terms of attention vs. avoidant coping responses as well.
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As regards attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967), the results 
presented here, could be interpreted as having provided support for the 
prediction that majority of people engage in attributional search following 
a negative event. Over 80% of this patient population mentioned a cause 
for their illness when asked an open indirect question about what 
attributional ideas they had. Furthermore, the emphasis attribution theory 
(Kelley, 1967) places on the importance of feelings of control over tlie 
event, also found some support in the present study findings. The theory 
predicts that people are more likely to attribute to controllable factors. This 
finding could be seen in this population in the fact that the majority of 
patients attributed their illness to behavioural self blame, which provides 
them with some control, if applied, over both further health complications 
and/or recurrence of the illness.
Characterological self blame was found to be related to and predictive of 
higher levels of distress. This finding could imply support for the model 
of learned helplessness (Abramson et al., 1978) which predicts that people 
who attribute to mtemal, stable and global factors will show poorer 
adjustment. In this case attributing to characterological self blame is an 
mtemal attribution (something within the person themselves), stable 
(something that is persistent) and global (it can appear in a range of 
situations, not just one). This finding also provides support for Janoff- 
Bulman's (1979) distinction into self behaviour vs. characterological self 
blame in relation to adjustment. However, behavioural self blame was 
found to be related to higher distress levels at discharge which does not 
support a clear distinction between behavioural self blame and 
characterological self blame as regards distress. This result could, as was 
pointed out in section 8.2., be due to a time effect on behavioural self 
blame, which might suggest that the distinction into self character and 
behavioural self blame needs to take into account the tine an attribution is 
made, at least following illness. This idea does however, need further 
assessment.
8.5. Implications for the care and rehabilitation of cardiac patients.
As was pointed out in chapter 1 of this thesis, anxiety, depression and 
overall distress are considered among the most formidable problems in 
cardiac rehabilitation (Hackett & Cassem, 1974; Langosch, 1989).
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Furthermore, depression following MI has been found to be related to 
worse health outcome (Frasure-Smith & Prince, 1987). The results of the 
study presented here showed that both the use of avoidant coping and 
blaming ones own character for the illness onset as well as blaming other 
people, were either concurrently related to levels of distress and/or 
predictive of subsequent distress, explaining a considerable amount of the 
variance in distress, as high as 34%. These findings therefore have an 
important implication for the care and rehabilitation of cardiac patients. 
They imply that identifying ways of coping and patients' causal attributions 
could aid rehabilitation and the recovery process as they have been found 
ta  interact with levels of distress. If patients who used avoidant coping 
and/or attributed their illness to characterological self blame could be 
identified, problems as regards distress might be prevented. This appears 
to be particularly important early following the illness onset as blaming 
one's own character for the MI was found to predict higher subsequent 
distress levels. These findings could imply that providing training in 
altering certain attributions, such as characterological self blame, might be 
beneficial. However, as this study was not an intervention study one has to 
be aware of making too strong conclusions. It does although appear that 
some coping reactions and causal attributions are problematic as regards 
distress, it is however, difficult to say if others would be considerably 
better. These points are nevertheless worth investigating.
The present finding, showing that a number of patients were unable to 
recognise how different causes were related to each other, such as eating 
fatty foods and high levels of cholesterol, could also have implications for 
both rehabilitation and health education. As Norman (1991) pointed out, it 
is important to provide people with information on how different causal 
factors could be related in order for tliem to successfiilly manage to 
prevent further health problems. Furthermore, it is valuable for health care 
professionals and health educators to gain information on where there 
might be gaps in people's knowledge, as this might provide them with 
information as regards where education and rehabilitation should aim.
8.6. Implications for future research.
As mentioned in section 8.2., the current research found a support for the 
process oriented approach of coping. Coping was found to both change
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over time following the MI and across different stressful encounters. 
Although not suggesting that the trait approach to coping is not important, 
these results were not found to support the trait view of coping which 
assumes that coping is primarily a property of the person and variations m 
the stressful situation are of little importance. The results of the present 
study suggest that coping should be viewed and assessed as a changeable 
process affected both by time and situations, which implies a need for 
longitudinal studies in the assessment of coping rather than cross- 
sectional research, in particular following a chronic condition. This same 
argument apphes to attributional research, as causal attributions were 
found to change as time passed. Furthermore, longitudinal studies are 
required in order to assess whether behavioural self blame is mediated by 
time as regards adjustment.
A limitation of the present study concerns the issue that its findings can 
only be applied to patients with MI, they can not be generalised to other 
patient populations. Whether other populations experiencing matching 
stressful events would respond in a similar manner has to be left unsaid. 
However, assessing this issue is an interesting and an important task for 
future research.
Whether findings can be rephcated across different study populations will 
at least to some degree rely on the assessment tools chosen for each study. 
It would for example, be interesting to see if the COPE’s coping scales 
continue in other studies, to group into two dimensions of attention vs. 
avoidant coping. Furthermore, based on the present findings, a 
consideration for future research includes assessing whether 
characterological self blame is related to and predictive of adjustment in 
different populations. However, in order to provide comparable results, 
characterological self blame needs to be defined, categorised and coded in 
the same manner across different studies.
The results of this study, in particular in relation to causal attributions, also 
provide interesting questions as regards otlier variables. For example, if 
attributions predict distress do tliey also predict other outcomes, such as
lifestyle changes? Furthermore, in the hght of the present finding, winch 
showed that coping did not predict the other variables, it might be a task 
for future research to examine what, apart from distress, influences and 
motivates coping.
Finally, in order to make use of results gained in studies like the one 
presented here and others similar, future research needs to aim towards 
intervention studies where the benefits of training in coping and causal 
attributions following illness could be assessed.
8.7. Conclusion.
In the year following a first MI patients' causal attributions were found to 
predict their coping strategies, in particular avoidant coping, providing 
support for Leventhal's self regulation model. Causal attributions, such as 
characterological self blame and other blame were also found to be related 
to and/or predictive of subsequent higher levels of anxiety, depression and 
overall distress. Coping strategies were not found to predict subsequent 
distress, they were however, concurrently associated with distress at all 
assessment times.
With regard to care and rehabilitation of cardiac patients the results of this 
study point towards the importance of examining and, if necessary altering 
certain causal attributions and coping strategies m order for the patient to 
gain the best possible recovery.
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APPENDIX I
Introduction To The Study 
&
Patient Information Sheet
Introduction to the study.
I wonder if I could tell you about a study we are doing here at the hospital. We 
are doing the study because we want to give the best possible care to people 
who have had a heart attack.
Now there are three possible ways in which we can give advice and support. 
We are reasonably confident that the advice we give here now, as it stands, it 
good, but we are trying to find the best time to target the advice. So what we 
want to do is try three different ways of giving information to people.
One way is the standard advice that you would receive here, and everyone 
entering the study will still get the standard care.
A second possibility is that perhaps it would be beneficial to receive additional 
advice and support whilst in hospital. So the second group would get the 
standard care plus additional counselling from the Cardiac Recovery Sister.
A third possibility is that people may benefit from support after they go home. 
So the third group would receive standard care plus support from the Recovery 
Sister in hospital and after they go home. She would see them weekly for up to 
six weeks after they go home.
As I say, we do not know which of these methods is best for people and this 
study will hopefully give us that information. We are also interested in the 
effects of the heart attack on your partner - so they would be included in the 
study and also receive the advice and support.
People who enter the study will be asked to answer some questions whilst they 
are in the hospital and will also be seen at home 3 times - after 2 months, 6 
months and 1 year, so I will follow you up to see how you are getting on.
The information you give will be completely confidential and I would not 
divulge it to anybody else.
First of all we are asking people if they are prepared to agree to be in any of the 
three groups. If you are prepared to participate in the study the decision about 
which group you will be in will be made at random - that means that the 
recovery sister wül open an envelope to see which group you will be in. I 
would not know which group it will be as I will be following you up. The 
choice will be decided when you enter the study.
You don't have to take part in the study and if you don't take part you will 
receive the standard care.
I have a summary written down here that you can keep.
Do you think it is something you would like to take part in?
Do you have any questions that I could answer?
(Joan Foulkes, 1991).
Patient Information Sheet
You, or your partner, has recently suffered a heart attack, and you may have 
several questions about how this could affect you. The staff are involved in a 
study which is designed to compare the different methods o f giving information 
and advice.
Before deciding to participate in this study you should have read, or have read 
to you, this information sheet and consider it carefully. Any questions that you  
may have w ill be answered by the research nurse.
Purpose o f the studv.
The purpose o f the study is to evaluate the effects o f information and 
counselling, provided for patients and their partners following a heait attack. If 
you agree to participate you and your partner w ül be allocated at random into 
one o f three groups.
1 The first group w ill receive standard rehabilitation advice as currently
practised.
2. The second group w ül be follow ed up in the ward by the nurse
counsellor and also received information atid counselling from her. The 
program w ill have a standard care but the content and tuning o f the sessions 
w ill, as far as possible, be tailored to your individual needs.
3. The third group wül receive follow  up by the nurse counsellor, both in
hospital and on an out-patient basis for up to 2 months. This may necessitate 
out-patient visits to the hospital and/or home visits by the nurse counsellor, but 
this WÜ1 be negotiated on an individual basis.
I f you agree to participate, the effects o f the package w ül be assessed by 
interview/questionnaire at a 2 month, 6 month and 1 year period.
Consent and Withdrawal.
You may refuse consent to participate or withdraw from this study at any time 
without prejudice to your care and you are not obliged to state your reasons.
Confidentialitv.
Your confidentiality w ill be maintained at all times. Names w ill not be used in 
any publications which may arise from this study.
(Joan Foulkes, 1991)
APPENDIX II 
Consent Form
Consent Form.
Cardiac Recovery Studv.
I have read (have had read) the description of the study and Mly 
understand what this study will involve. I agree to participate in this study 
on the understanding that my refusal to be included in this study will not 
affect my treatment in any way and that 1 may withdraw from the study at 
any time without prejudice.
Patient's signature date
Patient's name (printed)
Partner's signature date
Partner's name (printed)
Witness's signature date
Witness's name (printed)
APPENDIX III 
Follow-up Letter
Mr or Mrs X 
00 SomeÜiing Road 
Scotland
Dear X,
Cardiac Recovery Study
Thank you for your support with the above study, I will telephone you 
shortly in order to arrange a suitable time to visit and complete die next 
follow up interview.
We are grateful for your continued support and appreciate you giving your 
time to help with our research.
Yours sincerely
  !
Hafrun Guômundsdôttir !
APPENDIX IV
Questionnaires 
(Cope, Cause & HAD)
COPE (as used at discharge and at 2 mth follow up>.
Now we are wanting to know how you are coping with your heart attack (at this point 
in time), the particular situation you are in now. We will go through this list with your 
heart attack in mind. You can respond by saying either;
1 - 1  don't do this at all 3 = I do this a medium amount. 
2 = I do this a little bit 4 - 1 do this a lot
1. I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience. 1 2  3 4
2. I turn to work or other substitute activities to take my mind
off things. 1 2  3 4
3. I get upset and let my emotions out. 1 2  3 4
4. I try to get advice from someone about what to do. 1 2  3 4
5. I concentrate my efforts on doing something about it. 1 2  3 4
6. I say to myself’’this isn't real.” 1 2  3 4
7. I put my trust in God. 1 2  3 4
8. I laugh about the situation. 1 2  3 4
9. I admit to myself that I can’t deal with it, and quit trying. 1 2  3 4
10.1 restrain myself from doing anything too quickly. 1 2  3 4
11.1 discuss my feelings with someone. 1 2  3 4
12.1 use alcohol or drugs to make myself feel better. 1 2  3 4
13.1 get used to the idea that it happened. 1 2  3 4
14.1 talk to someone to find out more about the situation. 1 2  3 4
15.1 keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities. 1 2  3 4
16.1 daydream about things other than this. 1 2  3 4
17.1 get upset, and am really aware of it. 1 2  3 4
18.1 seek God's help. 1 2  3 4
19.1 make a plan o f action. 1 2  3 4
2 0 .1 make jokes about it. 1 2  3 4
21.1 accept that this has happened and that it can't be changed. 1 2  3 4
22 .1 hold off doing anything about it until the situation permits. 1 2  3 4
23 .1 tiy to get emotional support from friends or relatives. 1 2  3 4
24 .1 just give up trying to reach my goal. 1 2  3 4
25 .1 take additional action to try to get rid of the problem. 1 2  3 4
26 .1 try to lose myself for a while by drinking alcohol or taking drugs. 1 2  3 4
27 .1 refuse to believe that it has happened. 1 2  3 4
2 8 .1 let my feeling out. 1 2  3 4
29 .1 try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 1 2  3 4
3 0 .1 talk to someone who could do something concrete about the
problem. 1 2  3 4
1 = 1 don't do this at all. 3 = I do this a medium amount.
2 = I do this a little bit. 4 = I do this a lot.
3 1 .1 sleep more than usual. 1 2  3 4
3 2 .1 try to come up with a strategy about what to do. 1 2  3 4
33.1 focus on dealing with this problem, and if necessary let other
things slide a little. 1 2  3 4
34 .1 get sympathy and understanding from someone. 1 2  3 4
35.1 drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less. 1 2  3 4
3 6 .1 kid around about it. 1 2  3 4
3 7 .1 give up the attempt to get what I want. 1 2  3 4
38 .1 look for something good in what is happening. 1 2  3 4
3 9 .1 think about how I might best handle the problem. 1 2  3 4
4 0 .1 pretend that it hasn't really happened. 1 2  3 4
4 1 .1 make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon. 1 2  3 4
4 2 .1 try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts
at dealing with this. 1 2  3 4
4 3 .1 go to movies or watch TV, to think about it less. 1 2  3 4
4 4 .1 accept the reality of the fact that it happened. 1 2  3 4
4 5 .1 ask people who have had similar experiences what they did. 1 2  3 4
4 6 .1 feel a lot o f emotional distress and find myself expressing those
feelings a lot. 1 2  3 4
4 7 .1 take direct action to get around the problem. 1 2  3 4
4 8 .1 try to find comfort in my religion. 1 2  3 4
4 9 .1 force myself to wait for the right time to do something. 1 2  3 4
50 .1 make fun o f the situation. 1 2  3 4
51.1 reduce the amount o f effort I'm putting into solving the problem.
52 .1 talk to someone about how I feel.
53 .1 use alcohol or drugs to help me get through it.
54 .1 learn to live with it.
55 .1 put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this.
5 6 .1 think hard about what steps to take.
5 7 .1 act as though it hasn't even happened.
58 .1 do what has to be done, one step at a time.
5 9 .1 learn something from the experience.
60 .1 pray more than usual.
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
COPE fat 12 mth follow up).
We are interested in seeing how you are coping with your heart attack now and also 
looking back over the year how von cooed with it. In this case we will go over the 
questions with those two things in mind, i.e., how you are coping with the heart attack 
now and also looking back over the whole year how you coped.
1= 1  don't (didn't) do this at all. 3 = I do (did) this a medium amount.
2 = I do (did) this a little bit. 4 = I do (did) this a lot.
Now_______ The year
1. I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
2. I turn to work or other substitute activities to take my
mind off things. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
3. I get upset and let my emotions out. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
4. I try to get advice from someone about what to do. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
5. I concentrate my efforts on doing something about it. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
6. I say to myself "this isn't real.” 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
7. I put my trust in God. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
8. I laugh about the situation. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
9. I admit to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit
trying. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
10.1 restrain myself from doing anything too quickly. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
11.1 discuss my feelings with someone. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
12.1 use alcohol or drugs to make myself feel better. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
13.1 get used to the idea that it happened. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
14.1 talk to someone to find out more about the situation. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
15.1 keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or
activities. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
16.1 daydream about things other than this. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
17.1 get upset, and am really aware o f it. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
18.1 seek God's help. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
19.1 make a plan o f action. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
20 .1 make jokes about it. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2 1 .1 accept that this has happened and that it can't be changed. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
22 .1 hold off doing anything about it until the situation
permits 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2 3 .1 try to get emotional support from friends or
relatives. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
24 .1 just give up trying to reach my goal. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
25 .1 take additional action to try to get rid of the
problem. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
26 .1 try to lose myself for a while by drinking alcohol or taking
drugs. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
27 .1 refuse to believe that it has happened. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2 8 .1 let my feeling out. 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4
2 9 .1 try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more
positive. 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1= 1  don't (didn't) do this at all. 3 = I do (did) this a medium amount. 
2 = I do (did) this a little bit. 4 = I do (did) this a lot.
3 0 .1 talk to someone who could do something concrete 
about the problem.
31.1 sleep more than usual.
3 2 .1 try to come up with a strategy about what to do.
33 .1 focus on dealing with this problem, and if necessary let 
other things slide a little.
34 .1 get sympathy and understanding from someone.
35.1 drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about 
it less.
36 .1 kid around about it.
37 .1 give up the attempt to get what I want.
38 .1 look for something good in what is happening.
39 .1 think about how I might best handle the problem.
40 .1 pretend that it hasn't really happened.
41.1 make sure not to make matters worse by acting too 
soon.
4 2 .1 try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my 
efforts at dealing with this.
43 .1 go to movies or watch TV, to think about it less.
4 4 .1 accept the reality of the fact that it happened.
4 5 .1 ask people who have had similar experiences what 
they did.
46 .1 feel a lot o f emotional distress and find myself expressing 
those feelings a lot.
47 .1 take direct action to get around the problem.
48 .1 try to find comfort in my religion.
49 .1 force myself to wait for the right time to do 
something.
50 .1 make fim o f the situation.
51.1 reduce the amount of effort I'm putting into solving the 
problem.
52.1 talk to someone about how I feel.
53 .1 use alcohol or drugs to help me get through it.
54 .1 learn to live with it.
55 .1 put aside other activities in order to concentrate on 
this.
56 .1 think hard about what steps to take.
57 .1 act as though it hasn't even happened.
58 .1 do what has to be done, one step at a time.
59 .1 leam something from the experience.
60 .1 pray more than usual.
Now The Year
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
COPE (30 itemsk
We are also interested in seeing how you usually cope with other difficult or stressful 
situations in your life. The response format is the same as before but this time you tell 
me how you usually cope.
1= 1  usually don't do this at all. 
2 = 1 usually do this a little bit.
3 = 1  usually do this a medium amount. 
4 = 1 usually do this a lot.
1 .1 turn to work or other substitute activities to take my
mind off things. 1 2  3 4
2 .1 concentrate my efforts on doing something about it. 1 2  3 4
3 .1 say to myself "this isn't real.” 1 2  3 4
4 .1 put my trust in God. 1 2  3 4
5 .1 laugh about the situation. 1 2  3 4
6 .1 discuss my feelings with someone. 1 2  3 4
7 .1 talk to someone to find out more about the situation. 1 2  3 4
8 .1 daydream about things other than this. 1 2  3 4
9 .1 get upset, and am really aware of it. 1 2  3 4
10.1 seek God's help. 1 2  3 4
11.1 make jokes about it. 1 2  3 4
12.1 accept that this has happened and that it can't be changed. 1 2  3 4
13.1 hold off doing anything about it until the situation permits. 1 2  3 4
14.1 let my feeling out. 1 2  3 4
15.1 try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more
positive. 1 2  3 4
16.1 talk to someone who could do something concrete about the 
problem. 1 2  3 4
17.1 try to come up with a strategy about what to do. 1 2  3 4
18.1 focus on dealing with this problem, and if necessary let other
things slide a little. 1 2  3 4
19.1 drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less. 1 2  3 4
20 .1 give up the attempt to get what I want. 1 2  3 4
21 .1 pretend that it hasn't really happened. 1 2  3 4
22 .1 make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon. 1 2  3 4
23 .1 try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at 
dealing with this. 1 2  3 4
2 4 .1 accept the reality of the fact that it happened. 1 2  3 4
2 5 .1 reduce the amount o f effort I'm putting into solving the
problem. 1 2  3 4
2 6 .1 talk to someone about how I feel. 1 2  3 4
2 7 .1 use alcohol or drugs to help me get through it. 1 2  3 4
2 8 .1 think hard about what steps to take. 1 2  3 4
2 9 .1 do what has to be done, one step at a time. 1 2  3 4
30. I learn something from the experience. 1 2  3 4
CAUSE
(The causai attribution questionnaire as it was presented at discharge data 
collection nointk
1. I wonder if you could tell me, when you think about your illness what do you think 
about?
2. Many people who have had a heart attack, develop some sort o f ideas about how 
they got it. In other words, even though we don’t know all the causes o f a heart attack, 
most people have some ideas or theoiy about why they have it. I wonder what kind of 
ideas you have had?
3. Which one of the following do you think may have caused your heart attack? (The 
examiner reads out each item and the response format).
1. Myself No Might have Yes
2. Other people No Might have Yes
3. Stress No Might have Yes
4. Worry No Might have Yes
5. Eating fatty foods No Might have Yes
6. Type of work that I do/did No Might have Yes
7. Overwork No Might have Yes
8. Working too hard No Might have Yes
9. High levels of cholesterol No Might have Yes
10. It is in my family No Might have Yes
11. Stress at work No Might have Yes
12. Smoking No Might have Yes
13. Being overweight No Might have Yes
14. By chance No Might have Yes
15. Fate No Might have Yes
16. High blood pressure No Might have Yes
17. Poor diet No Might have Yes
18. Environmental factors No Might have Yes
19. Nerves No Might have Yes
20. Arguing with people No Might have Yes
21. Over exertion or sudden exercise No Might have Yes
22. Lack of exercise No Might have Yes
23. Driving or being caught up in heavy traffic No Might have Yes
24. Depression No Might have Yes
25. Drinking excessive amounts o f alcohol No Might have Yes
26. By the way other people treat me. No Might have Yes
27. Listening to other people's problems No Might have Yes
28. Punishment for doing wrong No Might have Yes
29. Payment for sins No Might have Yes
30. Bad luck No Might have Yes
31. The kind of person I am No Might have Yes
32. Will of God No Might have Yes
33. Problems with my children No Might have Yes
34. Problems with my spouse No Might have Yes
4. Is there anything else that you would like to add to this list that you think might 
have caused your heart attack?
Yes No
If Yes, what?___________________________________________________________
5. Now lets look at the causes you have said yes to and pick out the ones you think 
are the most important. Please, pick out the 3 most important causes of your heart 
attack. Order them, the one you think is the most important first, the second most 
important next and so on.
1.__________________________________________
2 .__________________________________________
3.
6. Do you think these things have gone together to cause your illness or do you think 
that one has led to another, that one cause may have caused another?
CAUSE
(The causal attribution questionnaire as it was presented at 2 ,6  and 12 months follow u p ) .
1. I wonder if you could tell me, when you think about your illness what do you think 
about?
2. Many people who have had a heart attack, develop some sort of ideas about how 
they got it. In other words, even though we don't know all the causes of a heart attack, 
most people have some ideas or theory about why they have it. I wonder what kind of 
ideas you have had?
3. Which one of the following do you think may have caused your heart attack? (The 
causal attribution checklist is handed to the patient for them to choose from).
MIGHT HAVE YES
No. No.
4. Is there anything else that you would like to add to this list that you think might 
have caused your heart attack?
Yes No
If Yes, what?___________________________________________________________
5. Now lets look at the causes you have said yes to and pick out the ones you think 
are the most important. Please, pick out the 3 most important causes of your heart 
attack. Order them, the one you think is the most important first, the second most 
important next and so on.
1.__________________________________________
2 .__________________________________________
3.
6. Do you think these things have gone together to cause your illness or do you think 
that one has led to another, that one cause may have caused another?
1. Myself
2. Other people
3. Stress
4. Worry
5. Eating fatty foods
6. Type of work that I do/did
7. Overwork
8. Working too hard
9. High levels o f cholesterol
10. It is in my family
11. Stress at work
12. Smoking
13. Being overweight
14. By chance
15. Fate
16. High blood pressure
17. Poor diet
18. Environmental factors
19. Nerves
20. Arguing with people
21. Over exertion or sudden exercise
22. Lack of exercise
23. Driving or being caught up in heavy traffic
24. Depression
25. Drinking excessive amounts o f alcohol
26. By the way other people treat me
27. Listening to other people's problems
28. Punishment for doing wrong
29. Payment for sins
30. Bad luck
31. The kind of person I am
32. Will o f God
33. Problems with my children
34. Problems with my spouse
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Health care professionals are aware that emotions play an important part in most illnesses. If they 
know about those feelings they will be able to help you more. The following questions are designed to 
help them to know how you feel. We would like to start by asking you to think about how you are 
feeling now and ask you to answer the following questions with that in mind.
I feci tense or "wound up":
Most of the time...................
A lot of tlie time...................
Time to time, occasionally....
Not at alt.........................
I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:
Definitely as much.......
Not quite so much........
Only a little................
Hardly at all...............
I get a sort of frightened feeling as if 
something awful is about to happen;
Very definitely and quite badly.
A lot of the time................
Time to time, occasionally...
Not at all  .....................
I can laugh and see the funny side of 
things:
As much as I always could.....
Not quite so much now...........
Definitely not so much now.... 
Not at all.............. ............
Worrying thoughts go through my mind:
A great deal of the time....
A lot of the time................
From time to time but not too
often.........................
Only occasionally  ...........
I feel cheerful:
Not at all........................
Not often........................
Sometimes.....................
Most of tlie time............
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed:
Definitely.........................
Usually...........................
Not often.........................
Not at all  .......... ............
1 feel as if I am slowed down:
Nearly all the time..
Very often.............
Sometimes............
Not at all............. .
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1 get a sort of frightened feeling like "butterflies" in 
the stomach:
Not at all............ .
Occasionally.......
Quite often .
Very often...........
I have lost interest in my appearance:
Definitely............
Very often. .
Sometimes..........
Not at all.............
I feel restless as if I have to be on the move:
Very much indeed..
Quite a lot............
Not very much......
Not at all..............
I look forward with enjoyment to things:
As much as I ever did.....
Rather less than I used to. 
Definitely less tlian I
used to..........................
Hardly at all..................
1 get sudden feelings of panic:
Very often indeed..........
Quite often....................
Not very often.............. .
Not at all................ .
I can enjoy a good book or TV programme:
Often............................
Sometimes.....................
Not often.....................
Very seldom..................
1 = 1
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APPENDIX V 
Data Coding Instructions
Data Codigg Instructions For Checklist Causal Attributions.
Could you please help uie witli tlie following. I am trying to categorise the 
items appearing on the next page. These items are causal attributions and 
each one needs to be put into one category.
The categorise are as follows:
Behavioural se lf blame: refers to when self-blame focuses on ones own 
behaviour. Individuals can blame themselves for having engaged in (or 
having failed to engage in) a particular activity, thereby attributing blame 
to past behaviours = behavioural self blame (Janoff-Bulman,1979).
Characterological self blame: refers to when self-blame focuses on ones 
character, an overall view of the kind of people individuals perceive 
themselves to be. Individuals can blame themselves for the kind of people 
they are, thereby faulting their character = characterological self blame 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1979).
Other-blame: refers to when other people are blamed for the 
situation/event.
Circumstances: refers to when the focus is on circumstances or the 
environment.
Biology: this category refers to when causes are focused on the individuals 
biology.
Chance: chance or fate are the focus of attributions.
God: God or religious beliefs are the focus of the attribution.
Please, put the number of the items on the line so that each item 
belongs to one category and only one.
Behavioural self 
blame:
Characterological self 
blame:
Other blame:__
Circumstances:
Biology:_____
Chance:______
God:
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